


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Tom Thacker, Harrison Hurwitz, and David Schulert
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- | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2025

**Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, and George Barros
with William Runkel**

February 2, 2025, 3:45 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.


Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:20 am ET on February 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a former boarding school dormitory holding 84 local Russian civilians preparing to evacuate and four Ukrainian police officers.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike wounded four people and killed four.[2] The Ukrainian Air Force warned that Russian sources are attempting to blame Ukraine for the strike.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and senior Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike from Sumy Oblast against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha.[4] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike.[5] Russian opposition outlet *Agentstvo* reported that Russian state-run TV stations *Channel One (Perviy Kanal)* and *NTV* claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike against a dormitory holding civilians in Sudzha but also reported Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast.[6] ISW is unable to independently verify the details of the strike at this time.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Children's Issues Daria Herasymchuk reported on February 2 that Russia has illegally deported at least 20,000 Ukrainian children since 2022 and that Ukraine has repatriated 1,189 children

with support from humanitarian organizations and Qatar, South Africa, and the Vatican.[7] Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have killed Ukrainian parents, kidnapped their children, and transported the children to "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea. Herasymchuk stated that Russian authorities have also separated children from their families in illegal filtration camps. Ukraine's Regional Human Rights Center identified 13 such "rehabilitation" or "evacuation" camps in occupied Crimea alone. Russian authorities reportedly use the camps in occupied Crimea to indoctrinate and militarize Ukrainian children before further deporting them to Russia for adoption. Herasymchuk warned that Russian authorities are increasingly attempting to mobilize Ukrainian teenage boys into the Russian military - a violation of the Geneva Convention.[8] ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[9] The United Nation's Genocide Convention Article 2 defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.[10]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Key Takeaways:

- Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.
- Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

- **Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.**


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 2 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) attacked Kositsa from Russkoye Porechnoye (both northeast of Sudzha) and that Russian forces attacked south of Sudzha near Kurilovka, Plekhovo, and Guyevo and northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo.[11] Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Novoivanovka (northwest of Sudzha).[12]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction
February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 2.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 2 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novomylnsk and Kalynove (both northeast of Kupyansk).[13] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[14] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border near Topoli; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Hlushkivka, and Stepova Novoselivka on February 1 and 2.[15] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian

brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are not conducting mechanized assaults after Ukrainian forces repelled the previous two mechanized assaults and that Russian forces are conducting assaults with infantry, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and cars.[16]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[17] Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Makiivka, and Novomykhailivka on February 1 and 2.[18]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Terny, Yampolivka, and Torske on February 1 and 2 but did not advance.[19] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 2 that Russian forces attacked near Yampolivka with armored vehicle support and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two armored personnel carriers.[20]


Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[21] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Hryhorivka.[22] Russian forces attacked north of Siversk in the direction of Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on February 1 and 2.[23] Ukraine’s Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 2 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Verkhokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two armored fighting vehicles and a buggy.[24]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on February 1 and 2.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[26]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[27] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and east of Toretsk near Krymske on February 1 and 2.[28] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults including armored vehicles, buggies, and scooters about one to two times per week. The officer stated that Russian forces often attack one settlement with three to six

infantry fighting vehicles while attacking a nearby settlement with three to 10 buggies and two to three motorcycles.[29]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 2. Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska railway line northeast of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk) and advanced in northern Baranivka, to southwestern Berezivka (both east of Pokrovsk), south of Nadiivka, to southeastern Sribne, and towards Preobrazhenka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[31] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin and south west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyarivka, Yelyzavetivka, Zvirove, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka, and


Sribne on February 1 and 2.[32] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Novoyelyzavetivka and Novoserhiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards central Uspenivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the southwestern part of the settlement.[34] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces suffered more than 15,000 casualties, of which about 7,000 were killed in action, in the Pokrovsk direction in January 2025.[35] Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[36]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 2 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Dachne, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces have occupied roughly one third of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove), but ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy less than one percent of the settlement.[38] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Andriivka, Ulakly, Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka and Rozdolne on February 1 and 2.[39] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kurakhove direction, and elements of the 68th Tank Regiment and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Dachne.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 2. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 2 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Rivnopil, in southern Novodarivka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[41] Russian forces continued attacking near Novopil and Novosilka (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on February 1 and 2.[42]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Polohy direction on February 2. Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[43]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 2 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky and Nesteryanka on February 1 and 2.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces operating in the Zaporizhia direction collect spare parts from Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones to use in Russian FPV drones.[45] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th

Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[46]



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on February 1 and 2 but did not advance.[47]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction February 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 55 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa oblasts; that 13 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that drones struck Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Slobidskyi Raion, Kharkiv City causing a fire at a production facility and warehouse, and that Russian drones damaged a house and an infrastructure facility in Sumy Oblast.[49]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 2 that Russian forces launched almost 50 missiles, roughly 660 strike drones, and more than 760 guided glide bombs against Ukraine between January 24 and February 2.[50]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 2 that Russian occupation authorities forcibly mobilized around 300 Ukrainian civilians from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to the Russian military between October 31 and December 31, 2024.[51] The GUR, citing the Ukrainian "I Want to Live" hotline, reported that Russian authorities deployed 30 Ukrainian civilians from occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts to an unspecified military unit in occupied Crimea in Fall 2024. The GUR noted that the mobilized Ukrainian civilians face systematic abuse and poor living conditions. Article 51 of the Geneva Convention explicitly prevents an occupying power from compelling the population it occupies to serve in the occupying power's military, including via "pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary recruitment." [52]

A Russian milblogger continued to complain about Russian command failures within the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Moscow Military District) that led to the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) premature announcement of the seizure of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that Russian military personnel operating near Novoyehrovika reported that one company in the 20th CAA's 3rd Motorized Rifle Division had only 30 personnel left following recent assaults and lacked ammunition and that the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division's 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment suffered heavy losses in "stupid" assaults.[54] The milblogger claimed that Russian military authorities postponed efforts to resolve systemic problems within the Russian military leadership following Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian forces are reportedly using ground control systems (GCSs) that can control "swarms" of drones. The Hermes Design Bureau, a subsidiary of the Kaisant anti-drone systems manufacturer, stated on January 31 that it developed a GCS that can operate a "swarm" of unlimited drones using a single remote control.[55] Russian forces are reportedly using the system in Ukraine to operate drones on different frequencies in order to combat electronic warfare (EW).

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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- [1] <https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1885779119180238928> ; <https://t.me/kpszsus/27952> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08UQyHqJREveuqWs9yWbR9LAXCexAmxYhSwNB TAdnexavm2iTTuYQbuVu9tpJDnFvl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T1G1RFmCR1bKbRhVyv3XziBCmp5tVxBCBBftdNFJeFBoYkLkD8DYy7vAD1d42xcHl>
- [2] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0T1G1RFmCR1bKbRhVyv3XziBCmp5tVxBCBBftdNFJeFBoYkLkD8DYy7vAD1d42xcHl>
- [3] <https://t.me/kpszsus/27952>
- [4] https://t.me/mod_russia/48463 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298679 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/298681 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/51447 ; <https://t.me/ombudsmanrf/6088>
- [5] https://t.me/dva_majors/63602 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20498 ; <https://t.me/designersmil/10114> ; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/21432; <https://t.me/Mikle1On/33786> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20875> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20873>; <https://t.me/iamsniper/10531> ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12391 ; <https://t.me/vrogov/19005> ; https://t.me/basurin_e/16837 ; <https://t.me/epoddubny/22338>
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- [9] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2024> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing-occupied>
- [10] <https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/unga/1948/en/13495> ; <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-prevention-and-punishment-crime-genocide>

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[12] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85522> ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5461

[13] https://t.me/z_arhiv/30809 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30806

[14] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61854> ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/30806

[15] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[16] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04XONrDJWsc>; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/02/02/yidut-na-vsomu-shho-ruhayetsya-u-zsu-rozpovily-pro-specyfyku-rosijskyh-atak-nakupyanskomu-napryamku/>

[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8275 ; <https://t.me/skarlatop/4471>

[18] <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/24351> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[19] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[20] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[21] ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8273 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4817

[22] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>

[23] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61856>

[24] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[25] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxr4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMacXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[26] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>

[27] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1886084712940089643>; <https://youtu.be/tmOWoQ5M2ak?si=58PB8eYjkmCFb4tv>

[28] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxr4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMacXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811

[29] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/02/01/navit-na-samokatah-nashi-voyiny-rozpovily-yak-zdijsnyuye-shturmy-vorog-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA>

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8271; https://t.me/Petliura_NOVA/107

[31] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31827>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61857>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61838>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61850>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61851>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61857>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20893>

[32] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxr4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMacXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4811; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61838>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61850>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61851>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61857>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/20882>

[33] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85539>

[34] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61838>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61840>

