1	Draft NIST Special Publication 800-218
2	Secure Software Development
3	Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1:
	Recommendations for Mitigating the Risk of Software
4 5	Vulnerabilities
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52

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85	National Institute of Standards and Technology
86	Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory
87	100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
88	Email: <u>ssdf@nist.gov</u>
89	All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

90

101

Reports on Computer Systems Technology

91 The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and

92 Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical

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98 federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research,

99 guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities

100 with industry, government, and academic organizations.

Abstract

102 Few software development life cycle (SDLC) models explicitly address software security in

103 detail, so secure software development practices usually need to be added to each SDLC model

104 to ensure that the software being developed is well-secured. This document recommends the

105 Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) – a core set of high-level secure software

106 development practices that can be integrated into each SDLC implementation. Following these

107 practices should help software producers reduce the number of vulnerabilities in released

108 software, mitigate the potential impact of the exploitation of undetected or unaddressed

109 vulnerabilities, and address the root causes of vulnerabilities to prevent future recurrences.

110 Because the framework provides a common vocabulary for secure software development,

111 software purchasers and consumers can also use it to foster communications with suppliers in

- 112 acquisition processes and other management activities.
- 113

Keywords

secure software development; Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF); secure

- 115 software development practices; software acquisition; software development; software
- 116 development life cycle (SDLC); software security.
- 117Trademark Information
- 118 All registered trademarks or trademarks belong to their respective organizations.

119

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120 The authors thank all of the organizations and individuals who provided input for this update to

121 the SSDF. In response to Section 4 of Executive Order (EO) 14028 on "Improving the Nation's

122 <u>Cybersecurity</u>," NIST held a <u>June 2021 workshop</u> and received <u>over 150 position papers</u>, many

- of which suggested secure software development practices, tasks, examples of implementations, and references for consideration for this SSDF update. The authors appreciate all of those
- suggestions, as well as the inputs from those who spoke at the workshop or attended the
- 126 workshop and shared their thoughts during or after the workshop.
- 127 The authors also wish to thank all of the individuals and organizations who provided comments
- 128 on drafts of the original version of the SSDF, including the Administrative Offices of the U.S.
- 129 Courts, The Aerospace Corporation, BSA | The Software Alliance, Capitis Solutions, the

130 Consortium for Information & Software Quality (CISQ), HackerOne, Honeycomb Secure

131 Systems, iNovex, Ishpi Information Technologies, the Information Security and Privacy

132 Advisory Board (ISPAB), Juniper Networks, Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance (MITA),

- 133 Microsoft, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the National Institute of Standards and
- 134 Technology (NIST), Northrop Grumman, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for

135 Research and Engineering, Red Hat, the Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code

136 (SAFECode), and the Software Engineering Institute (SEI).

137

Audience

138 There are two primary audiences for this document. The first is software producers (e.g.,

139 commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] product vendors, government-off-the-shelf [GOTS] software

140 developers, custom software developers) regardless of size, sector, or level of maturity. The

second is software purchasers and consumers, both federal agencies and other organizations.

142 Readers of this document are not expected to be experts in secure software development in order

143 to understand it, but such expertise is required to implement its recommended practices.

Personnel within the following Workforce Categories and Specialty Areas from the National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework [SP800181]
are most likely to find this publication of interest:

- Securely Provision (SP): Risk Management (RSK), Software Development (DEV),
 Systems Requirements Planning (SRP), Test and Evaluation (TST), Systems
 Development (SYS)
- Operate and Maintain (OM): Systems Analysis (ANA)
- Oversee and Govern (OV): Training, Education, and Awareness (TEA); Cybersecurity
 Management (MGT); Executive Cyber Leadership (EXL); Program/Project Management
 (PMA) and Acquisition
- Protect and Defend (PR): Incident Response (CIR), Vulnerability Assessment and Management (VAM)
- Analyze (AN): Threat Analysis (TWA), Exploitation Analysis (EXP)

157	Note to Reviewers		
158 159	The authors welcome feedback on any part of this document but are particularly interested in the following:		
160 161 162	• Do the SSDF practices, tasks, and implementation examples fit well into your current software development practices? Are there any conflicts or gaps that the SSDF should address?		
163 164	• Should the SSDF practices and tasks involving software integration, building, and delivery be split so that integration is separate from building and delivery?		
165 166 167	• What types of artifacts and evidence can be captured, documented, and shared publicly as byproducts of implementing the secure software development practices? Are there examples you can share?		
168	If you are from a standards developing organization or another organization that has produced a		
169	set of secure practices, and you would like to map your secure software development standard or		
170	guidance to the SSDF, please contact the authors at <u>ssdf@nist.gov</u> . They would like to introduce		
171	you to the National Online Informative References Program (OLIR) so that you can submit your		
172	mapping there to augment the existing set of informative references.		

Call for Patent Claims 173 174 This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use 175 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information 176 Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also 177 178 includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications 179 relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents. 180 ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, 181 in written or electronic form, either: 182 a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold 183 and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or 184 b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to 185 applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance 186 or requirements in this ITL draft publication either: 187 i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair 188 discrimination; or 189 ii. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are 190 demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. 191 Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances 192 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the

assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on

the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of

195 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

196 The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest

197 regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.

198 Such statements should be addressed to: <u>ssdf@nist.gov</u>

199 Executive Summary

This document describes a set of fundamental, sound practices for secure software development called the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF). Organizations should integrate the SSDF throughout their existing software development practices, express their secure software development requirements to third-party suppliers using SSDF conventions, and acquire software that meets the practices described in the SSDF. Using the SSDF helps organizations to meet the following secure software development recommendations:

- Organizations should ensure that their people, processes, and technology are prepared to perform secure software development.
- Organizations should protect all components of their software from tampering and unauthorized access.
- Organizations should produce well-secured software with minimal security vulnerabilities in its releases.
- Organizations should identify residual vulnerabilities in their software releases and
 respond appropriately to address those vulnerabilities and prevent similar ones from
 occurring in the future.
- The SSDF does not prescribe exactly how to implement each practice. The focus is on the outcomes of the practices rather than on the tools, techniques, and mechanisms to do so. This means that the SSDF can be used by organizations in any sector or community, regardless of size
- 218 or cybersecurity sophistication. It can be used for any type of software development, regardless
- 219 of technology, platform, programming language, or operating environment.
- 220 The SSDF defines only a high-level subset of what organizations may need to do, so
- 221 organizations should consult the references and other resources for additional information on
- 222 implementing the practices. Not all practices are applicable to all use cases; organizations should
- adopt a risk-based approach to determine what practices are relevant, appropriate, and effective
- to mitigate the threats to their software development practices.
- 225 Organizations can communicate how they are meeting the clauses from section 4 of the
- 226 President's Executive Order (EO) on "Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity (14028)" using the
- 227 SSDF practices and tasks described in Appendix A.

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241 **1** Introduction

242 A software development life cycle (SDLC)¹ is a formal or informal methodology for designing, creating, and maintaining software (including code built into hardware). There are many models 243 for SDLCs, including waterfall, spiral, agile, and - in particular - agile combined with software 244 245 development and IT operations (DevOps) practices. Few SDLC models explicitly address 246 software security in detail, so secure software development practices usually need to be added to 247 and integrated into each SDLC model. Regardless of which SDLC model is used, secure 248 software development practices should be integrated throughout it for three reasons: to reduce 249 the number of vulnerabilities in released software, to mitigate the potential impact of the 250 exploitation of undetected or unaddressed vulnerabilities, and to address the root causes of 251 vulnerabilities to prevent recurrences.

- 252 Most aspects of security can be addressed multiple times within an SDLC, but in general, the
- 253 earlier in the SDLC that security is addressed, the less effort and cost is ultimately required to
- achieve the same level of security. This principle, also known as *shifting left*, is critically
- 255 important regardless of the SDLC model. Shifting left minimizes any technical debt that would
- 256 require remediating early security flaws late in development or after the software is in
- 257 production.
- 258 There are many existing documents on secure software development practices, including those
- 259 listed in the <u>References</u> section. This document does not introduce new practices or define new
- 260 terminology; instead, it describes a set of recommended high-level practices based on established
- standards, guidance, and secure software development practice documents. These practices,
- 262 collectively called the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF), are intended to help
- the target audiences achieve secure software development objectives. Many of the practices
- 264 directly involve the software itself, while others indirectly involve it (e.g., securing the
- 265 development environment).
- 266 Future work may expand on these recommendations, potentially covering topics such as how the
- 267 SSDF may apply to and vary for particular software development methodologies and associated
- 268 practices like DevOps and how an organization can transition from using just their current
- 269 software development practices to also incorporating the practices specified by the SSDF. Future
- work will likely take the form of use cases so that the insights will be more readily applicable to
- 271 various types of development environments.
- 272 This document identifies and recommends secure software development practices but does not
- 273 prescribe exactly how to implement them. The focus is on the outcomes of the practices to be
- 274 implemented rather than on the tools, techniques, and mechanisms used to do so. Advantages of
- 275 specifying the practices at a high level include the following:

¹ Note that SDLC is also widely used for "system development life cycle." All usage of "SDLC" in this document is referencing software, not systems.

