

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron, and Peter Mills
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
Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Thomas Bergeron
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
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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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
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
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We reassessed Russian control to the Kozacha Lopan – Nova Kozacha – Lobanivka line in northern Kharkiv given the Ukrainian General Staff report that Russian forces shelled Ukrainian positions in Udy, Kharkiv. We never observed evidence of Ukrainian counterattacks in the rural Udy area, indicating these control of terrain changes likely did not occur in the past several days. This reduced Russian-controlled area in our map of May 1 does not indicate that Ukrainian forces made further gains in the past 24 hours, only that we have received sufficiently detailed and reliable reporting of previous implied gains to adjust our map. We recoded Chornohlazivka, Kalynove, and Shapovalivka to Ukrainian counteroffensives given the observed pattern of Ukrainian counteroffensives in Prudianka and Karasivka. Evidence of mine attacks in Chornohlazivka and Kalynove from late April support the assessment that Russian forces no longer occupy these areas. ISW will update its assessments based on observing and verifying more information.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Note: We recoded Russian control over Zolota Balka and Shevchenkivka, Kherson Oblast, to Russian assessed advances based on the Kherson Oblast Administration report of Russian artillery fire in the area on May 4. Ukrainian forces also announced regaining control over four unspecified villages along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border on May 3. ISW will update our map once open sources name the liberated settlements.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 3, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Note: We recoded assessed Russian advance west of Snihurivka from Chervone and Novopetrivka to Ukrainian counteroffensives given this territory likely had to be liberated to support the April 27 counteroffensive on Shyroke, Novopetrivka, and Lyubin. ISW will update our maps once we can verify more data.


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
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
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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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
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
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Mariupol as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



The Kremlin declared victory in Mariupol on April 21 after capturing the city besides Ukrainian holdouts in the encircled Azovstal Metallurgical Combine. Russian forces reportedly conducted an assault on remaining Ukrainian defenders at Azovstal on May 4. Ukrainian forces engaged in small-scale street fights in the Left Bank District outside Azovstal on April 27. Russian war reporters filmed some Russian elements redeploying from Mariupol northward on April 24 and April 25. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not mention Ukrainian defensive activity near the port of Mariupol or Primorsky District on April 22, indicating Russian clearing efforts. The Kremlin will spin the (still incomplete) capture of Mariupol into a major victory in Ukraine to compensate for stalled or failed Russian offensives elsewhere.

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
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The Kremlin declared victory in Mariupol on April 21 after capturing the city besides Ukrainian holdouts in the encircled Azovstal Metallurgical Combine. Russian forces continued naval artillery and air strikes on remaining Ukrainian defenders at Azovstal on May 2. Ukrainian forces engaged in small-scale street fights in the Left Bank District outside Azovstal on April 27. Russian war reporters filmed some Russian elements redeploying from Mariupol northward on April 24 and April 25. The Ukrainian General Staff notably did not mention Ukrainian defensive activity near the port of Mariupol or Primorsky District on April 22, indicating Russian clearing efforts. The Kremlin will spin the (still incomplete) capture of Mariupol into a major victory in Ukraine to compensate for stalled or failed Russian offensives elsewhere.

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
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
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
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Moldova Situational Map as of May 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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