

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker

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* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Christina Harward, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes,
Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros**

June 8, 2024, 7:30pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on June 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet *RT* on June 8 that Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.[1] Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose and not to conduct offensive operations.[2] Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.[3] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.[4] Russian

forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as of early May.[5] It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about 15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[6]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive 2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.[7] There are six operational Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.[8] This figure is not incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000 new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.[10] Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.[11] This careful balance between Russian casualties and newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.[12] ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.[13] The availability of new combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate between intensified offensive operations.

Mashovets stated that Russian forces have accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).[14] Russian forces have likely not properly trained or equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited mechanized assaults.[15] ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.[16] These reported limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.[17] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.[18] North Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.[20] A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.[21] One Russian milblogger, however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.[22]

Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or destroyed the other 73 percent.[23] Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2 gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.[24] The *Financial Times* (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.[25] Shmyhal stated that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian energy generation facilities.[26] Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter 2024-2025.[27] Ukraine's nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.[28] The head of Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.[29] Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.[30]

US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.[31] Biden apologized for the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian aggression.[32] Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.[33] ISW continues to assess that the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere in the theater.[34]

Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. *Bloomberg* reported on June 7 that former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.[35] *Bloomberg* reported that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West. *Bloomberg* cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic sacrifices.[36] *Bloomberg* reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.[37] *Bloomberg* cited anonymous sources as saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or as being done under pressure.


Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[38] The *Economist* reported on May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central Bank.[39] The *Economist* reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take so much change. The *Economist* noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin, implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022. Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.[40] Putin has recently been preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate her honesty given her track record for stability.[41]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stry Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.[42] The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a hospital in Moscow.[43] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Matsehora in absentia for treason.[44]

Key Takeaways:

- **The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength.**
- **Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves.**
- **Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8.**
- **Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity.**
- **US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7.**
- **Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine.**
- **Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.**
- **Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted tactical counterattacks northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk on June 7 and 8 while Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vovchansk, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[45] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Russian forces have launched more than 300 guided glide bombs at Vovchansk since May 1, 2024.[46] Voloshyn also claimed on June 8 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over most of Vovchansk, implying that Ukrainian forces recently conducted tactical counterattacks within Vovchansk.[47] German outlet *BILD* reported on June 8 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Vovchansk and liberated several of the town's blocks.[48] ISW is unable to verify reports of successful Ukrainian counterattacks within Vovchansk at this time. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 7 that the Ukrainian first line of defense has stalled Russian advances in the Kharkiv direction and that Russian forces have pulled back some units operating in the Kharkiv direction from the frontline.[49]


Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kharkiv as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Geolocated footage posted on June 7 indicates that Russian forces seized Hlyboke.

Geolocated footage posted on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Starytsya.

Radius of 25 kilometers around Kharkiv (geodesic distance measurement)



Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Noel Mikkelsen, Daniel Mealie, Thomas Bergeron, Mitchell Belcher, and Tom Thacker
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- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- ▬ Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- ▨ Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- ▬ Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- ▬ Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Russian Field Fortifications
- ▬ Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- ▬ Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives


* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Russian forces likely recently seized Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) amid continued fighting in the area on June 8. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced to southern Hlyboke and likely seized the settlement.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack and advanced on the outskirts of Hlyboke, but another Russian milblogger refuted this claim.[51] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces likely pushed Russian forces from the dacha area north of Lyptsi and southwest of Hlyboke.[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk and continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces made limited advances northeast of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[53] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields southeast of Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming this claim.[54] Russian forces launched assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Ivanivka, and Andriivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske, Druzhelyubivka, Novosadove, and Hrekivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area on June 7 and 8.[55] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian counterattacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.[56]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk), Zolotarivka (east of Siversk), Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), and Rozdolivka (south of Siversk) on June 7 and 8.[57] Russian milbloggers noted on June 7 and 8 that there are criticisms that Russian forces conducted assaults near Bilohorivka with a poor understanding of commanding modern combat operations and suffered losses.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations in the area on June 8. Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced within central Kanal Microraion (easternmost Chasiv Yar).[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within northern, central, and southern Kanal Microraion, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims.[60] Another Russian milblogger claimed on June 7 that Russian forces advanced 100 meters westward within Kalynivka.[61] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, within eastern Chasiv Yar in Kanal and Novyi microraions, east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiiivka and Andriivka on June 7 and 8.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces may be using new laser-guided projectiles in the Chasiv Yar area, although ISW has not observed wider reporting about such Russian capabilities near Chasiv Yar.[63] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 58th Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[64]


Assessed Control of Terrain near Chasiv Yar as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces reportedly advanced northwest of Avdiivka amid intensifying Russian offensive operations in the area as of June 8. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and control up to half of the settlement.[65] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near and within Sokil (northwest of Avdiivka).[66] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Avdiivka near Novooleksandrivka, Novopokrovske, Yevhenivka, Sokil, and Novoselivka Persha; west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka, Karlivka, Umanske, and Netaylove; and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske on June 7 and