276 277	• Can be used by organizations in any sector or community, regardless of size or cybersecurity sophistication
278 279	• Can be applied to software developed to support information technology (IT), industrial control systems (ICS), cyber-physical systems (CPS), or the Internet of Things (IoT)
280 281 282	• Can be integrated into any existing software development workflow and automated toolchain; should not negatively affect organizations that already have robust, secure software development practices in place
283 284 285	• Makes the practices broadly applicable, not specific to particular technologies, platforms, programming languages, SDLC models, development environments, operating environments, tools, etc.
286 287	• Can help an organization document its secure software development practices today and define its future target practices as part of its continuous improvement process
288 289 290	• Can assist an organization currently using a classic software development model in transitioning its secure software development practices for use with a modern software development model (e.g., agile, DevOps)
291 292	• Can assist organizations that are procuring and using software to understand secure software development practices employed by their suppliers
293 294 295 296 297 298	This document also provides a common language to describe fundamental secure software development practices. This is similar to the approach taken by the <i>Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity</i> , also known as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [NISTCSF]. ² Expertise in secure software development is not required to understand the practices. The common language helps facilitate communications about secure software practices among both internal and external organizational stakeholders, such as:
299 300 301	• Business owners, software developers, project managers and leads, cybersecurity professionals, and operations and platform engineers within an organization who need to clearly communicate with each other about secure software development
302 303 304 305	• Software purchasers and consumers, including both Federal Government agencies and other organizations, that want to define required or desired characteristics for software in their acquisition processes in order to have higher-quality software (particularly with fewer security vulnerabilities) ³
306 307 308	• Software producers (e.g., commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] product vendors, government-off-the-shelf [GOTS] software developers, software developers working within or on behalf of software consumer organizations, software testers/quality

² The SSDF practices may help support the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions, Categories, and Subcategories, but the SSDF practices do not map to them and are typically the responsibility of different parties. Developers can adopt SSDF practices, and the outcomes of their work could help organizations with their operational security in support of the Cybersecurity Framework.

³ Future work may provide more practical guidance for software consumers on how they can leverage the SSDF in specific use cases.

- 309 assurance personnel) who want to integrate secure software development practices
- 310 throughout their SDLCs, express their secure software practices to their customers, or
- 311 define requirements for their suppliers

This document's practices are not based on the assumption that all organizations have the same security objectives and priorities. Rather, the recommendations reflect that each software

- 315 security objectives and profities. Rather, the recommendations reflect that each software 314 producer may have unique security assumptions, and each software consumer may have unique
- string producer may have unique security assumptions, and each software consumer may have unique security needs and requirements. While the aim is for each software producer to follow all
- 316 applicable practices, the expectation is that the degree to which each practice is implemented and
- the formality of the implementation will vary based on the producer's security assumptions. The
- 318 practices provide flexibility for implementers, but they are also clear to avoid leaving too much
- 319 open to interpretation.
- 320 Although most of these practices are relevant to any software development effort, some are not.
- 321 For example, if developing a particular piece of software does not involve using a compiler,
- 322 there would be no need to follow a practice on configuring the compiler to improve executable
- 323 security. Some practices are foundational, while others are more advanced and depend on certain
- 324 foundational practices already being in place. Also, practices are not all equally important for all
- 325 cases. Risk should be considered when deciding which practices to use and how much time and
- resources to devote to each practice.⁴ The practices, tasks, and implementation examples are not
- 327 prioritized. Finally, the frequency for performing recurring practices is not specified because the 328 frequency appropriate for any particular situation depends on risk and other factors defined by
- 329 the organization.
 - 330 The responsibility for implementing the practices is distributed among different organizations
 - based on the delivery of the software and services (e.g., on premises, infrastructure as a service,
 - 332 software as a service, platform as a service, container as a service, serverless). It follows a shared
 - responsibility model involving the platform/service providers and the tenant who is consuming
 - those platforms/services.

⁴ Organizations seeking guidance on how to get started with secure software development can consult many publicly available references, such as "SDL That Won't Break the Bank" by Steve Lipner from SAFECode (<u>https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Lipner-SDL-For-The-Rest-Of-Us.pdf</u>) and "Simplified Implementation of the Microsoft SDL" by Microsoft (<u>https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=12379</u>).

2 The Secure Software Development Framework

This document defines version 1.1 of the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF),
with fundamental, sound, and secure recommended practices based on established secure
software development practice documents. The practices are organized into four groups:

- Prepare the Organization (PO): Organizations should ensure that their people,
 processes, and technology are prepared to perform secure software development at the
 organization level. Many organizations will find some PO practices to also be applicable
 to subsets of their secure software development, like individual development groups or
 projects.
- Protect the Software (PS): Organizations should protect all components of the software
 from tampering and unauthorized access.
- Produce Well-Secured Software (PW): Organizations should produce well-secured software with minimal security vulnerabilities in its releases.
- Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV): Organizations should identify residual vulnerabilities
 in software releases and respond appropriately to address those vulnerabilities and
 prevent similar ones from occurring in the future.
- 351 Each practice definition includes the following elements:
- Practice: The name of the practice and a unique identifier, followed by a brief
 explanation of what the practice is and why it is beneficial
- Tasks: One or more actions needed to accomplish a practice
- Implementation Examples: One or more examples of types of tools, processes, or other
 methods that could be used to help implement a task; not intended to imply that any
 example or combination of examples is required or that only the stated examples are
 feasible options
- References: Pointers to one or more established secure development practice documents
 and their mappings to a particular task; not all references will apply to all instances of
 software development
- Table 1 defines the practices. They are only a **subset** of what an organization may need to do with the practices focused on helping organizations achieve secure software development objectives. The information in the table is space constrained, and much more information on each practice can be found in the references.
- 366 **Note:** The order of the practices and tasks in the table is not intended to imply the sequence of 367 implementation or the relative importance of any practice or task.

Table 1: The Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Prepare the Organization (PO)			
Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known at all times so that they can be taken into account throughout the SDLC and duplication of effort can be minimized because the requirements information can be collected once and shared. This includes requirements from internal sources (e.g., the organization's policies, business objectives, and risk management strategy) and external sources (e.g., applicable laws and regulations).	PO.1.1: Identify and document all security requirements for the organization's software development infrastructures and processes, and maintain the requirements over time.	 Define policies for securing software development infrastructures and their components, including development endpoints, throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security. Define policies for securing software development processes throughout the SDLC and maintaining that security, including open-source and other third-party software components utilized by software being developed. Review all security requirements at least annually or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources or if a major vulnerability incident has occurred. Educate affected individuals on impending changes to requirements. 	BSAFSS: SM.3, DE.1, I BSIMM: CP1.1, CP1.3, IEC62443: SM-7, SM-9 NISTCSF: ID.GV-3 OWASPASVS: 1.1.1 OWASPASVS: 1.10 OWASPSAMM: PC1-A, PCISSLC: 2.1, 2.2 SCFPSSD: Planning the SP80053: SA-8, SA-15 SP800160: 3.1.2, 3.2.1, SP800181: T0414; K0262, K0524; S0010, 5
	PO.1.2: Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet, and maintain the requirements over time.	 Define policies that specify risk-based software architecture and design requirements, such as making code modular to facilitate code reuse and updates, isolating security components from other components during execution, avoiding undocumented commands and settings, and providing features that will aid software purchasers and consumers with the secure deployment, operation, and maintenance of the software. Define policies that specify the security requirements for the organization's software, and verify compliance at key points in the SDLC (e.g., classes of software flaws verified by gates). Analyze the risk of applicable technology stacks (e.g., languages, environments, deployment models), and recommend or require the use of stacks that will reduce risk compared to others. Define policies that specify what needs to be archived for each software release (e.g., code, package files, third-party libraries, documentation) and how long it needs to be retained based on the SDLC model and other factors. Ensure that policies cover the entire software life cycle, including notifying users of the impending end of software support and the date of software end-of-life. Review all security requirements at least annually, or sooner if there are new requirements from internal or external sources or if a major vulnerability incident has occurred. 	BSAFSS: SC.1-1, SC.2 BSIMM: SM1.4, CP1.1, IEC62443: SR-3, SR-4, ISO27034: 7.3.2 MSSDL: 2, 5 NISTCSF: ID.GV-3 OWASPMASVS: 1.12 OWASPSAMM: PC1-A PCISSLC: 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, SCFPSSD: Establish C SP80053: SA-2, SA-8 SP800160: 3.1.2, 3.2.1, SP800181: T0414; K00 K0262, K0524; S0010, 5
	PO.1.3: Communicate requirements to all third parties who will provide commercial software components to the organization for reuse by the organization's own software. [Formerly PW.3.1]	 Define a core set of security requirements for software components, and include it in acquisition documents, software contracts, and other agreements with third parties. Define security-related criteria for selecting software; the criteria can include things such as the third party's vulnerability disclosure program and product security incident response capabilities. Require third parties to provide evidence that their software complies with the organization's security requirements. Require third parties to provide provenance data for their software and its dependencies. Establish and follow procedures to address risk when there are security requirements that third-party software components to be acquired do not meet. 	BSAFSS: SM.1, SM.2, BSIMM: CP2.4, SR2.5, IDASOAR: 19, 21 IEC62443: SM-9, SM-11 MSSDL: 7 NISTCSF: ID.SC-3 OWASPSAMM: SR3-A SCAGILE: Tasks Requist SCFPSSD: Manage Se SCSIC: Vendor Sourcing SP800160: 3.1.1, 3.1.2 SP800181: T0203, T04

