



Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 03, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The disorderly withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv makes precise mapping of the situation in Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts difficult. There are likely no organized Russian defensive positions in those oblasts, but Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to clear "lost orcs"--Russians left behind in the withdrawal. We will not attempt to map those clearing operations. Ukrainian forces may already have regained control of more of Chernihiv Oblast than we depict, but we do not yet have sufficient evidence to adjust our assessed areas of advance beyond those shown here. The situation will likely clarify over the next few days, and we will adjust the advance and / or control lines accordingly.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 02, 2022, 12:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Thomas Bergeron
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We cannot verify reports that Ukrainian forces secured all of Kyiv Oblast as 1500 ET April 2. This map is current as of 1200 ET April 2. We will refine our map as we observe and confirm more data.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 01, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Thomas Bergeron
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We have updated our map to show increased claimed Ukrainian counteroffensives across Ukraine, most notably in Kyiv Oblast, in the past 24 hours. We additionally recessed the assessed line of control for Russian forces in Kyiv oblast to north of the Uzh River given unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian counterattacks in Orane and Dytyatky on April 1. These Ukrainian attacks, if confirmed, indicate a Ukrainian threat to sever Russian lines of communication to Russian forces south of Orane. Russian forces' frontlines trace in Kyiv Oblast remain fluid and dynamic. We will refine our map as we observe and confirm more data.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kyiv as of April 03, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Thomas Bergeron
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Note: The disorderly withdrawal of Russian forces from around Kyiv makes precise mapping of the situation in Kyiv and Chernihiv Oblasts difficult. There are likely no organized Russian defensive positions in those oblasts, but Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to clear "lost orcs"--Russians left behind in the withdrawal. We will not attempt to map those clearing operations. Ukrainian forces may already have regained control of more of Chernihiv Oblast than we depict, but we do not yet have sufficient evidence to adjust our assessed areas of advance beyond those shown here. The situation will likely clarify over the next few days, and we will adjust the advance and / or control lines accordingly

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kyiv as of April 02, 2022, 12:00 PM ET



Note: We cannot verify reports that Ukrainian forces secured all of Kyiv Oblast as 1500 ET April 2. This map is current as of 1200 ET April 2. We will refine our map as we observe and confirm more data.

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kyiv as of April 01, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Thomas Bergeron
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We have updated our map to show increased claimed Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kyiv Oblast and southern Chernihiv Oblast in the past 24 hours. We additionally recessed the assessed line of control for Russian forces in Kyiv oblast to north of the Uzh River given unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian counterattacks in Orane and Dytyatky on April 1. These Ukrainian attacks, if confirmed, indicate a Ukrainian threat to sever Russian lines of communication to Russian forces south of Orane. Russian forces' frontlines trace in Kyiv Oblast remain fluid and dynamic. We will refine our map as we observe and confirm more data.


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of April 03, 2022, 3:00 ET




* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of April 02, 2022, 12:00 ET




* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of April 01, 2022, 3:00 ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Mariupol as of April 03, 2022, 3:00 ET



Russian forces continue their grinding advance into Mariupol, which they have encircled and are bombarding. Fighting is proceeding block-by-block and slowly. Russian forces began penetrating Mariupol's city center on March 24. ISW has not observed sufficient evidence to significantly change assessed advances in Mariupol between April 2 and April 3, though Russian forces likely have advanced.

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Mariupol as of April 02, 2022, 12:00 ET



Russian forces continue their grinding advance into Mariupol, which they have encircled and are bombarding. Fighting is proceeding block-by-block and slowly. Russian forces began penetrating Mariupol's city center on March 24. ISW has not observed sufficient evidence to significantly change assessed advances in Mariupol between April 1 and April 2, though Russian forces likely have advanced.

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Mariupol as of April 01, 2022, 3:00 ET



Russian forces continue their grinding advance into Mariupol, which they have encircled and are bombarding. Fighting is proceeding block-by-block and slowly. Russian forces began penetrating Mariupol's city center on March 24. ISW has not observed sufficient evidence to change assessed advances in Mariupol between March 31 and April 1, though Russian forces likely have advanced.

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.