8.[67] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled almost 220 Russian assaults in the Pokrovsk direction (northwest of Avdiivka) in the past week and that Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove (west and southwest of Donetsk City) directions.[68] Voloshyn stated that elements of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction are constraining the offensive activity of elements of at least three Russian combat brigades.[69] Voloshyn added that Russian forces in the area have large reserves, replenish losses quickly, and have committed their most-prepared units to assaults.[70] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating within Sokil.[71]

Assessed Control of Terrain Northwest of Avdiivka as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on June 8. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Solodke (southwest of Donetsk City) during a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[72] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Paraskoviivka and Kostyantynivka on June 7 and 8.[73] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th

AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and unspecified elements of the DNR 1st AC are reportedly operating near Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City).[74]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area south of Velyka Novosilka near Zavitne Bazhannya, Urozhaine, and Staromayorske on June 7 and 8.[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian sources claimed on June 8 that Russian forces advanced near Robotyne, but ISW has not observed visual evidence confirming these claims. Chairperson of the Russian Presidential Administration's Commission on Sovereignty Issues and co-chairperson of the Russian occupation integration council Vladimir Rogov (who frequently makes reports of dubious credibility about the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline) claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Robotyne and that Ukrainian forces' nearest positions are about 500 to 700 meters north of Robotyne's northern outskirts.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne).[77] Russian forces reportedly attacked near Robotyne; east of Robotyne near Verbove; northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novopokrovka; and south of Robotyne near Novoprokopivka on June 7 and 8.[78] Russian forces also launched assaults west and northwest of Robotyne near Kopani and south of Mali Shcherbaky, respectively.[79] Elements of the Russian Guards 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



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
- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
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- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Emerging land in the Kakhovka Reservoir
- Russian Field Fortifications

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: A Russian source claimed on June 5 that Russian forces advanced 500 meters along a one-and-one-half-kilometer-wide front northeast of Robotyne.

Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully attack Ukraine’s limited tactical bridgehead in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near Krynky on June 7 and June 8.[81] Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on June 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a store in occupied Sadove (the east bank of Kherson Oblast) and killed 22 people.[82]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 8, 2024, 3:00 PM ET



Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched several drones over occupied Crimea overnight on June 7 to 8. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down five drones and jammed four drones over Crimea, and that Russian forces destroyed two Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea that were moving in the direction of Crimea.[83] Russian sources claimed that there were audible

explosions at the Striletska Bay, where elements of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) destroyed a naval drone.[84]

The United Kingdom MoD reported on June 8 that satellite imagery shows that Russian forces installed eight barges on the southern side of the Kerch Strait Bridge.[85] The UK MoD noted that Russian forces began installing the barges on May 10 and completed the installation by May 22, and assessed that the Russian military likely seeks to defend the bridge and the shipping channel from Ukrainian unmanned surface vehicles (USV). The UK MoD observed that storms have previously damaged other barriers and this damage had likely reduced their effectiveness. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that the recent Ukrainian attack on the Russian tugboat shows that Russian forces overestimated the effectiveness of these barriers. Pletenchuk added that Russian forces will try to restore ferries across the Kerch Strait, which Ukrainian forces previously damaged.[86] Pletenchuk also noted that Russian officials will finish the construction of the alternative railway route through southern Ukraine by the end of 2024, but that the ferry remains the main Russian logistics tool for supplying occupied Crimea.

The Russian BSF appears to have recently transferred ships to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. The Ukrainian Navy reported that there is one Russian ship in the Black Sea and seven in the Sea of Azov, of which three are cruise missile carriers with 24 Kalibr cruise missiles.[87] Pletenchuk stated that the large Russian naval groupings in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are likely part of a Russian plan to reduce the vulnerability of Russian ships to drone strikes.[88] Pletenchuk explained that the Russian naval command may have understood that crowding Russian naval assets in Novorossiysk, Russia, could be too dangerous for Russian forces. ISW recently observed satellite imagery showing that Russian forces have pulled at least 18 naval vessels from the port in Novorossiysk with roughly half remaining in the immediate area and half traveling in the Black Sea.[89]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted limited drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on June 7 to 8. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-59 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast and 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight.[90] Oleshchuk reported that Ukrainian forces shot down the Kh-59 missile and nine Shahed drones over Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian strikes damaged an unspecified infrastructure facility in the oblast.[91] Russian milbloggers amplified footage of fires allegedly in Kharkiv City and at an oil depot in Hrebinky, Kyiv Oblast, but Ukrainian forces did not report Russian drone or missile strikes in these areas.[92]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Russian forces have launched over 10,000 glide bombs at Ukraine since January 1, 2024, including more than 3,2000 glide bombs just in May 2024.[93]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on June 8 that Russian ultranationalist pro-war Telegram channels circulated edited footage on June 7 in which claimed servicemen of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment declared that the regiment was not destroyed in battle contrary to recent claims.[94] Footage published on June 2 shows a Russian soldier claiming to be from the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 5th Company stating that only 12 people remained in his company of the original 100 personnel who fought near Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast.[95] *Astra* reported that unspecified Russian actors altered an unrelated video published by an unspecified BARS unit on June 5 and claimed that this video showed elements of the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The BARS personnel appealed to viewers to donate drones to the unit in the original video, and unspecified actors dubbed the audio of this video with the refutation of the destruction of the 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment.[96] The BARS personnel notably cover their mouths in their original video, making it easy for social media actors to replace the video's original audio with fake audio as viewers cannot see that the false audio does not match the movements of the soldiers' mouths.[97]