References

1, IA.1, IA.2 3, SR1.1 -9

0 -A, PC1-B, PC2-A

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.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3 0003, K0039, K0044, K0157, K0168, K0177, K0211, K0260, K0261, 0, S0357, S0368; A0033, A0123, A0151

C.2, PD.1-1, PD.1-2, PD.1-3, PD.2-2, SI, PA, CS, AA, LO, EE .1, CP1.2, CP1.3 -4, SR-5, SD-4

2 -A, PC1-B, PC2-A, PC3-A, SR1-A, SR1-B, SR2-B, SA1-B, IR1-A .3, 3.3 Coding Standards and Conventions 3 .1, 3.3.1 0003, K0039, K0044, K0157, K0168, K0177, K0211, K0260, K0261, 0, S0357, S0368; A0033, A0123, A0151

2, SM.2-1, SM.2-4 5, SR3.2

-10

-A quiring the Help of Security Experts 8 Security Risk Inherent in the Use of Third-Party Components cing Integrity Controls 9, SA-12, SR-5 .2 0415; K0039; S0374; A0056, A0161

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Implement Roles and Responsibilities (PO.2): Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared to perform their SSDF-related roles and responsibilities throughout the SDLC.	PO.2.1: Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SSDF. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.	 Define SSDF-related roles and responsibilities for all members of the software development team. Integrate the security roles into the software development team. Define roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity staff, security champions, project managers and leads, senior management, software developers, software testers, software assurance leads and staff, product owners, operations and platform engineers, and others involved in the SDLC. Conduct an annual review of all roles and responsibilities. Educate affected individuals on impending changes to roles and responsibilities. 	BSAFSS: PD.2-1, PD.2 BSIMM: SM1.1, CP3.2 IEC62443: SM-2, SM-1 NISTCSF: ID.AM-6, ID. PCISSLC: 1.2 SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-3 SP800160: 3.2.1, 3.2.4, SP800181: K0233
	PO.2.2: Provide role-based training for all personnel with responsibilities that contribute to secure development. Periodically review personnel proficiency and role-based training, and update the training as needed.	 Document the desired outcomes of training for each role. Define the type of training or curriculum required to achieve the desired outcome for each role. Create a training plan for each role. Acquire or create training for each role; acquired training may need to be customized for the organization. Measure personnel performance to identify areas where changes to training may be beneficial. 	BSAFSS: PD.2-2 BSIMM: SM1.3, CP2.5, IEC62443: SM-4 MSSDL: 1 NISTCSF: PR.AT OWASPSAMM: EG1-A PCISSLC: 1.3 SCAGILE: Operational 1 SCFPSSD: Planning th SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-8 SP800160: 3.2.4, 3.2.6 SP800181: OV-TEA-00 K0226, K0243, K0245,
	PO.2.3: Obtain upper management commitment to secure development, and convey that commitment to all with SSDF-related roles and responsibilities.	 Appoint a single leader or leadership team to be responsible for the entire secure software development process, including authorizing the release of software to production. Increase upper management awareness of the risks of developing software without integrating security throughout the development life cycle and the risk mitigation provided by the SSDF practices. Assist upper management in incorporating secure development support into their communications with personnel with SSDF-related roles and responsibilities. Educate all personnel with SSDF-related roles and responsibilities on upper management's commitment to the SSDF and the importance of the SSDF to the organization. 	BSIMM: SM1.2, SM1.3 NISTCSF: ID.RM-1, ID. OWASPSAMM: SM1.A PCISSLC: 1.1 SP800181: T0001, T00

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al Security Tasks 14, 15; Tasks Requiring the Help of Security Experts

the Implementation and Deployment of Secure Development Practices vare Development Integrity Controls

2.6 001, OV-TEA-002; T0030, T0073, T0320; K0204, K0208, K0220, 5, K0252; S0100, S0101; A0004, A0057 .3, CP2.5 ID.SC-1 .A

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Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Implement Supporting Toolchains (PO.3): Use automation to reduce human effort and improve the accuracy, consistency, usability, and comprehensiveness of security practices throughout the SDLC, as well as provide a way to document and demonstrate the use of these practices. Toolchains and tools may be used at different levels of the organization, such as organization-wide or project-specific, and may address a particular part of the SDLC, like a huild ningling.	PO.3.1: Specify which tools or tool types must or should be included in each toolchain to mitigate identified risks, as well as how the toolchain components are to be integrated with each other.	 Define categories of toolchains, and specify the mandatory tools or tool types to be used for each category. Identify security tools to integrate into the developer toolchain. Evaluate tools' signing capabilities to create immutable records/logs for auditability within the toolchain. Use automated technology for toolchain management and orchestration. 	CNCFSSCP: Securing I Automation, Secure Aut Deployments—Verificat MSSDL: 8 OWASPSAMM: IR2-B, SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15 SP800181: K0013, K01
build pipeline.	PO.3.2: Follow recommended security practices to deploy and maintain tools and toolchains.	 Evaluate, select, and acquire tools, and assess the security of each tool. Integrate tools with other tools and existing software development processes and workflows. Use code-based configuration for toolchains (e.g., pipelines as code, toolchains as code). Implement the technologies and processes needed for reproducible builds. Update, upgrade, or replace tools as needed to address tool vulnerabilities or add new tool capabilities. Continuously monitor tools and tool logs for potential operational and security issues, including policy violations and anomalous behavior. Regularly verify the integrity and check the provenance of each tool to identify potential problems. Be prepared to share evidence and artifact data when requested with auditors and purchasers who want to confirm the use of tools and toolchains to support the development practices. See <u>PW.6</u> for examples of build and compilation tools. 	BSAFSS: DE.2 CNCFSSCP: Securing I Secure Authentication// Environments, Encryptic IEC62443: SM-7 <u>NISTDVS</u> : 2.2 OWASPASVS: 1.14.3, OWASPASVS: 1.14.3, OWASPASVS: 7.9 <u>OWASPSCVS</u> : 3, 5 SCAGILE: Tasks RequiscFPSSD: Use Curren SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15 SP800181: K0013, K01
	PO.3.3: Configure tools to generate evidence and artifacts of their support of secure software development practices as defined by the organization.	 Use existing tooling (e.g., workflow tracking, issue tracking, value stream mapping) to create an audit trail of the secure development-related actions that are performed for continuous improvement purposes. Determine how often the collected information should be audited, and implement the necessary processes. Establish and enforce security and retention policies for evidence and artifact data. Be prepared to share evidence and artifact data when requested with auditors and purchasers who want to confirm the use of secure software development practices. 	BSAFSS: PD.1-5 CNCFSSCP: Securing Securing Artefacts—Ve IEC62443: SM-12, SI-2 MSSDL: 8 OWASPSAMM: PC3-B OWASPSCVS: 3.13, 3. PCISSLC: 2.5 SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15 SP800181: K0013; T00
Define and Use Criteria for Software Security Checks (PO.4): Help ensure that the software resulting from the SDLC meets the organization's expectations by defining and using criteria for checking the software's security during development.	PO.4.1: Define criteria for software security checks and track throughout the SDLC.	 Ensure that the criteria adequately indicate how effectively security risk is being managed. Define key performance indicators (KPIs) and key risk indicators (KRIs) for software security. Add software security criteria to existing checks (e.g., the Definition of Done in agile SDLC methodologies). Review the artifacts generated as part of the software development workflow system to determine if they meet the criteria purposes. Record security check approvals, rejections, and exception requests as part of the workflow and tracking system. Summarize the results of the software security checks, including a description of the security risks that were successfully mitigated. 	BSAFSS: TV.2-1, TV.5- BSIMM: SM1.4, SM2.2, IEC62443: SI-1, SI-2, S ISO27034: 7.3.5 MSSDL: 3 OWASPSAMM: PC3-A PCISSLC: 3.3 SP80053: SA-15 SP800160: 3.2.1, 3.2.5, SP800181: K0153, K01

