

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 7, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros and Kateryna Stepanenko

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\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 6, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 5, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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# Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 3, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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**Map of Eastern Ukraine: Russian Military Advances (May and June 2022)**

**Legend:**

- Russian military advances in May and June 2022
- Russian military advances in May 2022
- Russian military advances in June 2022
- Russian military advances in May 2022

**Key Locations and Regions:**




- Belgorod Oblast:** Ruski Tyshky, Ternova, Vovchansk, Velykyi Burluk.
- Kharkiv Oblast:** Kharkiv City, Chuhuiv, Kupiansk, Izyum, Raikhorodok-Kramatorsk, Popasna, Bakhmut, Kostiantynivka, Myrnohrad, Horlivka, Yenakiieve, Shakhtarsk, Donetsk.
- Valuysky Raion:** Vovchansk.
- Donetsk Oblast:** Izyum, Raikhorodok-Kramatorsk, Popasna, Bakhmut, Kostiantynivka, Myrnohrad, Horlivka, Yenakiieve, Shakhtarsk, Donetsk.
- Severodonetsk Raion:** Severodonetsk.

**Scale:** 0 to 160 Kilometers.

**Text Boxes:**

- The governor of Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces are moving to Izyum from the directions of Vovchansk and Kupiansk on May 5.
- The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed control over Sviatohirsk on June 7.
- Radius of 25 kilometers around Kharkiv (geodesic distance measurement).


**Map by George Barros and Katerina Stepanenko**  
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- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
|  Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours |  Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 |  Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory |
|  Key Ukrainian Roads                       |  Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*                     |  Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              |
|  Russian Ground Lines of Communication     |  Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory           |  Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare              |

Note: ISW is unable to verify Russian reports that Ukrainian forces crossed the Pechenihiy Reservoir, established positions in Khotomlyia in late May, and are operating on the road spanning Primorskoye - Martovoye - Pershotravnevoye - Khotomlyia as of June 2. We recessed Russian control in this area and recoded it as Russian advances on June 4 but will not advance Ukrainian counteroffensives until we observe corroborating evidence.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 6, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 5, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 3, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 7, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: ISW is unable to verify unconfirmed Russian milblogger reports from Rybar and Swodki claiming that Russian forces destroyed the Ukrainian bridgehead near Davydiv Brid and counterattacked across the Inhulets River in Bila Krynytsya on June 5 and 6 at this time. Neither Rybar nor Swodki provided visual evidence for these claims. Official Russian sources have discussed activity in this area. We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensive near Davydiv Brid on June 4 given Ukraine's Operational Command South stated on June 3 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck Russian forces near Davydiv Brid, indicating that Ukrainian forces may not control it. We will update our maps as we collect and confirm more information.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 6, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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


\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensive near Davydiv Brid on June 4 given Ukraine's Operational Command South stated on June 3 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck Russian forces near Davydiv Brid, indicating that Ukrainian forces may not control it. We also expanded Russian advances near Blahodatne in Mykolaiv Oblast on June 4 after observing more geolocated combat footage. We will update our map when we collect more data.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Note: We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensive near Davydov Bridge on June 4 given Ukraine's Operational Command South stated on June 3 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck Russian forces near Davydov Bridge, indicating that Ukrainian forces may not control it. We also expanded Russian advances near Blahodatne in Mykolaiv Oblast on June 4 after observing more geolocated combat footage. We will update our map when we collect more data.



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


\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We recessed assessed Russian advance back to the assessed Russian control line on the left bank of the Inhulets River in Kherson Oblast given we have not seen Russian forces operating on the right bank of the river given the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. Combat footage from Starosillya from June 1 supports this assessment. We advanced Ukrainian counteroffensives to Davydov Brid given Ukrainian media is referring to the settlement as Ukrainian-liberated. We will update our map when we collect more data. We also expanded Russian control to Vysokopillia, Potmkyne, and Novovooznesenske after observing Ukrainian casualties that failed to capture Vysokopillia on May 31.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk as of June 7, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▨ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

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


- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine\*
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


- |   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
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


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


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# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of June 7, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We recessed Ukrainian counteroffensives in Severodonetsk that we coded on June 5. We advanced assessed Russian advance to the Severodonetsk industrial area near the Azot chemical plant given Luhansk Oblast Governor Serhiy Haidai stated on June 6 that the situation in Severodonetsk has "deteriorated" and that Ukrainian forces are holding positions in Severodonetsk's industrial zone. Haidai's June 6 statement marked a significant change in Haidai's characterization of the situation in Severodonetsk from June 5, in which he stated that Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured half of the city. Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov stated on June 6 that Russian forces captured the entire residential area of Severodonetsk, which is consistent with Haidai's June 6 statement. ISW will continue to refine our assessment as we collect and reconcile more data.



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


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


\* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: We refined our assessment of the battle for Severodonetsk using new information from several sources on June 3 - 5. Luhansk Oblast Governor Serhiy Haidai reported on June 5 that Ukrainian forces regained 50 percent of Severodonetsk. Haidai previously reported on June 3 and 4 that Ukrainians forces regained 20 percent of the city. Russian Telegram channel Swodki claimed that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of the western outskirts of Syrotno and Lesna Dacha. We will continue to refine our assessment as we collect more information.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of June 4, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Note: We refined our assessment of the battle for Severodonetsk using new information from several sources on June 3 and 4. Luhansk Oblast Governor Serhiy Haidai reported on June 3 and 4 that Ukrainian forces regained 20 percent of the city. Russian milbloggers Igor Girkin and Moscowcalling claimed on June 4 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack resulting in high losses among Chechen units in Severodonetsk but that the counterattack does not change the strategic situation. Russian Telegram channel Voenkor Kotylenok Z reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack. We will continue to refine our assessment as we collect more information.



# Assessed Control of Terrain Around Severodonetsk as of June 3, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Note: We recessed assessed Russia advance from Metolkine, Luhansk Oblast, given Luhansk Oblast Governor Serhiy Haidai reported on June 3 that Russian forces attempted to assault Metolkine but were unsuccessful and retreated to their previous positions. We recessed assessed Russian advances near Bobrove given the Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 2 that Russian forces failed to capture Bobrove.