Russian federal subjects continue to recruit personnel to staff volunteer formations. Dagestani regional news outlet *Golos Stepi* reported on June 4 that the Republic of Dagestan is recruiting personnel for the "Kaspiy" ("Caspian") volunteer detachment from either Russian inactive reservists (also known in Russian as *zapasniki*) or individuals who have not served in the Russian military.[98] *Golos Stepi* reported that the "Kaspiy" detachment is recruiting riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, mortar men, snipers, signalmen, and other specialties for six-, eight-, or 12-month contracts with the Russian MoD. Candidates must be between 20 and 60 years old, and the advertisement promises a monthly salary of 205,000 rubles (about \$2,292), unspecified benefits upon signing, social benefits, and contract veteran status upon completion of the volunteer service contract.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian defense enterprises continue to develop electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes. The Development Director of Russian EW and anti-drone development company Trimix (3mx), Sergey Shandobylo, stated on June 8 that 3mx is developing an EW drone jammer capable of turning off the engines of enemy drones while they are mid-air and plans to introduce this jammer by the end of 2024.[99] Shandobylo also stated that 3mx is currently testing the "Tamerlan" comprehensive system for protecting Russian objects from drone strikes at an unspecified oil depot. Shandobylo claimed that the Tamerlan system can detect drones up to three kilometers away and track the drone on radar up to 500 meters away until the system suppresses it.[100]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Moldovan outlet *Telegraph* reported on June 8 that Moldovan Party of Action and Solidarity member of parliament Oazu Nantoi stated that the Kremlin is utilizing the Moldovan pro-Russian "Victory" electoral bloc to conduct information operations in Moldova and mobilize the pro-Russian "fifth column" in Moldova.[101] Nantoi stated that the Kremlin aims to spread disinformation, create fear and chaos in Moldova, and manipulate and control Moldovan society. Nantoi called on Moldova to combat the media channels and political financing that are part of Russia's hybrid operations in Moldova. Nantoi compared the Kremlin's use of the Victory bloc in Moldova to the Kremlin's use of the Russian information company "Ninth Wave" to target Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have stated that the Kremlin funds "Ninth Wave" and uses it to spread false narratives about Ukraine in the West.[102] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin aims to utilize the Victory electoral bloc, which pro-Russian and Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan opposition politicians created in April 2024, to destabilize Moldovan society and democracy.[103]

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) reportedly placed former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whom Ukrainian authorities imprisoned on politically motivated charges under pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, on Russia's wanted list.[104] The Russian MVD previously placed other current and former Ukrainian political and military officials on the wanted list. The Kremlin is likely trying to discredit the current and previous pro-Western Ukrainian governments that supported the 2004 Orange Revolution and followed the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity.[105]

The Kremlin is likely attempting to use current and former pro-Russian Western officials to lend legitimacy to Kremlin narratives about the West. Former Austrian Foreign Minister Karin Kneissl claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire *TASS* on June 8 that President of Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik told her that the West is planning to "divide" Russia into multiple parts – a known narrative often amplified and leveraged by Kremlin officials to excuse Russia's own aggressions against the West.[106] Kneissl has close ties to the Kremlin and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Kremlin has leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to influence the Balkans.[107]

Russian milbloggers continued to amplify critical Ukrainian political voices who criticized the Ukrainian frontline situation on June 8.[108]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Belarusian service reported on June 7 that satellite imagery shows that Belarus is constructing two new specialized storage facilities, of which at least one element has an Iskander-M missile system, at the base of the Belarusian 465th Missile Brigade in Asipovichy, Mogliev Oblast.[109] RFE/RL cited commercially-available satellite imagery collected through July 5, 2023 and May 19, 2024, and noted that these new storage facilities appear visually similar to other Belarusian facilities built between Fall 2022 and April 2023, presumably to house

Iskanders. RFE/RL assessed that each of these hangars can store up to 12 combat vehicles, and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated in February 2024 that Belarus has two Iskander-M batteries, or 24 combat vehicles. RFE/RL quoted defense analyst Konrad Muzyka, stating that Belarus may be building these new hangars for a new Iskander-M battery to complete the formation of a full Iskander brigade.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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