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ng Materials—Verification; Securing Build Pipelines—Verification, Authentication/Access; Securing Artefacts—Verification; Securing cation

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g Build Pipelines—Verification, Automation, Controlled Environments, n/Access; Securing Artefacts—Verification, Automation, Controlled ption; Securing Deployments—Verification, Automation

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quiring the Help of Security Experts 9 ent Compiler and Toolchain Versions and Secure Compiler Options vare Delivery Integrity Controls

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g Build Pipelines—Verification, Automation, Controlled Environments; Verification

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/.5-1 2.2, SM2.6 , SVV-3

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Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
	PO.4.2: Implement processes, mechanisms, etc. to gather and safeguard the necessary information in support of the criteria.	 Use the toolchain to automatically gather information that informs security decision-making. Deploy additional tools if needed to support the generation and collection of information supporting the criteria. Automate decision-making processes utilizing the criteria. Only allow authorized personnel to access the gathered information, and prevent any alteration or deletion of the information. Be prepared to share evidence and artifact data when requested with auditors and purchasers who want to confirm the use of secure software development practices. 	BSAFSS: PD.1-4, PD.1 BSIMM: SM1.4, SM2.2 IEC62443: SI-1, SVV-1 OWASPSAMM: PC3-B PCISSLC: 2.5 SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15 SP800160: 3.2.5, 3.3.7 SP800181: T0349; K01
Implement and Maintain Secure Environments for Software Development (PO.5): Ensure that all components of the environments for software development are strongly protected from internal and external threats to prevent compromises of the environments or the software being developed or maintained within them. Examples of environments for software development include development, build, test, and distribution environments.	PO.5.1: Separate and protect each environment involved in software development.	 Use separate identification and authentication realms with risk-based authentication and conditional access for each environment. Use network segmentation and access controls to separate the environments from each other and from production environments, and to separate components from each other within each non-production environment, in order to reduce attack surfaces and attackers' lateral movement and privilege/access escalation. Enforce authentication and tightly restrict connections entering and exiting each software development environment, including minimizing access to the internet to only what is necessary. Minimize the use of and dependencies on production enterprise software in non-production environments. Regularly log, monitor, and audit the trust relationships between the environments and between the components within each environment. Continuously log and monitor operations and alerts across all components of the development environment to detect, respond, and recover from attempted and actual cyber incidents. Configure security controls and other tools involved in separating and protecting the environments to generate evidence and artifacts for their activities. Collect, protect, and regularly check provenance data for all software deployed in each environment, and determine if any of the software or their dependencies have new known vulnerabilities. 	BSAFSS: DE.1, IA.1, IA CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC62443: SM-7 NISTCSF: PR.AC-5, PF SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP800181: OM-NET-00 T0484, T0485, T0553; I K0104, K0112, K0179,
	PO.5.2: Secure and harden development endpoints (i.e., endpoints for software designers, developers, testers, builders, etc.) to perform development-related tasks using a risk-based approach.	 Configure each development endpoint based on approved hardening guides, checklists, etc.; for example, enable FIPS-compliant encryption of all sensitive data at rest and in transit. Configure each development endpoint and the development resources to provide the least functionality needed by its users and services and to enforce the principle of least privilege. Continuously monitor the security posture of all development endpoints. Configure security controls and other tools involved in securing and hardening development endpoints to generate evidence and artifacts for their activities. Require multi-factor authentication for all access to development endpoints and development resources. Provide dedicated development endpoints on non-production networks for performing all development-related tasks; provide separate endpoints on production networks for typical enterprise tasks. 	BSAFSS: DE.1-1, IA.1 IEC62443: SM-7 NISTCSF: PR.AC-4, PI SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCSIC: Vendor Softwa SP800181: OM-ADM-0 K0077, K0088, K0130,

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D.1-5 2.2 -1, SVV-2, SVV-3, SVV-4 -B

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equiring the Help of Security Experts 11 ware Delivery Integrity Controls -001, SP-SYS-001; T0019, T0023, T0144, T0160, T0262, T0438, 3; K0001, K0005, K0007, K0033, K0049, K0056, K0061, K0071, 79, K0326, K0487; S0007, S0084, S0121; A0048

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PR.AC-7, PR.IP-1, PR.IP-3, PR.IP-12, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM quiring the Help of Security Experts 11 vare Delivery Integrity Controls I-001, SP-SYS-001; T0484, T0485, T0489, T0553; K0005, K0007, 0, K0167, K0205, K0275; S0076, S0097, S0121, S0158; A0155

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Protect Software (PS)			
Protect All Forms of Code from Unauthorized Access and Tampering (PS.1): Help prevent unauthorized changes to code, both inadvertent and intentional, which could circumvent or negate the intended security characteristics of the software. For code that is not intended to be publicly accessible, this helps prevent theft of the software and may make it more difficult or time-consuming for attackers to find vulnerabilities in the software.	PS.1.1: Store all forms of code, including source code and executable code, based on the principle of least privilege so that only authorized personnel, tools, services, etc. have the necessary forms of access.	 Store all source code in a code repository, and restrict access to it based on the nature of the code. For example, some code may be intended for public access, in which case its integrity and availability should be protected; other code may also need its confidentiality protected. Use version control features of the repository to track all changes made to the code with accountability to the individual developer account. Review and approve all changes made to the code after the code has been automatically scanned for vulnerabilities and any issues have been remediated. Use code signing to help protect the integrity of executables. Use cryptography (e.g., cryptographic hashes) to help protect file integrity. 	BSAFSS: IA.1, IA.2, SM BSIMM: SE2.4 CNCFSSCP: Securing t Environments, Secure A IDASOAR: Fact Sheet 2 IEC62443: SM-6, SM-7, NISTCSF: PR.AC-4, PR OWASPASVS: 1.10, 10 OWASPASVS: 1.10, 10 OWASPASVS: 7.1 OWASPSAMM: OE3-B PCISSLC: 5.1, 6.1 SCSIC: Vendor Softward Controls SP80053: SA-10
Provide a Mechanism for Verifying Software Release Integrity (PS.2): Help software purchasers and consumers ensure that the software they acquire is legitimate and has not been tampered with.	PS.2.1: Make integrity verification information available to software purchasers and consumers.	 Post cryptographic hashes for release files on a well-secured website. Use an established certificate authority for code signing so that consumers' operating systems or other tools and services can confirm the validity of signatures before use. Periodically review the code signing processes, including certificate renewal, rotation, revocation, and protection. 	BSAFSS: SM.4, SM.5, S BSIMM: SE2.4 CNCFSSCP: Securing I IEC62443: SM-6, SM-8, NISTCSF: PR.DS-6 OWASPSAMM: OE3-B OWASPSCVS: 4 PCISSLC: 6.1, 6.2 SCSIC: Vendor Softward SP80053: SR-9 SP800181: K0178
Archive and Protect Each Software Release (PS.3): Preserve software releases in order to help identify, analyze, and eliminate vulnerabilities discovered in the software after release.	PS.3.1: Securely archive the necessary files and other data (e.g., integrity verification information, provenance data) to be retained for each software release.	 Store the release files, associated images, etc. in repositories following the organization's established policy; allow read-only access to them for auditing purposes by necessary personnel and no access by anyone else. Store and protect release integrity verification information and provenance data, such as by keeping it in a separate location from the release files or by signing the data. 	BSAFSS: PD.1-5, DE.1 CNCFSSCP: Securing A Securing Deployments- IDASOAR: 25 IEC62443: SM-6, SM-7 NISTCSF: PR.IP-4 OWASPSCVS: 1, 3.18, PCISSLC: 5.2, 6.1, 6.2 SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-10, SA-15
	PS.3.2: Collect, maintain, and share provenance data for all components and other dependencies of each software release (e.g., in a software bill of materials [SBOM]).	 Make the provenance data available to software purchasers in accordance with your organization's policies, preferably using standards-based formats. Update the provenance data every time any of the software's components or other dependencies are updated. 	BSAFSS: SM.2 BSIMM: SE3.6 CNCFSSCP: Securing N <u>NTIASBOM</u> : All OWASPSCVS: 1.4, 2 SCSIC: Vendor Software <u>SCTPC</u> : MAINTAIN3 SP80053: SR-4