[35] <https://t.me/osirskiy/1052>

[36] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85543>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153349

[37] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31826>

[38] <https://t.me/yurasumy/20881>

[39] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxr4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>

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[40] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85545> ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13332; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85516>

[41] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>

[42] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037DTce1LeE5hnBrEtoYZ6XUDoV75aqifk6sAJUFqHPPFxR4aNTzV2U1vE6C1R1Deql> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl> ; <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DTbqVGwU8dkA7QwzMAcXYNW07bRP6d1Gmz1ZNbE8NCwGAfSNyuQajAHLRw2KHAL2l>

[43] https://t.me/voin_dv/13151; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153378

[44] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>;
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[45] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23302>

[46] <https://t.me/vrogov/19004>

[47] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ciZhtdRfMR8CyYQhp7ejicEys7dtN32mDJCCZYQqsXLm2Fn9NyEoKFh8wfAbeZhGl>;
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[48] <https://t.me/kpszsu/27965>

[49] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/37789; <https://www.facebook.com/share/p/18bWTMuhyt/>;
<https://suspilne dot media/sumy/938887-vlucanna-sahedu-u-s-sad-na-sumsini-poskodzenij-dvopoverhovij-budinok/>; https://suspilne dot media/938869-rf-obstrilala-internat-v-sudzi-u-piratini-zastrelili-pracivnika-tck-11-zagiblih-cerez-udar-po-poltavi-1075-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1738478213&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ;
<https://t.me/synegubov/12899>

[50] <https://suspilne dot media/939003-sotni-udariv-zelenskij-rozpoviv-skillkoma-raketami-i-bpla-udarila-rf-po-ukraini-cogo-tizna/>;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/zelenskyy.official/?ref=embed_video;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/4814

[51] <https://t.me/DIUkraine/5314>

[52] <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51>

[53] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025>

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/63620 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/63641

[55] <https://tass dot ru/novaya-tehnika-vs-rf/23018895>

**Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan,
Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan**

February 1, 2025, 3pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on February 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems suitable for intercepting such missiles.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[3] The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City.[4] The


Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).[5]

A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones.[7] Another Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea.[8] Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.[9]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.**
- **A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha), Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha), and Nikolayevo-Darino (east of Sudzha); 400 meters near Kurilovka; and more than 150 meters in Makhnovka (both south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[10] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast stated that Russian forces are increasing guided glide bomb strikes against Kursk Oblast.[11] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed about 19 Russian heavy and light armored vehicles during an unsuccessful Russian attack, after which Russian forces switched to attacking in small infantry groups. Elements of the Russian BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Korenevsky Raion; elements of the "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Kashtan" Detachment are reportedly operating near Berdin (northeast of Sudzha); and elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Nikolayevo-Darino.[12]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on January 31 and February 1.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Zelene (north of Kharkiv City).[14]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced west of Orlyanka (east of Kupyansk).[15] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces seized Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[16] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk and along the international border near Topoli; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Stepova Novoselivka; and south of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka on January 31 and February 1.[17] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Dvorichna.[18] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian

brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian infantry attacked in groups of two to 30 personnel.[19] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces first attack with less trained infantry who identify Ukrainian firing positions, after which better trained infantry attack on Ukrainian forces' flanks. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the northern and western outskirts of Novomylnsk (northeast of Kupyansk and Dvorichna).[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions in northern Zapadne (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[21] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), reinforced by elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and Zapadne.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (southeast of Borova), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[22] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahyrzove, Lovoza, Bohuslavka, and Pishchane and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Makiivka and towards Novomykhailivka on January 31 and February 1.[23] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 47th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[24] A Russian milblogger continued to claim that the Russian MoD's January 20 claim that Russian forces seized Novoyehorivka is inaccurate and causing unnecessary losses among elements of the 84th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th CAA, MMD) that continue to attack the settlement.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Terny (west of Lyman), Ivanivka, and Novosadove (both northwest of Lyman), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Terny, Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and towards Zelena Dolyne and west of Lyman near Torske on January 31 and February 1.[27] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area east of Lyman.[28]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 1 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on January 31 and February 1.[29] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 1 that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon near Verkhokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces damaged two armored fighting vehicles involved in the assault.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that difficult terrain and Ukrainian defenses are slowing Russian advances in Bilohorivka.[31] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on February 1 that


Russian forces operating in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions maintain the tactical reserves needed to conduct rotations.[32]

Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar.[33] Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Block-9 mine, Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on January 31 and February 1.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar).[35] Elements of the Russian "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade; 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps); 3rd Airborne (VDV) Battalion and 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[36]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on February 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk.[37] The Russian MoD claimed on January 31 that elements of the Russian 101st Separate Rifle Regiment (likely 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Krymske (north of Toretsk).[38] ISW currently does not assess that Russian forces have advanced in Krymske, however. Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and Krymske on January 31 and February 1.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on February 1 that the Russian command mostly deploys mobilized personnel from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to attack in the area.[40] The officer noted that Russian forces occasionally commit well-equipped and trained assault groups from other unspecified areas of the frontline to assault operations in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk) and recently advanced on the northern outskirts of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[41] Russian forces continued attacking Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Sribne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, and Kotlyarivka on January 31 and February 1.[42] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the 228th and 428th motorized rifle regiments, and 6th and 80th tank regiments (90 Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Novoandriivka area.[43]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 1. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[44] Russian forces continued attacking west of Kurakhove near Dachne, Ulakly, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozdolne and Zelenivka on January 31 and February 1.[45] Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 67th Rifle Regiment or 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are attacking Andriivka from the northeast and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigade (51st CAA) are attacking Andriivka from Shevchenko (just east of Andriivka).[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, EMD) are attacking Dachne from the

Zelenivka-Yantarne area (southwest of Kurakhove) and elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking Dachne from the east.

The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 31 and February 1.[48] Elements of the Russian 3rd Battalion of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Velyka Novosilka.[49] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the areas north through southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[50]




Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, southeast of Hulyaipole near Stepanivka, south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, and southwest of Hulyaipole near Zahirne.[51]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Huliaipole Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced north of Robotyne amid continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 1 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced south of Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne).[52] Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbak and Nesteryanka on January 31 and February 1.[53] Drone operators of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on January 31 and February 1 but did not advance.

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction
February 1, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about problems with Russian armored vehicles. A Russian milblogger complained on February 1 that the Russian military is struggling to transport infantry in frontline areas on armored vehicles and that Russian forces are suffering high losses during transport – likely due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[55] The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD’s unwillingness in previous decades to innovate armored vehicles and called for Russia to develop an analog to the US M113 armored personnel carrier.[56]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2ybV7ZLeXS9BfBz9QBLhwuoWBCZ1gVzLPYq55erM5kG9EdfZDN3bhcRsC23EYJL3cl>; <https://t.me/otukharkiv/4034>
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**Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,
and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

January 31, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on January 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about \$2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of defense production in Ukraine.[1] Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros (about \$207 million).[2] Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.[3]

Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area.[4] Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024.[5] Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near Dvorichna, as part of this broader

intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west [right] bank of the Oskil River), advanced in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna).[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk.[7] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October 2024.[8] The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22 alone.[9] The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a priority sector for Russian forces.[10]


Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), credited elements of the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th CAA) with seizing Dvorichna on January 28.[11] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 25 that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA), the Russian Volunteer Corps, and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are attacking Dvorichna from the south, advanced to the P-79 Dvorichna-Kupyansk highway, and advanced to Kindrashivka (south of Zapadne and north of Kupyansk) as part of efforts to bypass Zapadne from the south.[12] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has also redeployed most of the 6th CAA's artillery to the Dvorichna area, including elements of the 9th Artillery Brigade.[13]

The tempo of Russian offensive operations along this sector of the front was generally much lower than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine throughout most of 2024 and Russian units in the area are likely well-rested and prepared to begin a months-long campaign to envelop Kupyansk. The Russian military does not appear to have significant uncommitted reserves to funnel into this effort, but the Russian military command may be willing to redeploy frontline units from another sector of the frontline to exploit any significant tactical gains in the Dvorichna-Kupyansk area.[14] Mashovets suggested that the Russian military command may redeploy elements of the 6th CAA, including elements of its 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Motorized Rifle Division, from the Vovchansk area (northeast of Kharkiv City) to Dvorichna if Russian forces begin to make substantial advances north of Kupyansk.[15] The Russian military command may want to redeploy additional elements of the 6th CAA to the Dvorichna area rather than redeploying forces from another relatively inactive area, as redeploying forces that are relatively nearby and are subordinated to the same formation as the forces already north of Kupyansk could help reduce command and control (C2) and coordination issues between frontline units operating immediately north and northwest of Kupyansk. Russian forces have historically struggled with C2 issues when redeploying units from multiple discrete formations and areas of the frontline to new

efforts, a problem that was particularly notable during the Russian defense against Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.[16]

Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also participating in the envelopment of Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil River, and pressure Borova. Mashovets stated recently that elements of the 1st GTA's 4th and 47th tank divisions were unsuccessfully attacking east of Kupyansk near Kotlyarivka.[17] Elements of the 1st GTA, including its 4th and 47th tank divisions, 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, are also reportedly operating along the Kolisnykivka-Kruhlyakivka-Zahryzove salient.[18] Russian forces in this salient have advanced to the east (left) bank of the Oskil River but have thus far struggled to cross the river. Russian advances beyond the Oskil River and further Russian advances in the Dvorichna area are a necessary first step in Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk from the northwest and southwest. The Oskil River will likely continue to constrain further Russian advances westward from the Kruhlyakivka salient, however. Elements of the 1st GTA are also operating near Lozova and Zelenyi Hai (both southeast of the Kruhlyakivka salient) and have been attacking westward to expand the southern flank of the salient, suggesting that Russian forces are also trying to push towards Borova (southwest of the Kolisnykivka-Zelenyi Hai line). It is unclear if elements of the 1st GTA will be able to undertake two simultaneous operational efforts to advance on Borova and cross the Oskil River to support Russian efforts to envelop Kupyansk.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces' seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 was Russia's first relatively successful envelopment after Russian forces regained the theater-wide initiative in Fall 2023, and Russian forces spent four months closing a gap 12 to 15 kilometers wide and ultimately forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw under threat of tactical encirclement. The seizure of Avdiivka likely served as the Russian military command's blueprint for future envelopments in other frontline areas. The Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' effort to envelop Vuhledar successfully forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw from Vuhledar, and Russian forces seized the settlement in October 2024.[19] Elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces were then able to leverage the seizure of Vuhledar,

advance further west, and interdict Ukrainian egress routes to envelop and seize Velyka Novosilka in January 2025.[20] Russian forces have been successful in closing smaller envelopments around Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka, but ongoing Russian efforts to conduct larger envelopments around Pokrovsk and Kupyansk will test the extent of Russian capabilities.

The Russian military command also appears to be experimenting with involving multiple military districts in a single envelopment. The Russian military command achieved significant tactical successes via envelopments in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025, possibly due in part to keeping these two operational efforts under a single command – the Eastern Grouping of Forces. Having a unified command over both these directions likely helped minimize coordination issues and ensured a cohesive and unified vision in operational-level planning in the area. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces is currently overseeing the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast and southwest by bringing together tactical advances near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) in an arc around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and closing a gap that is currently 30 kilometers wide.[21] The Russian military command appears to be involving elements of both the 6th CAA (LMD) and 1st GTA (MMD) to envelop Kupyansk, which could complicate offensive operations in the area. The Russian military command will likely continue to experiment with envelopments of various depths and involving various force groupings as it works to further refine this method and learn from battlefield successes and failures.

The Russian military's ability to iterate on this method across multiple military districts is notable and indicates that the Russian General Staff may be improving its ability to disseminate lessons learned across multiple sectors of the frontline. Russian forces have previously failed to learn and implement lessons learned across areas of responsibility (AoRs), which has resulted in costly troop and armored vehicle losses throughout the frontline over the last three years.[22] Russian forces have historically been more adept at learning and implementing lessons among units within a single grouping of forces/military district, but Russian forces' ability to undertake an envelopment in the Kupyansk direction modeled on Russian activity in Donetsk Oblast indicates that the Russian General Staff is at least attempting to disseminate lessons learned and possibly new doctrine throughout the theater.[23]

The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future. Russian forces have been incrementally working to push Ukrainian forces from the east bank of the Oskil River since Winter 2023-2024, and the Russian military command has previously deprioritized the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman line in favor of other operational efforts in Ukraine.[24] The envelopment of Kupyansk will almost certainly be a months-long effort that requires Russian forces to close a gap 25 to 30 kilometers wide while also fording and maintaining logistics across the Oskil River, seizing small settlements in their path, and repelling Ukrainian counterattacks. Mashovets and a Russian milblogger have suggested that the Russian military command may intend to leverage advances near Dvorichna and Vovchansk to advance on Velykyi Burluk from the northwest and southeast.[25] Russian forces are currently 30 and 35 kilometers from Velykyi Burluk from their closest point of advance in the Kupyansk and Vovchansk directions respectively, and Russian forces could spend six months to a year making slow, grinding advances toward Velykyi Burluk before they truly threaten the settlement.


