

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 21, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron  
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\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 20, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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
# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of April 19, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron, and Zach Coles  
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
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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of April 21, 2022, 3:00 PM ET






# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of April 20, 2022, 3:00 PM ET





# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of April 19, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Note: We have updated our map in Kharkiv Oblast north of Kharkiv City and near Derhachi to show our current assessment of the probable front line north of Kharkiv based on observing new data on Russian indirect fire on villages in this region. These strikes corroborate local authorities' statements about Russian forces in the Derhachi area. Some of the Ukrainian gains shown likely occurred before April 19, but we have only just acquired sufficient evidence and clarity on Ukrainian and Russian operations to reflect them accurately in the map of April 19. These changes are not the result of changes on the ground in the past 24 hours.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of April 21, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Note: We have updated our map in Kherson to reflect an unconfirmed report that unknown assailants killed a pro-Russian blogger in Kherson City on April 21, likely for collaborating with Russian occupation authorities in the city. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted on April 21 that civilians are also engaging in daily non-violent sabotage activities in Kherson.



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


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Note: We have updated our map in northern Kherson Oblast to recode area north of Nova Kakhovka as Russian-controlled territory based on observing new reports of Russian occupation activities in villages in these areas. Russian forces have controlled this area before April 20, but we have only just acquired sufficient evidence and clarity on Russian operations to reflect them accurately in the map of April 20.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of April 19, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Note: Ukrainian authorities claimed on April 14 that the Ukrainian 80th Airmobile Brigade (which previously operated near Mykolaiv) liberated unspecified villages in southern Ukraine, but did not name those villages for operational security reasons. We will update our maps to reflect this data once we can confirm this claimed counterattack.




# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of April 21, 2022, 3:00 ET



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
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
# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of April 19, 2022, 3:00 ET



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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Mariupol as of April 21, 2022, 3:00 ET




Russian forces continue their grinding advance into Mariupol, which they have encircled and are bombarding. Russian forces began penetrating Mariupol's city center on March 24. Ukraine's 36th Marine Brigade reported escaping encirclement at the Ilyich Metallurgical Plant and reuniting with the Ukrainian Azov Regiment on April 12, prompting Russian reports of mass Ukrainian surrender. Russian forces advanced toward the Port of Mariupol from southern and northern directions on April 15 and April 16, likely to encircle the remaining Ukrainian forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces control all of Mariupol except the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine on April 21, but there are reports of street fighting. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Russian forces to stop the assault on Azovstal on April 21 in favor of a siege.

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


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