SM.4-1, DE.1-2

g the Source Code—Verification, Automation, Controlled e Authentication; Securing Materials—Automation et 25 I-7, SM-8 PR.DS-6, PR.IP-3 10.3.2

vare Delivery Integrity Controls, Vendor Software Development Integrity

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g Deployments—Verification I-8, SUM-4

vare Delivery Integrity Controls

E.1-2, IA.2 g Artefacts—Automation, Controlled Environments, Encryption; ts—Verification

18, 3.19, 6.3 .2 vare Delivery Integrity Controls -15, SR-9

g Materials—Verification, Automation

2 vare Delivery Integrity Controls

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Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Produce Well-Secured Software (PW)	l		
Design Software to Meet Security Requirements and Mitigate Security Risks (PW.1): Identify and evaluate the security requirements for the software; determine what security risks the software is likely to face during operation and how the software's design should mitigate those risks; and justify any cases where risk-based analysis indicates that security requirements should be relaxed or waived. Addressing security requirements and risks during software design (secure by design) helps make software development more efficient.	PW.1.1: Use forms of risk modeling, such as threat modeling, attack modeling, or attack surface mapping, to help assess the security risk for the software.	 Train the development team (security champions in particular) or collaborate with a risk modeling expert to create models and analyze how to use a risk-based approach to address the risks and implement mitigations. Perform more rigorous assessments for high-risk areas, such as protecting sensitive data and safeguarding identification, authentication, and access control, including credential management. Review vulnerability reports and statistics for previous software to inform the security risk assessment. Use data classification methods to identify and characterize each type of data that the software will interact with. 	BSAFSS: SC.1 BSIMM: AM1.2, AM1.3, A IDASOAR: 1 IEC62443: SM-4, SR-1, S ISO27034: 7.3.3 MSSDL: 4 NISTCSF: ID.RA NISTDVS: 2.1 OWASPASVS: 1.1.2, 1.2 OWASPASVS: 1.6, 1.8 OWASPSAMM: TA1-A, T PCISSLC: 3.2, 3.3 SCAGILE: Tasks Requiri SCFPSSD: Threat Model SCTTM: Entire guide SP80053: SA-8, SA-15, S SP800160: 3.3.4, 3.4.5 SP800181: T0038, T0062 K0149, K0151, K0152, K K0487, K0624; S0006, S A0107
	PW.1.2: Document the software's security requirements, risks, and design decisions.	 Document the response to each risk, including how mitigations are to be achieved, and what the rationales are for any approved exceptions to the security requirements. Summarize the documentation to serve as evidence and artifacts for the design activities. 	BSAFSS: SC.1-1, PD.1- BSIMM: AA2.2 IEC62443: SD-1 ISO27034: 7.3.3 MSSDL: 4 OWASPASVS: 1.1.3, 1.1 OWASPMASVS: 1.3, 1.6 OWASPSAMM: DR1-B PCISSLC: 3.2, 3.3 SP80053: SA-10 SP800181: T0256; K0000 K0344, K0362, K0487; S
	PW.1.3: Where appropriate, build in support for using standardized security features and services (e.g., integrating with existing log management, identity management, access control, and vulnerability management systems) instead of creating proprietary implementations of security features and services. [Formerly PW.4.3]	 Maintain an organization-wide software repository of modules for supporting standardized security features and services. Designate which security features and services must be supported by software to be developed. 	BSAFSS: SI.2-1, SI.2-2, BSIMM: SFD1.1, SR1.1 IEC62443: SD-1, SD-4 MSSDL: 5 OWASPASVS: 1.1.6 OWASPSAMM: SA2-A SCFPSSD: Standardize Audit Practices

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15, SA-17 .5 0062; K0005, K0009, K0038, K0039, K0070, K0080, K0119, K0147, 2, K0160, K0161, K0162, K0165, K0297, K0310, K0344, K0362, 6, S0009, S0022, S0078, S0171, S0229, S0248; A0092, A0093,

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0005, K0038, K0039, K0147, K0149, K0160, K0161, K0162, K0165, 7; S0006, S0009, S0078, S0171, S0229, S0248; A0092, A0107 2-2, LO.1 1.1 -4

-A ize Identity and Access Management; Establish Log Requirements and

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Review the Software Design to Verify Compliance with Security Requirements and Risk Information (PW.2): Help ensure that the software will meet the security requirements and satisfactorily address the identified risk information.	PW.2.1: Have either 1) a qualified person (or people) who were not involved with the design or 2) adequate automated processes instantiated in the toolchain (or both) review the software design to confirm and enforce that it meets all of the security requirements and satisfactorily addresses the identified risk information.	 Review the software design to confirm that it addresses all of the security requirements. Review the risk models created during software design to determine if they appear to adequately identify the risks. Review the software design to confirm that it satisfactorily addresses the risks identified by the risk models. Have the software's designer correct failures to meet the requirements. Change the design and/or the risk response strategy if the security requirements cannot be met. Document the findings of the design review to serve as evidence and artifacts. 	BSAFSS: TV.3 BSIMM: AA1.1, AA1.2, IEC62443: SM-2, SR-2 ISO27034: 7.3.3 OWASPASVS: 1.1.5 OWASPSAMM: DR1-A PCISSLC: 3.2 SP800181: T0328; K00 K0172, K0297; S0006,
Verify Third-Party Software Complies with	PW.3.1: Moved to PO.1.3		
Security Requirements (PW.3): Moved to PW.4	PW.3.2: Moved to PW.4.5		
Pw.4 Reuse Existing, Well-Secured Software When Feasible Instead of Duplicating Functionality (PW.4): Lower the costs of software development, expedite software development, and decrease the likelihood of introducing additional security vulnerabilities into the software by reusing software modules and services that have already had their security posture checked. This is particularly important for software that implements security functionality, such as cryptographic modules and protocols.	PW.4.1: Acquire well-secured software components (e.g., software libraries, modules, middleware, frameworks) from commercial, open-source, and other third-party developers for use by the organization's software.	 Review and evaluate third-party software components in the context of their expected use. If a component is to be used in a substantially different way in the future, perform the review and evaluation again with that new context in mind. Obtain provenance information (e.g., SBOM, source composition analysis) for each software component, and analyze that information to better assess the risk that the component may introduce. Establish an organization-wide software repository to host sanctioned and vetted open-source components. Maintain a list of organization-approved commercial software components and component versions along with their provenance data. Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. 	BSAFSS: SM.2 BSIMM: SR1.1 CNCFSSCP: Securing IDASOAR: 19 IEC62443: SM-9, SM-1 MSSDL: 6 NISTCSF: ID.SC-2 OWASPASVS: 1.1.6 OWASPSAMM: SA1-A OWASPSCVS: 4 SCSIC: Vendor Sourcir SCTPC: MAINTAIN SP80053: SA-4, SA-12 SP800181: K0039
	PW.4.2: Create and maintain well-secured software components in-house following SDLC processes to meet common internal software development needs that cannot be better met by third-party software components.	 Follow organization-established security practices for secure software development when creating and maintaining the components. Maintain an organization-wide software repository for these components. Designate which components must be included in software to be developed. 	BSIMM: SFD1.1, SFD2 IDASOAR: 19 OWASPASVS: 1.1.6 SCTPC: MAINTAIN SP800181: SP-DEV-00
	PW.4.3: Moved to PW.1.3		

