

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of January 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, and Will Kiellm
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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 28, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of December 27, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of January 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



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Light reconnaissance elements of the Ukrainian Carlson special volunteer unit placed a Ukrainian flag on a tower in the wetlands on the left bank of the Dniester River, approximately 600 meters south of Kherson City and claimed the area will become a Ukrainian bridgehead that will support future operations to further liberate southern Kherson on December 3. ISW does not assess that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead or lodgment in this location as Carlson claimed as of December 3. The Carlson element's ability to operate in the area uncontested and the lack of observed Russian fortifications or defensive forces in the area indicate that Russian forces do not exercise full control over the area. Russian control lines are likely south of the Konk River.


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
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
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
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of January 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- | | | |
|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours | Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Major Railroads |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24 | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine* | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | |

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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of December 31, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- + Major Railroads
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of December 30, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
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
Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of December 29, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



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- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of December 28, 2022, 3:00 PM ET




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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of January 2, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours

Key Ukrainian Roads

Russian Ground Lines of Communication

Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24

Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*

Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory

Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

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The Ukrainian Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine published an audio intercept on December 22 in which a Russian soldier operating in the vicinity of Chervonopopivka supported reports that Ukrainian forces captured part of the R-66 Kreminna-Svatove road in the vicinity of Zhytlivka (just south of Chervonopopivka). The Ukrainian General Staff has repeatedly reported since November 30 that Russian forces shelled Chervonopopivka, indicating Russian forces no longer control Chervonopopivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to establish a position in Chervonopopivka on November 27, indicating Ukrainian maneuvers near Chervonopopivka. The R-66 runs through Chervonopopivka and the road's capture by Ukrainian forces would be consistent with the evidence presented in the intercepted phone call plus the Ukrainian General Staff's reports.

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Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours

Key Ukrainian Roads

Russian Ground Lines of Communication

Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24

Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*

Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory

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


- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Key Ukrainian Roads
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
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Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory

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
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Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of December 28, 2022, 3:00 PM ET



Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours

Key Ukrainian Roads

Russian Ground Lines of Communication

Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24

Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*

Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory

Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory


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