Russian commanders do not seem concerned about the speed or consistency of their advances in Ukraine, likely because they believe that the war will drag on until Russia militarily defeats Ukraine. The Russian military expended four months on the seizure of Avdiivka, spent most of 2024 working to level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast, and has devoted the last three years to seizing the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but does not appear particularly concerned with expediting these advances.[26] Putin has previously articulated a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely and has repeatedly indicated that he has no interest in a resolution of the war on any terms but those he dictates.[27] Putin's commanders are internalizing these statements and likely coming to the logical conclusion that Putin has no interest in ending the war and intends to continue fighting until he accomplishes his objectives in Ukraine, which are the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and the categorical destruction of the Ukrainian military.[28]

This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian forces' recent envelopments have demonstrated that these efforts require substantial numbers of personnel, armor, and artillery systems to sustain their tempo of advance. The personnel and vehicle losses that Russia is suffering to make these creeping, gradual advances are unsustainable given Russia's current force generation and defense industrial capacities. Reports of Russian tank and armored vehicle losses in 2024 indicate, for example, that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to exhaust its finite Soviet-era stocks.[29] Russia's current monthly recruitment rate is also likely either just equal to or below the quantity needed to replace Russia's monthly casualty rate one-to-one, but there are reports that select Russian regions are failing to meet their monthly recruitment quotas as citizens are less willing to volunteer to fight.[30] Russia's ability to continue slowly enveloping settlements, instead of attempting to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that penetrates Ukraine's defensive lines and quickly achieves operationally significant advances, in the medium to long term is contingent on Russia's ability to supply the high quantities of personnel and materiel needed to sustain these operations.

Russian forces are also intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in fields north of Sukhi Yaly (southwest of Kurakhove) during a motorized assault and have likely collapsed the southern part of the Ukrainian pocket along the Zelenivka-Sukhi Yaly-Yantarne line.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced northeast of Sukhi Yaly, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are prioritizing advances towards Kostyantynopil from the south and Andriivka from the north (both west of Kurakhove) to encircle Ukrainian forces near Dachne and Ulakly (both west of Kurakhove and east of the Kostyantynopil-Andriivka line).[33] Russian forces recently advanced across fields up to the eastern outskirts of Andriivka, and further advances in and south of Andriivka will likely complicate Ukrainian forces' ability to withdraw from the pocket.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 31 that Russian forces also advanced to central Andriivka and pushed Ukrainian forces to the outskirts of Kostyantynopil but that Russian forces have not yet entered Kostyantynopil.[35]

Russian forces are also pushing against the pocket from its eastern side. ISW assessed on January 28 that Russian forces likely advanced in fields southeast of Dachne, and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 29 and 30 that Russian forces further advanced towards the settlement.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 31 that there are reports that Russian forces control half of Dachne and that Russian forces may encircle Ukrainian forces near Dachne if Russian forces cut the H-15 highway near Ulakly.[37] Footage published on January 31 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a Ukrainian bridge across the Sukhi Yaly River near Kostyantynopil, and a Russian milblogger noted that this is the second bridge that Russian forces have destroyed in the area – likely part of the Russian effort to trap Ukrainian forces in the pocket.[38] Russian forces likely aim to close or collapse the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove to free up Russian forces operating in the area for offensive operations elsewhere, such as advances towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border from either the Pokrovsk direction or the Velyka Novosilka direction, as ISW has previously assessed.[39]

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Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia's economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated on January 31 that Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities reached an agreement to accept an EU package totaling 64 million euros (about \$66.3 million).[40] Recean stated that 20 million euros (about \$20.7 million) will go towards purchasing gas for Transnistria and that another 10 million euros (about \$10.3 million) will go to Moldova for its electricity purchases. The EU will also give Moldova 34 million euros (about \$35.2 million) to support its federal budget. Russian business outlet *Kommersant* reported on January 30 that unspecified sources stated that Transnistria will use its EU-allocated funds to buy gas on the European market from February 1 to 10 through Moldovan state electricity company Energoatom, which Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz will then

supply to Transnistria.[41] *Kommersant's* sources stated that Transnistria intends to use Russian funding to buy gas from a yet-to-be-determined Hungarian company starting February 11. Transnistria's acceptance of the EU aid heavily degrades Russia's economic influence over Transnistria, as free Russian gas supplies to Transnistria's power plant supported electricity exports that sustained Transnistria's budget.[42] Russian and pro-Kremlin Transnistrian authorities will likely attempt to play up Russia's role in providing Transnistria with limited funding for gas purchases starting in mid-February in order to promote Russia as Transnistria's benefactor and savior. EU funding for Moldova's electricity purchases will also likely degrade the efficacy of Russian anti-EU narratives, particularly those about Moldova's turn to higher-priced European electricity, ahead of the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.


Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Unmanned Systems Forces, and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery in Volgograd City on the night of January 30 to 31, causing an explosion in the area.[43] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on January 31 that the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery is the sixth largest oil refinery in Russia.[44] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed on January 31 that drone debris caused a fire at an unspecified oil refinery in the oblast.[45] A Russian insider source posted footage purportedly showing an explosion near the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery.[46] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Lukoil-Volgogradneftoperobka Oil Refinery in February and May 2024.[47]

Key Takeaways:

- **The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31.**
- **Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.**
- **Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.**
- **Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are also participating in the envelopment of Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil River, and pressure Borova.**
- **Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.**

- **The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.**
- **This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.**
- **Russian forces are also intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.**
- **Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia's economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic.**
- **Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**
- **Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)


- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued assaults in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 31 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 600 meters in Makhnovka (south of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked in forested areas near Nikolskiy (northwest of Sudzha) and Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novaya Sorochina and Staraya Sorochina (both northwest of Sudzha at the northernmost point of the salient).[50] Elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Pogrebki (northwest of Sudzha), and drone operators of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating in the Sudzha direction.[51]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that Ukrainian missile and artillery forces destroyed a Russian command post in Rylsk (northwest of Sudzha).[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the January 31 strike is part of an ongoing Ukrainian operation aimed at destroying Russian command posts and depriving Russian forces of effective command and control (C2) in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.[53]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on January 30 and 31 and did not advance.[54] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Bati” Detachment are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[55]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in other areas of the Kupyansk direction on January 31, attacking east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 30 and 31.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Petropavlivka.[57] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 31 that Russian forces usually conduct assault operations during the daytime and artillery strikes at night.[58] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are continuing to leverage manpower advantages to conduct meat assaults against Ukrainian forces in this direction. Elements of the Russian

375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[59]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 31 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and east of Borova near Kopanky on January 30 and 31.[60] Elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]- including the 84th Reconnaissance Battalion- are reportedly attacking near Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[61]

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 31. Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[62] Russian forces continued attacking north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Balka Zhuravka (formerly Nevske), Yampolivka, Terny, and Novolyubivka; and southeast of Borova near Novomykhailivka on January 30 and 31.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Yampolivka.[64] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Lyman direction.[65]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 31 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 31 that Russian forces advanced into Verkhokamyanske (east of Siversk).[66] Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Spirne on January 30 and 31.[67] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on January 31 that Russian forces attacked with armored vehicle support near Bilohorivka and Verkhokamyanske and that Ukrainian forces destroyed and damaged 10 armored fighting vehicles involved in the assault.[68] Drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd

Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[69]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on January 31 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pivnichnyi Microraion (northern Chasiv Yar) and advanced elsewhere within Chasiv Yar, including near the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar, and toward Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar).[70] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Bila Hora, and Predtechyne on January 30 and 31.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Shevchenko Microraion (southwestern Chasiv Yar) is a contested "gray" zone.[72] Drone operators of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar, and elements of the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Chasiv Yar.[73]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Chasiv Yar January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 31. Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Petrivka (west of Toretsk) and eliminated the pocket between Toretsk and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[74] Additional geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Toretsk.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Shcherbynivka and that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[76] ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are likely to leverage the seizure of Toretsk to advance quickly into more open fields west of the settlement, as Russian forces may prioritize applying pressure on the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025.[77] ISW also recently assessed that Russian forces may continue to prioritize the Pokrovsk direction in order to eliminate the Ukrainian


pocket between Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and Toretsk.[78] Russian forces attacked within Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Krymske, and south of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on January 30 and 31.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces have seized half of the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the area.[80] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized 70 percent of Krymske. ISW has not observed any geolocated evidence of Russian advances into Krymske.



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 31. Geolocated footage published on January 29 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk).[81] The Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD] claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novovasylivka (southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 1.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed

on January 30 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk) and south of Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to eastern Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[83] Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, Myrolyubivka, and Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Novoandriivka, Nadiivka, Zvirove, Zaporizhzhia, and Preobrazhenka on January 30 and 31.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Uspenivka and that Russian forces are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near Nadiivka.[85] Reuters reported on January 31 that the deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces have much higher quantities of infantry in the area and are attacking in small groups that are willing to take high casualties.[86] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are "adeptly" exploiting the terrain and low-visibility weather conditions to hide from Ukrainian drones near Pokrovsk. Elements of the "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight for Russia, are reportedly operating in the area.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are entering the easternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on a regular basis.[88] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim but has observed geolocated confirmation that Russian forces are roughly four kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border at their nearest point south of Udachne.