.2, AA2.1 R-2, SR-5, SD-3, SD-4, SI-2

1-A, DR1-B

K0038, K0039, K0070, K0080, K0119, K0152, K0153, K0161, K0165, 06, S0009, S0022, S0036, S0141, S0171

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Image: Source Code by Adhering to Source PW.5.1: Follow all socure coding practices that and practice for weiling the solware modules and services for veiling the solware for solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and file, this should in hade new vulnershikes found in the solware solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and file, this should in hade new vulnershikes found in the solware solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and file, this should in hade new vulnershikes found in the solware solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and file, this should in hade new vulnershikes in a longer solware solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached for the solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and file, this should in the new vulnershikes in a longer solware solware solware component is still actively maintained and has not reached and the hade new vu	Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
of all in-house and third-party software components before reusing them for the organization's own software.reached end of life; this should include new vulnerabilities found in the software component that is no longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Confirm the integrity of software components through digital signatures or other mechanisms.CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC2443: SNA-9, SNA-1 NISTDVS: 2.11 OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 2.4CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC2443: SNA-9, SNA-1 NISTDVS: 2.11 OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPASVS: 2.4, 6 SCSIC: Vendor Sourci SP80053: SR-4 SP80053: SR-4<		and all other third-party software components comply with the requirements, as defined by the organization,	 modules and services that vendors have not yet fixed. Use existing results from commercial services for vetting the software modules and services. 	IEC62443: SI-1, DM-1 MSSDL: 7 NISTCSF: ID.SC-4 NISTDVS: 2.11 OWASPASVS: 10, 14.2 OWASPMASVS: 7.5 OWASPSAMM: TA3-A
Coding Practices (PW.5): Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities during source code creation by following organization-defined vulnerability severity criteria. appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements. • Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. BSIMM: SR3.3, CR3.5 IDASOAR: 2 IEC62443: SI-1, SI-2 ISO27034: 7.3.5 MSSDL: 9 • Check for other vulnerabilities that are common to the development languages and environment. • Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. • Movid using unsafe functions and calls. • BSIMM: SR3.3, CR3.5 IDASOAR: 2 IEC62443: SI-1, SI-2 ISO27034: 7.3.5 MSSDL: 9 • OWASPASVS: 7.6 SCFPSSD: Establish L Find Security Issues Ea SP800181: SP-DEV-00 K0624; S0019, S0060, • Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. • Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. • BSIMM: SR3.3, CR3.5		of all in-house and third-party software components before reusing them for the organization's own	 reached end of life; this should include new vulnerabilities found in the software being remediated. Determine a plan of action for each software component that is no longer being maintained or will not be available in the near future. Confirm the integrity of software components through digital signatures or 	NISTDVS: 2.11 OWASPASVS: 14.2.4, OWASPSCVS: 4, 6 SCSIC: Vendor Sourcir SP80053: SR-4
	Coding Practices (PW.5): Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software, and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities during source code creation by following organization-defined vulnerability severity	appropriate to the development languages and environment to meet the organization's requirements.	 Avoid using unsafe functions and calls. Handle errors gracefully. Provide logging and tracing capabilities. Use development environments with automated features that encourage or require the use of secure coding practices with just-in-time training-in-place. Follow procedures for manually ensuring compliance with secure coding practices. Check for other vulnerabilities that are common to the development languages and environment. Have the developer review their own human-readable code to complement 	IEC62443: SI-1, SI-2 ISO27034: 7.3.5 MSSDL: 9 OWASPASVS: 1.1.7, 1

References /.2, TV.3 g Materials—Verification, Automation 4.2 -A, SR3-B quiring the Help of Security Experts 8 Security Risk Inherent in the Use of Third-Party Components cing Integrity Controls, Peer Reviews and Security Testing ASSESS 12, SR-3 .8 002; K0153, K0266 M.2-2, SM.2-3 ng Materials—Verification, Automation -10 4, 14.2.5 cing Integrity Controls

3, LO.1, EE.1 .5

, 1.5, 1.7, 5, 7

Log Requirements and Audit Practices, Use Code Analysis Tools to Early, Handle Data Safely, Handle Errors, Use Safe Functions Only -001; T0013, T0077, T0176; K0009, K0016, K0039, K0070, K0140, 50, S0149, S0172, S0266; A0036, A0047

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Configure the Integrated Development Environment, Compilation, Interpreter, and Build Processes to Improve Executable Security (PW.6): Decrease the number of security vulnerabilities in the software and reduce costs by eliminating vulnerabilities before testing occurs.	PW.6.1: Use compiler, interpreter, and build tools that offer features to improve executable security.	 Use up-to-date versions of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. Follow change management processes when deploying or updating compiler, interpreter, and build tools, and audit all unexpected changes to tools. Regularly validate the authenticity and integrity of compiler, interpreter, and build tools. 	BSAFSS: DE.2-1 CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC62443: SI-2 MSSDL: 8 SCAGILE: Operational SCFPSSD: Use Curren SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15
	PW.6.2: Determine which compiler, interpreter, and build tool features should be used and how each should be configured, then implement and use the approved configurations.	 Enable compiler features that produce warnings for poorly secured code during the compilation process. Implement the "clean build" concept, where all compiler warnings are treated as errors and eliminated. Enable compiler features that randomize characteristics, such as memory location usage, that would otherwise be easily predictable and thus exploitable. Conduct testing to ensure that the features are working as expected and not inadvertently causing any operational issues or other problems. Continuously verify that the approved configurations are being used. Document information about the compiler, interpreter, and build tool configuration in a knowledge base that developers can access, search, and reproduce in their local development environment. 	BSAFSS: DE.2-3, DE.2 CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC62443: SI-2 MSSDL: 8 NISTDVS: 2.5 OWASPASVS: 14.1, 14 OWASPMASVS: 7.2 PCISSLC: 3.2 SCAGILE: Operational SCFPSSD: Use Curren SCSIC: Vendor Softwar SP80053: SA-15 SP800181: K0039, K00
Review and/or Analyze Human-Readable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements (PW.7): Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released	PW.7.1: Determine whether code <i>review</i> (a person looks directly at the code to find issues) and/or code <i>analysis</i> (tools are used to find issues in code, either in a fully automated way or in conjunction with a person) should be used, as defined by the organization.	 Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code review should be performed and how it should be conducted. This may include third-party code and reusable code modules written in-house. Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code analysis should be performed and how it should be conducted. 	IEC62443: SM-5, SI-1, SCSIC: Peer Reviews a SP80053: SA-11 SP800181: SP-DEV-00
to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Human-readable code includes source code, scripts, and any other form of code that an organization deems human- readable.	PW.7.2: Perform the code review and/or code analysis based on the organization's secure coding standards, and document and triage all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	 Perform peer review of code, and review any existing code review, analysis, or testing results as part of the peer review. Use peer reviews to check code for backdoors and other malicious content. Use peer reviewing tools that facilitate the peer review process, and document all discussions and other feedback. Use a static analysis tool to automatically check code for vulnerabilities and compliance with the organization's secure coding standards with a human reviewing the issues reported by the tool and remediating them as necessary. Use review checklists to verify that the code complies with the requirements. Use automated tools to identify and remediate documented and verified unsafe software practices on a continuous basis as human-readable code is checked into the code repository. Identify and document the root cause of each discovered issue. Document lessons learned from code review and analysis in a knowledge base that developers can access and search. 	BSAFSS: TV.2, PD.1-4 BSIMM: CR1.2, CR1.4, IDASOAR: 3, 4, 5, 14, 4 IEC62443: SI-1, SVV-1 ISO27034: 7.3.6 MSSDL: 9, 10 NISTDVS: 2.3, 2.4 OWASPASVS: 1.1.7, 1 OWASPMASVS: 7.5 OWASPASVS: 1.1.7, 1 OWASPMASVS: 7.5 OWASPSAMM: IR1-B, PCISSLC: 3.2, 4.1 SCAGILE: Operational SCFPSSD: Use Code A Security Testing Tools, SCSIC: Peer Reviews a SP80053: SA-11, SA-11 SP800181: SP-DEV-00 K0039, K0070, K0140, S0242, S0266; A0007,

g Build Pipelines—Verification, Automation

al Security Task 3 ent Compiler and Toolchain Versions and Secure Compiler Options vare Development Integrity Controls

E.2-4, DE.2-5 g Build Pipelines—Verification, Automation

14.2.1

al Security Task 8 ent Compiler and Toolchain Versions and Secure Compiler Options vare Development Integrity Controls

0070

1, SVV-1 s and Security Testing

002; K0013, K0039, K0070, K0153, K0165; S0174

-4

.4, CR1.6, CR2.6, CR2.7, CR3.5 4, 15, 48 -1, SVV-2

, 10

B, IR2-A, IR2-B, IR3-A

hal Security Tasks 4, 7; Tasks Requiring the Help of Security Experts 10 e Analysis Tools to Find Security Issues Early, Use Static Analysis ls, Perform Manual Verification of Security Features/Mitigations vs and Security Testing A-15 -001, SP-DEV-002; T0013, T0111, T0176, T0267, T0516; K0009, -0, K0624; S0019, S0060, S0078, S0137, S0149, S0167, S0174, -07, A0015, A0036, A0044, A0047

