

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 2, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Ezgi Yazici
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of May 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Thomas Bergeron
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 2, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |
| Key Ukrainian Roads | Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives |
| Russian Ground Lines of Communication | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian* Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of May 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 2, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We recessed assessed Russian advance back to the assessed Russian control line on the left bank of the Inhulets River in Kherson Oblast given we have not seen Russian forces operating on the right bank of the river given the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. Combat footage from Starosillya from June 1 supports this assessment. We advanced Ukrainian counteroffensives to Davydov Brid given Ukrainian media is referring to the settlement as Ukrainian-liberated. We will update our map when we collect more data. We also expanded Russian control to Vysokopillia, Potmkyne, and Novovooznesenske after observing Ukrainian casualties that failed to capture Vysokopillia on May 31.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We scaled back Ukrainian counteroffensive in Davydiv Brid east of the Inhulets River based on the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command report that Russian forces destroyed bridges to Davydiv Brid and Velyka Oleksandrivka on May 31. Social media users prematurely implied that Ukrainian forces fully liberated the village on May 31, but the Ukrainian General Staff did not confirm these reports. Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Oleksiy Arestovich stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counteroffensive near the village of Davydiv Brid and stated that if this counteroffensive is successful, then Ukraine will cut off the Russian group operating in northern Kherson closer to Kryvyi Rih.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We coded a new Ukrainian counteroffensive in Davydiv Brid east of the Inhulets River on May 31 given social media reports showing two Ukrainian pontoon bridges to the settlement and reports of Russian airstrikes in the area. Social media users implied that Ukrainian forces fully liberated the village on May 31, but the Ukrainian General Staff did not confirm these reports. ISW will adjust our maps if open sources reveal more information about the success of the counteroffensive. Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Oleksiy Arestovich stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counteroffensive near the village of Davydiv Brid and stated that if this counteroffensive is successful, then Ukraine will cut off the Russian group operating in northern Kherson closer to Kryvyi Rih.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We coded a new Ukrainian counteroffensive south of Davydiv Brid east of the Inhulets River near Bilohirka, Bila Krynytsia, Lozove, and Andriyivka based off observing new information between May 27 and May 29. Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Oleksiy Arestovich stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counteroffensive near the village of Davydiv Brid and stated that if this counteroffensive is successful, then Ukraine will cut off the Russian group operating in northern Kherson closer to Kryvyi Rih. Arestovich said that Ukrainian forces did not cross the Inhulets river at Davydiv Brid directly, but a little down the river, supporting an assessment that a Ukrainian crossing of the Inhulets River likely occurred around the Bilohirka-Lozove area. The Ukrainian General Staff report of 0600 May 29 states that Russian forces in this area suffered losses took up defense on unfavorable borders near the village of Kostromka. The General Staff's report of 1800 May 29 specified additional Russian territorial losses and stated that Russian forces are moving reserves to restore lost positions near Andriyivka, Bilohirka, and Bila Krynytsia.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of May 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We coded a new Ukrainian counteroffensive south of Davydiv Brid east of the Inhulets River near Bilohirka, Bila Krynytsia, Lozove, and Andriyivka based off observing new information between May 27 and May 29. Ukrainian Presidential Adviser Oleksiy Arestovich stated on May 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counteroffensive near the village of Davydiv Brid and stated that if this counteroffensive is successful, then Ukraine will cut off the Russian group operating in northern Kherson closer to Kryvyi Rih. Arestovich said that Ukrainian forces did not cross the Inhulets river at Davydiv Brid directly, but a little down the river, supporting an assessment that a Ukrainian crossing of the Inhulets River likely occurred around the Bilohirka-Lozove area. The Ukrainian General Staff report of 0600 May 29 states that Russian forces in this area suffered losses took up defense on unfavorable borders near the village of Kostromka. The General Staff's report of 1800 May 29 specified additional Russian territorial losses and stated that Russian forces are moving reserves to restore lost positions near Andriyivka, Bilohirka, and Bila Krynytsia.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of June 2, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▨ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of June 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of May 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of May 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




- | | | |
|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

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Note: ISW expanded Russian assessed advances over the northern outskirts of Severodonetsk based on geolocated videos of Russian forces conducting ground assaults in the area on May 27.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of May 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of June 2, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We expanded Russian advances to the eastern part of Severodonetsk based on the Ukrainian General Staff report that Russian forces advanced in eastern Severodonetsk on June 1. We recessed assessed Russian advances near Bobrove given the Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Russian forces failed to capture Bobrove.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of June 1, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We expanded Russian advances to the eastern part of Severodonetsk based on the Ukrainian General Staff report that Russian forces advanced in eastern Severodonetsk on June 1. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai said that Russian forces controlling 70 percent of Severodonetsk on June 1. ISW will adjust our maps once more open sources confirm the location of Russian troops in Severodonetsk.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of May 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We expanded Russian advances to central neighborhood of Severodonetsk based on geolocated videos of Chechen units operating in the area on May 30. Geolocated social media videos also showed Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the neighborhood on May 29.


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of May 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We expanded Russian advances to the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River between Severodonetsk and Ozerne given Russian telegram channel Voenkor Kotenok Z claimed on May 30 that Russian forces have taken control of the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets river, minus the section in Severodonetsk. The Ukrainian General Staff report of 1800 May 30 states that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are regrouping and preparing for an offensive and that Russian forces tried to reconnoiter routes of advance through water obstacles. This unspecified water obstacle is likely the Siverskyi Donets River. This change encompasses the towns of Dibrova and Stary Karavan, which Russian forces claimed to have captured on May 30. We have not observed direct evidence of Russian forces taking Dibrova and Stary Karavan but have no reason to doubt these claims at this time. We will adjust our assessment if new evidence clarifies the situation on the ground.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of May 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We reshaped our assessment of the Severodonetsk eastern frontline after observing new information on May 28. We expanded Russian assessed advances from the east to Osklonivka given that Luhansk Governor Serhiy Haidai stated on May 28 that Russian forces retreated in the area of Osklonivka. The Ukrainian General Staff Report of 1800 May 28 stated that Russian forces conducted assaults against Borivske, indicating that Russian forces were likely west of Osklonivka. We also expanded assessed Russian advances from the north from Oleksandrivka and Smolianynove. We have not observed direct evidence for Russian forces overrunning Ukrainian positions in Oleksandrivka nor Smolianynove, but an advance from this direction would make sense given the reported fighting near Metolkine, which was unlikely to have been from an unsupported salient from Voronove. We will update our map when we collect more information.