ARCHIVED CONTENT
You are viewing ARCHIVED CONTENT released online between 1 April 2010 and 24 August 2018 or content that has been selectively archived and is no longer active. Content in this archive is NOT UPDATED, and links may not function.By Herbert L. Roitblat, Ph.D.
In which I argue that how you cooked your eDiscovery turkey in the laboratory may not be a good indicator of its taste when served from your kitchen.
In an article in Federal Court Law Review, Maura Grossman and Gordon Cormack critique Karl Schieneman and Thomas Gricks’ analysis of the implications of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(g) for the use of Computer Assisted Review (CAR or Technology Assisted Review, TAR). Put simply, (among other things) Schieneman and Gricks argue that one should measure the outcome of eDiscovery efforts to assess their reasonableness, and Grossman and Cormack argue that such measurement is unnecessary under certain conditions.
Rather, Grossman and Cormack argue, attorneys should rely on scientific studies of the efficacy of CAR/TAR systems based on an analogy to the Daubert standard. They argue that evaluating the success of eDiscovery is burdensome and can be misleading. They liken the process of eDiscovery to that of roasting a turkey.
By my analysis the turkey analogy may be appropriate, but the Grossman and Cormack analysis does not stand up to its own criteria. Grossman and Cormack are mistaken about the burden required to measure the efficacy of eDiscovery processes. In this discussion, I will focus on Grossman and Cormack’s scientific arguments.
Read the complete article at: Daubert, Rule 26(g) and the eDiscovery Turkey