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Test Executable Code to Identify Vulnerabilities and Verify Compliance with Security Requirements (PW.8): Help identify vulnerabilities so that they can be corrected before the software is released in order to prevent exploitation. Using automated methods lowers the effort and resources needed to detect vulnerabilities. Executable code includes binaries, directly executed bytecode and source code, and any other form of code that an organization deems executable.	PW.8.1: Determine if executable code testing should be performed to identify and eliminate classes of vulnerabilities not covered by previous reviews, analysis, or testing, and if so, which types should be used.	• Follow the organization's policies or guidelines for when code testing should be performed and how it should be conducted (e.g., within a sandboxed environment). This may include third-party executable code and reusable executable code modules written in-house.	BSAFSS: TV.3 IEC62443: SVV-1, SVV SCSIC: Peer Reviews SP80053: SA-11 SP800181: SP-DEV-00 K0342, K0367, K0536,
	PW.8.2: Design the tests, perform the testing, and document the results, including documenting and triaging all discovered issues and recommended remediations in the development team's workflow or issue tracking system.	 Perform robust functional testing of security features. Integrate dynamic vulnerability testing into the project's automated test suite. Incorporate tests for previously reported vulnerabilities into the project's test suite to ensure that errors are not reintroduced. Take into consideration the infrastructures and technology stacks that the software will be used with in production when developing test plans. Use fuzz testing tools to find issues with input handling. If resources are available, use penetration testing to simulate how an attacker might attempt to compromise the software in high-risk scenarios. Identify and document the root cause of each discovered issue. Document lessons learned from code testing in a knowledge base that developers can access and search. 	BSAFSS: TV.3, TV.5, I BSIMM: ST1.1, ST1.3, PT1.2, PT1.3 IDASOAR: 7, 8, 10, 11 IEC62443: SM-5, SM-1 ISO27034: 7.3.6 MSSDL: 10, 11 NISTDVS: 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 OWASPMASVS: 7.5 OWASPSAMM: ST1-A PCISSLC: 4.1 SCAGILE: Operational 4, 5, 6, 7 SCFPSSD: Perform Dy Vulnerability Scanning, Features/Mitigations, P SCSIC: Peer Reviews SP80053: SA-11, SA-1 SP800181: SP-DEV-00 T0456, T0516; K0009, S0001, S0015, S0046, A0015
Configure Software to Have Secure Settings by Default (PW.9): Help improve the security of the software at the time of installation to reduce the likelihood of the software being deployed with weak security settings, putting it at greater risk of compromise.	PW.9.1: Define a secure baseline by determining how to configure each setting that has an effect on security so that the default settings are secure and do not weaken the security functions provided by the platform, network infrastructure, or services.	Conduct testing to ensure that the settings, including the default settings, are working as expected and are not inadvertently causing any security weaknesses, operational issues, or other problems.	BSAFSS: CF.1 IDASOAR: 23 IEC62443: SD-4, SVV- ISO27034: 7.3.5 SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCSIC: Vendor Softwa Controls SP800181: SP-DEV-00
	PW.9.2: Implement the default settings (or groups of default settings, if applicable), and document each setting for software administrators.	 Verify that the approved configuration is in place for the software. Document each setting's purpose, options, default value, security relevance, potential operational impact, and relationships with other settings. Use authoritative programmatic technical mechanisms to document how each setting can be implemented and assessed by software administrators. Store the default configuration in a usable format and follow change control practices for modifying it (e.g., configuration as code). 	BSAFSS: CF.1 BSIMM: SE2.2 IDASOAR: 23 IEC62443: SG-3 OWASPSAMM: OE1-A PCISSLC: 8.1, 8.2 SCAGILE: Tasks Requ SCFPSSD: Verify Secu SCSIC: Vendor Softwa Controls SP800181: SP-DEV-00

VV-2, SVV-3, SVV-4, SVV-5 vs and Security Testing

-001, SP-DEV-002; T0456; K0013, K0039, K0070, K0153, K0165, 86, K0624; S0001, S0015, S0026, S0061, S0083, S0112, S0135

5, PD.1-4 .3, ST2.1, ST2.4, ST2.5, ST2.6, ST3.3, ST3.4, ST3.5, ST3.6, PT1.1,

11, 38, 39, 43, 44, 48, 55, 56, 57 *I*-13, SI-1, SVV-1, SVV-2, SVV-3, SVV-4, SVV-5

-A, ST1-B, ST2-A, ST2-B, ST3-A

al Security Tasks 10, 11; Tasks Requiring the Help of Security Experts

Dynamic Analysis Security Testing, Fuzz Parsers, Network ng, Perform Automated Functional Testing of Security , Perform Penetration Testing vs and Security Testing A-15 -001, SP-DEV-002; T0013, T0028, T0169, T0176, T0253, T0266, 9, K0039, K0070, K0272, K0339, K0342, K0362, K0536, K0624; 16, S0051, S0078, S0081, S0083, S0135, S0137, S0167, S0242;

′V-1, SG-1

equiring the Help of Security Experts 12 ware Delivery Integrity Controls, Vendor Software Development Integrity

-002; K0009, K0039, K0073, K0153, K0165, K0275, K0531; S0167

-A

equiring the Help of Security Experts 12 ecure Configurations and Use of Platform Mitigation ware Delivery Integrity Controls, Vendor Software Development Integrity

-001; K0009, K0039, K0073, K0153, K0165, K0275, K0531

Practices	Tasks	Implementation Examples	
Respond to Vulnerabilities (RV)			
Identify and Confirm Vulnerabilities on an Ongoing Basis (RV.1): Help ensure that vulnerabilities are identified more quickly so that they can be remediated more quickly, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	RV.1.1: Gather information from purchasers, consumers, and public sources on potential vulnerabilities in the software and third-party components that the software uses, and investigate all credible reports.	 Establish a vulnerability disclosure program, and make it easy for security researchers to learn about your program and report possible vulnerabilities. Monitor vulnerability databases, security mailing lists, and other sources of vulnerability reports through manual or automated means. Use threat intelligence sources to better understand how vulnerabilities in general are being exploited. Regularly check the provenance and software composition data for each software release in use to identify potential new vulnerabilities in its components. 	BSAFSS: VM.1-3, VM. BSIMM: CMVM1.2, CM CNCFSSCP: Securing IEC62443: DM-1, DM-2 ISO29147: 6.2.1, 6.2.2, ISO30111: 7.1.3 OWASPSAMM: IM1-A, OWASPSCVS: 4 PCISSLC: 3.4, 4.1, 9.1 SCAGILE: Operational SCFPSSD: Vulnerabilit SCTPC: MONITOR1 SP800181: K0009, K00
	RV.1.2: Review, analyze, and/or test the software's code to identify or confirm the presence of previously undetected vulnerabilities.	 Configure the toolchain to perform automated code analysis and testing on a regular or continuous basis. Automatically review provenance and software composition data for all software components and dependencies to identify any new vulnerabilities they have. [See <u>PW.7</u> and <u>PW.8</u>] 	BSAFSS: VM.1-2, VM.1 IEC62443: SI-1, SVV-2 ISO27034: 7.3.6 ISO29147: 6.4 ISO30111: 7.1.4 PCISSLC: 3.4, 4.1 SCAGILE: Operational SP80053: SA-11 SP800181: SP-DEV-00
	RV.1.3: Have a policy that addresses vulnerability disclosure and remediation, and implement the roles, responsibilities, and processes needed to support that policy.	 Have a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) and processes in place to handle the responses to vulnerability reports and incidents. Have a security response playbook to handle a generic reported vulnerability, a report of zero-days, a vulnerability being exploited in the wild, and a major ongoing incident involving multiple parties and open-source software components. 	BSAFSS: VM.1-1, VM.3 BSIMM: CMVM1.1, CM IEC62443: DM-1, DM-2 ISO29147: All ISO30111: All MSSDL: 12 OWASPMASVS: 1.11 OWASPSAMM: IM1-A, PCISSLC: 9.2, 9.3 SCFPSSD: Vulnerabilit SP800160: 3.3.8 SP800181: K0041, K00
Assess, Prioritize, and Remediate Vulnerabilities (RV.2): Help ensure that vulnerabilities are remediated as quickly as necessary, reducing the window of opportunity for attackers.	RV.2.1: Analyze each vulnerability to gather sufficient information to plan its remediation.	 Use issue tracking software (existing software, if available) to document each vulnerability. Estimate how much effort would be required to remediate the vulnerability. Estimate the potential impact of vulnerability exploitation. Estimate the resources needed to weaponize the vulnerability if that has not already been done. Estimate any other relevant factors needed to plan the remediation of the vulnerability. 	BSAFSS: VM.2 BSIMM: CMVM1.2, CM IEC62443: DM-2, DM-3 ISO30111: 7.1.4 PCISSLC: 3.4, 4.2 SCAGILE: Operational SP80053: SA-10 SP800160: 3.3.8 SP800181: K0009, K00