See topline for further updates on Russian activity in the Kurakhove direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on January 31. Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and Zelenivka on January 30 and 31.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers north of Rozlyv, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this


claim.[90] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 68th Tank Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD [Southern Military District]) are reportedly operating in Dachne; elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove; elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Bahatyr direction (west of Kurakhove); and drone operators of the "Vizantiya" detachment are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on January 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Rozdolne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and north of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[92] Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 30 and 31.[93] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in unspecified areas of the Velyka Novosilka direction.[94] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Velyka Novosilka.[95]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia direction on January 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Zaporizhzhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 31 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne and south of Zaporizhzhia City) and advanced to the center of the settlement.[96] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claimed Russian advance, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on January 31.[97] Artillery elements of the Russian 50th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne).[98]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dniipro direction and on the islands of the Dniipro River Delta on January 30 and 31.[99]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction January 31, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 31 that Russian forces launched 102 Shahed and decoy drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Kursk and Bryansk oblasts; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odessa oblasts; that 37 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; that drones impacted Sumy, Odesa, and Cherkasy oblasts; and that four drones remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 0900. Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* reported on January 31 that a Russian drone damaged an apartment building in

Cherkasy City, Cherkasy Oblast.[101] Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper reported on January 31 that Russian drones struck Chornomorsk and damaged a hospital, a warehouse, and buildings.[102]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast. *The New York Times* (NYT) reported on January 30 that Ukrainian and US officials stated that the Russian military command pulled North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast from the battlefield after suffering heavy casualties and that Ukrainian forces have not seen North Korean forces in the area for about two weeks (since about January 17).[103] US officials noted that the withdrawal of North Korean forces from the battlefield may be temporary and that North Korean forces could return to combat after receiving more training or after the Russian military command comes up with a way to deploy the North Korean forces and avoid such high losses. A Ukrainian official stated that North Korean forces' disorganization and lack of cohesion with Russian forces quickly increased North Korean casualties. Ukrainian officials and soldiers stated that North Korean forces had been advancing with few armored vehicles and rarely paused to regroup or fall back. The NYT reported that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un might expect Russia's help in advancing North Korea's missile program as well as diplomatic assistance at the United Nations (UN) in exchange for sending North Korean forces to Russia. ISW recently reported that North Korean forces likely withdrew from active combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[104] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskiy recently stated that Ukrainian forces have inflicted roughly 5,500 casualties on the 11,000 to 12,000-strong North Korean military contingent since November 2024.[105] The reported withdrawal of North Korean forces follows repeated statements from Ukrainian officials noting that North Korean troops were suffering unsustainable casualty rates in Kursk Oblast.[106]

The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place Kremlin-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions, by creating similar programs at the regional level. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nitkin announced on January 31 the creation of the "Heroes, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast" program, a regional analogue of the "Time of Heroes" program.[107] Kursk and Irkutsk Oblast authorities similarly recently announced their regional analogues of the "Time of Heroes" program, and the Kremlin instructed all Russian federal subjects to establish these programs.[108]

The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives for signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of ongoing efforts to bolster voluntary recruitment, including in occupied Ukraine in violation of the Geneva Convention. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin announced on January 31 that Samara Oblast increased the one-time payment for recruits who sign contracts between February 1 and December 31, 2025, from 500,000 rubles to 700,000 rubles (\$5,072 to \$7,101).[109] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration posted an advertisement offering individuals who sign military contracts in occupied Kherson Oblast a one-time payment of 800,000 rubles (\$8,116), a monthly salary of 210,000 rubles (\$2,130), and an annual salary of 3.32 million rubles (\$33,684).[110] Article 51 of the Geneva Convention explicitly prevents an occupying power from compelling the population it occupies to serve in the occupying power's military, including via "pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary recruitment." [111]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it plans to introduce new technology using artificial intelligence (AI) to the battlefield in Ukraine.[112] Several senior Russian civilian and defense officials attended the “ERA Technopolis” exhibition about AI on January 31 and selected unspecified “samples and technologies” for Russian forces to use on the battlefield in Ukraine.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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