M.3 CMVM3.4 ng Materials—Verification M-2, DM-3 2.2, 6.2.4, 6.3, 6.5

-A, IM2-B, EH1-B

).1 nal Security Task 5 vility Response and Disclosure

K0038, K0040, K0070, K0161, K0362; S0078 M.2-1 /-2, SVV-3, SVV-4, DM-1, DM-2

al Security Tasks 10, 11

-002; K0009, K0039, K0153 M.2 CMVM2.1

1-2, DM-3, DM-4, DM-5

1 -A, IM1-B, IM2-A, IM2-B

ility Response and Disclosure

0042, K0151, K0292, K0317; S0054; A0025

CMVM2.2 1-3

al Security Task 1, Tasks Requiring the Help of Security Experts 10

0039, K0070, K0161, K0165; S0078

	Practices	Tasks		Implementation Examples	
		RV.2.2: Develop and implement a remediation plan for each vulnerability.	•	Make a risk-based decision as to whether the vulnerability will be remediated or if the risk will be addressed through other means (e.g., risk acceptance, risk transference), and prioritize any actions to be taken If a permanent mitigation for a vulnerability is not yet available, determine how the vulnerability can be temporarily mitigated until the permanent solution is available, and add that temporary remediation to the plan. Develop and release security advisories that provide the necessary information to software purchasers and consumers, including descriptions of what has changed in the software and what configuration settings might need to be changed, if any. Deliver the remediation to the purchasers and consumers via an automated and trusted delivery mechanism.	BSAFSS: VM.1-1, VM-2 IEC62443: DM-4 ISO30111: 7.1.4, 7.1.5 PCISSLC: 4.1, 4.2, 10.1 SCAGILE: Operational 3 SCFPSSD: Fix the Vuln SCTPC: MITIGATE SP800160: 3.3.8 SP800181: T0163, T022
	Analyze Vulnerabilities to Identify Their Root Causes (RV.3): Help reduce the frequency of vulnerabilities in the future.	RV.3.1: Analyze all identified vulnerabilities to determine the root cause of each vulnerability.	•	Document the root cause of each discovered issue. Document lessons learned through root cause analysis in a knowledge base that developers can access and search.	BSAFSS: VM.2-1 IEC62443: DM-3 ISO30111: 7.1.4 OWASPSAMM: IM3-A PCISSLC: 4.2 SCFPSSD: Secure Deve SP800181: T0047, K000
		RV.3.2: Analyze the root causes over time to identify patterns, such as a particular secure coding practice not being followed consistently.	•	Document lessons learned through root cause analysis in a knowledge base that developers can access and search. Add mechanisms to the toolchain to automatically detect future instances of the root cause.	BSAFSS: VM.2-1, PD.1 IEC62443: DM-4 ISO30111: 7.1.7 OWASPSAMM: IM3-B PCISSLC: 2.6, 4.2 SCFPSSD: Secure Dev SP80053: SA-15 SP800160: 3.3.8 SP800181: T0111, K000
		RV.3.3: Review the software for similar vulnerabilities, and proactively fix them rather than waiting for external reports.	•	[See <u>PW.7</u> and <u>PW.8</u>]	BSAFSS: VM.2 BSIMM: CMVM3.1 IEC62443: SI-1, DM-3, I ISO30111: 7.1.4 PCISSLC: 4.2 SP800181: SP-DEV-007
		RV.3.4: Review the SDLC process, and update it if appropriate to prevent (or reduce the likelihood of) the root cause recurring in updates to the software or in new software that is created.	•	Document lessons learned through root cause analysis in a knowledge base that developers can access and search. Plan and implement changes to the appropriate SSDF practices.	BSAFSS: PD.1-3 BSIMM: CMVM3.2 IEC62443: DM-6 ISO30111: 7.1.7 MSSDL: 2 PCISSLC: 2.6, 4.2 SCFPSSD: Secure Deve SP80053: SA-15 SP800181: K0009, K003

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).1 al Security Task 2 ulnerability, Identify Mitigating Factors or Workarounds

0229, T0264; K0009, K0070

Development Lifecycle Feedback 0009, K0039, K0070, K0343

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evelopment Lifecycle Feedback

0009, K0039, K0070, K0343

8, DM-4

001, SP-DEV-002; K0009, K0039, K0070

evelopment Lifecycle Feedback

0039, K0070

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369 Appendix A—The SSDF and Executive Order 14028

370 The President's Executive Order (EO) on "Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity (14028)"

371 issued on May 12, 2021, charged multiple agencies – including NIST – with enhancing

372 cybersecurity through a variety of initiatives related to the security and integrity of the software

373 supply chain.

374 Section 4 of the EO directed NIST to solicit input from the private sector, academia, government

- agencies, and others and to identify existing or develop new standards, tools, best practices, and
- other guidelines to enhance software supply chain security. Table 2 maps the clauses from
- 377 Section 4 of the EO to the SSDF practices and tasks that help address each clause.
- 378

Table 2: SSDF Practices Corresponding to EO 14028 Clauses

EO 14028 Clause	SSDF Practices and Tasks
<u>4(c)</u>	All practices and tasks
<u>4(e)(i)(A)</u>	PO.5.1
<u>4(e)(i)(B)</u>	PO.5.1
<u>4(e)(i)(C)</u>	PO.5.2
<u>4(e)(i)(D)</u>	PO.5.1
<u>4(e)(i)(E)</u>	PO.5.2
<u>4(e)(i)(F)</u>	PO.3.2, PO.3.3, PO.5.1, PO.5.2
<u>4(e)(ii)</u>	PO.3.2, PO.3.3, PO.5.1, PO.5.2
<u>4(e)(iii)</u>	PO.3.1, PO.3.2, PO.5.1, PO.5.2, PS.1.1, PS.2.1, PS.3.1, PW.4.5
<u>4(e)(iv)</u>	PO.4.1, PO.4.2, PS.1.1, PW.2.1, PW.4.4, PW.5.1, PW.6.1, PW.6.2, PW.7.1, PW.7.2, PW.8.2, PW.9.1, PW.9.2, RV.1.1, RV.1.2, RV.2.1, RV.2.2, RV.3.3
<u>4(e)(v)</u>	PO.3.2, PO.3.3, PO.4.1, PO.5.1, PO.5.2, PW.1.2, PW.2.1, PW.7.2, PW.8.2, RV.2.2
<u>4(e)(vi)</u>	PO.1.3, PO.3.2, PO.5.1, PS.3.1, PS.3.2, PW.4.1, PW.4.5, RV.1.2
<u>4(e)(vii)</u>	PS.3.2
<u>4(e)(viii)</u>	RV.1.1, RV.1.2, RV.1.3, RV.2.1, RV.2.2, RV.3.3
<u>4(e)(ix)</u>	All practices and tasks
<u>4(e)(x)</u>	PO.1.3, PS.3.2, PW.4.1, PW.4.4, PW.4.5

379 Appendix B—Acronyms

380 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this document are defined below.

BSIMM	Building Security In Maturity Model
CISQ	Consortium for Information & Software Quality
CNCF	Cloud Native Computing Foundation
COTS	Commercial-Off-the-Shelf
CPS	Cyber-Physical System
DevOps	Development and Operations
EO	Executive Order
GOTS	Government-Off-the-Shelf
ICS	Industrial Control System
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IoT	Internet of Things
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
ISPAB	Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board
IT	Information Technology
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
KRI	Key Risk Indicator
MITA	Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command
NICE	National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTIA	National Telecommunications and Information Administration
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
PCI	Payment Card Industry
PSIRT	Product Security Incident Response Team
SAFECode	Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code
SAMM	Software Assurance Maturity Model
SBOM	Software Bill of Materials
SDL	[Microsoft] Security Development Lifecycle
SDLC	Software Development Life Cycle
SEI	Software Engineering Institute
SLC	Software Lifecycle
SOAR	State-of-the-Art Resources
SSDF	Secure Software Development Framework

381 Appendix C—Change Log

This appendix summarizes the most noteworthy changes from the <u>original SSDF</u>, published in
 April 2020, to this draft:

384	٠	References
385 386		 Added CNCFSSCP, IEC62443, ISO29147, ISO30111, NISTDVS, OWASPMASVS, OWASPSCVS
387		 Updated BSAFSS, BSIMM, OWASPASVS, PCISSLC
388		 Deleted OWASPTEST
389	•	Practices
390		• Added PO.5
391		• Deleted PW.3 (merged into PW.4)
392	٠	Tasks
393		 Added PO.1.2, PO.5.1, PO.5.2, PS.3.2, PW.1.2
394		• Moved PW.3.1 to PO.1.3; moved PW.3.2 to PW.4.5; moved PW.4.3 to PW.1.3
395		• Demoted PW.5.2 to a PW.5.1 example
396	٠	SSDF Table Conventions
397 398		 Retired identifiers for deleted/moved practices and tasks (PW.3, PW.3.1, PW.3.2, PW.4.3, and PW.5.2)
399 400		• Added colored borders and shaded rows for each group of practices; indicated retired practices and tasks by a lack of shading
401	٠	Converted the content from a white paper to a Special Publication 800-series document
402	•	Added Appendix A