


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

## February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



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Map by George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Daniel Mealie, Tom Thacker, Harrison Hurwitz, and David Schulert  
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- |  |  |                                    |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours                      | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia         |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory                | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare              | Ukrainian Advances in Russia       |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine                           |  |                                    |

**Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

**February 9, 2025, 4:45 pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on February 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.**

South Korea's *Yonhap News Agency* reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs.[1] Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet *Vazhnye Istorii* reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019.[2] Russian opposition outlet *Mediazona* reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.[3]

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example.[5] North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces' initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces' artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.[6]) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

**The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.** Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.[7] The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.

**North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.** Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security.[8] Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

**German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.** German outlet *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported on February 8, citing a classified internal German report, that the German Ministry of Defense (MoD) is investigating possible espionage connected to six drone sightings near the Schwesing Airbase, where Ukrainian forces have trained to operate Patriot air defense systems, from January 9 to 29, 2025.[9] *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported that German forces attempted to jam or down the drones, including with HP-47 jammers, RADIS drone detection systems, and Wingman counter-drone systems, but that German forces failed to down the drones or locate the operators in all six instances. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported that German authorities described the drones as "specialized objects" with modifications and are likely not commercially available. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* noted that authorities suspect that the operators launched the drones from ships in the North or Baltic seas and that the operators could be connected to Russia. A Bundeswehr spokesperson reportedly told *Süddeutsche Zeitung* that the German military has observed an increase in drones flying over German military facilities in an unspecified timeframe.


**Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.** Russia has been developing and improving its drone capabilities, including drone resistance to electronic warfare (EW) and Russia's own EW capabilities, in its ongoing war against Ukraine. NATO and its member states have increasingly warned of Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO members throughout 2024.[10] Reports that a NATO member state is struggling to combat likely Russian reconnaissance drones demonstrate the need for NATO states to further develop their defensive capabilities as Russia continues to use its experience on the battlefield in Ukraine to innovate new technologies.

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.**

- **The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.**
- **North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.**
- **German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.**
- **Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**
- **Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***


- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

## Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

**Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Sudzha amid continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on February 9.** Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted mechanized attacks southeast of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka.[11] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces counterattacked northwest of Sudzha near Sverdlikovo and Nikolskyi, north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya, and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[12]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southwest of Russkaya Konopelka.[13]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers continued to make conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka (both southeast of Sudzha). Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces partially or completely pushed Ukrainian forces from Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, while others claimed that Russian forces failed to advance during attacks in the area.[14] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are no longer in windbreaks near Ulanok (southeast of Sudzha).[15]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok, and elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[16] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment, "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast; and elements of the 83rd VDV Brigade, 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), and 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[17]

**Russian                      Main                      Effort                      –                      Eastern                      Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**




**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction**  
**February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**




**Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on February 9.** Russian forces attacked near Vovchansk (north of Kharkiv City) on February 8 and 9.[18] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are active on the outskirts of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[19]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Vovchansk**  
**February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in central Vovchansk.[20]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 9 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 8 and 9.[21]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[22] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of "Kontora" detachment of the 375th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and drone operators of the "Tilt" detachment are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[23]


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 9 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahyrzove, and Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on February 8 and 9.[24]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Ivanivka, and Novolyubivka and towards Nove and east of Lyman near Torske on February 8 and 9.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman) in order to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses.[26] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are trying to counterattack northwest of Ivanivka.[27]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Novolyubivka, 2.5 kilometers meters south of Ivanivka, west of Yampolivka, and one kilometer within Yampolivka.[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables near Zarichne (east of Lyman).[29]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**



**Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on February 8 and 9 but did not advance.[30]** Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to bypass Ukrainian positions near Bilohorivka using motorcycles.[31]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on February 8 and 9.[32] Ukrainian military officials reported on February 9 that Ukrainian forces destroyed and damaged two tanks, two armored


personnel carriers, two infantry fighting vehicles, and an armored tractor in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[33]

**Russian-claimed advances:** The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 9 that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka, however, and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces maintain a presence in the settlement.[35] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced north and south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of any of these Russian claims, however.

**Order of Battle:** Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself, east of Toretsk near Krymske, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on February 8 and 9.[38]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction**  
**February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**




Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces advanced along Klymenka Street in northern Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[39]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces are using civilian passenger cars during assaults in the Toretsk direction due to a shortage of armored vehicles.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovaynsk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating within Toretsk.[41]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novotoretske, Vodyane Druhe, Novooleksandrivka, Kalynove, and Zelene Pole; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Preobrazhenka, Pishchane, Nadiivka, Novoserhiivka, Sribne, Uspenivka, Zaporizhzhia, Novoandriivka, and Udachne on February 8 and 9.[42] The Khortytsia Group of Forces also reported that Russian forces attempted a mechanized assault of an unspecified echelon south of Yasenove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and that Ukrainian mines damaged two tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne and Zvirove (south of Pokrovsk) and towards Nadiivka, Sribne, and Pishchane.[44] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the first Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups entered the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[45]





Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Mine No. 3 in southeastern Pishchane.[46]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Zvirove.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 9 indicating that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoyelyzavetivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and within southeastern Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[48]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Udachne and advanced into eastern Zaporizhzhia, northeast of Zvirove, and one kilometer towards Sribne.[49] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on February 9 that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Pokrovsk from the west and are constantly bringing reinforcements to the area.[50] Trehubov noted that Russian forces continue attacking in small assault groups. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian mines are preventing Russian forces from advancing near Kotlyne.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Novoukrainka (southwest of Pokrovsk), and reconnaissance elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia.[52] Elements of the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating in the Russian rear near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[53]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 9 but did not make any confirmed advances.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on February 8 and 9.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control Zelenivka (southwest of Kurakhove).[55]



Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on February 9 that Russian forces advanced towards Ulakly (west of Kurakhove) and along Haharina Street in central Andriivka.[56] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dachne – contradicting limited Russian claims from February 8 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[58] Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Andriivka.[59]


**Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 9.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar on February 8 and 9.[60]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Novyi Komar (north of Velyka Novosilka).[61]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

**Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 9, but Russian forces did not advance.[62]** A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several unsuccessful counterattacks involving two tanks and three infantry fighting vehicles in the Orikhiv direction (north of Robotyne).[63]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 9, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on February 9 that Russian attacks have decreased in the area and that Russian forces are trying to create new assault groups for further attacks but that the accumulation of Russian forces is not significant enough to conduct assault operations for a long period.[64] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.

### Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 9.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Dnipro direction.[65]



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 151 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Volyn, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts and that 74 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that Russian drone strikes hit Kyiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Volyn oblasts.[67]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 9 that Russian forces launched over 10 missiles, almost 750 strike drones, and over 1,260 glide bombs against Ukraine in the past week (between February 2 and 9).[68]

**Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian milblogger amplified a recruitment advertisement for prospective drone operators to sign MoD contracts in Yaroslavl City, advertising one-year contracts with monthly salaries of 240,000 rubles (about \$2,476) and a one-time payment of 1,345,000 rubles (about \$13,877).[69] The advertisement states that people from anywhere within Russia or other CIS states can sign up and receive the benefits.

**Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Russian milbloggers published footage on February 9 showing Russian soldiers installing anti-drone nets over roads, claiming that Russian forces have covered a two-kilometer stretch of road between Bakhmut and Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast with these nets to shield against Ukrainian drone strikes.[70]

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian ethnic and national identity in occupied Ukraine and to militarize Ukrainian children. Ukrainian news outlet *ArmyInform* reported on February 9, citing the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner's Office, that Russian occupation authorities coerced 29,000 Ukrainian children in occupied Crimea to join Russian youth military-patriotic organization Yunarmiya in 2021 and that roughly 7,500 Ukrainian children in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts joined regional Yunarmiya branches in the same time period.[71] *ArmyInform* noted that Russian authorities also send children from occupied Ukraine to train at the Rosgvardia Military Institute in Perm and the Nakhimov Naval School in occupied Mariupol and that Russian authorities plan to double the number of students at the Nakhimov Naval School from 240 in 2024 to 560 in 2025. *ArmyInform* reported that schools in occupied Ukraine hold military-patriotic lessons for schoolchildren every week and have Ukrainian children write letters of support to Russian soldiers.

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



- [1] <https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk>
- [2] <https://storage dot googleapis.com/istories/news/2025/02/04/v-2024-godu-bolee-7-tisyach-severokoreitsev-vekhali-v-rossiyu-s-tselyu-uchebi-na-fone-soobshchenii-ob-uchastii-soldat-iz-kndr-v-voine-s-ukrainoi/index.html> ; [https://t.me/istories\\_media/8882](https://t.me/istories_media/8882)
- [3] <https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/08/koreya>; <https://en dot yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241018006856315?section=nk/nk>
- [4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024>; <https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2024/12/11/a-perfect-storm>
- [5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024>
- [6] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024>
- [7] <https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250209000700315?section=nk/nk>
- [8] <https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1739089983-55802660/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-pays-congratulatory-visit-to-ministry-of-national-defence-on-day-of-kpa-founding/>;  
<http://rodong.rep dot kp/en/index.php?MTVAMjAyNSowMiowOS1IMDEzQA==>
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**Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and George Barros**  
**February 8, 2025, 5:00pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:40am ET on February 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.** Japanese outlet *NHK*, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.[1] *NHK* noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told *Reuters* on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause.[2] A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[3] South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops.[4] ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities.[5] *Reuters* reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea–Russia alliance.[6]

**Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.** Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea.[7] Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions.[8] ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia’s force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war.[9] Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader

conflict with NATO.[10] Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.[11]


**The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.** A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.[12] ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however.[13] A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.[14]

**The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).** Western sources reported on February 7 and 8 that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania disconnected from the centralized Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (BRELL) energy network on February 8 as part of a long-planned effort to integrate more closely with the EU and strengthen regional security.[15] The three countries are temporarily operating independently from the grid and, pending final tests, will synchronize with the EU's grid on February 9. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas wrote on X (formerly Twitter) on February 7 that this move ensures Russia can no longer use energy as a "tool of blackmail"- something Russia has repeatedly leveraged against countries reliant on Russian energy, including Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine.[16] Russia's Ministry of Energy reported on February 8 that Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast, located on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, has also transitioned to autonomous power generation as a result of the Baltic states' decision.[17] Kaliningrad Oblast possesses three gas-fueled and one coal-fired power plant and can reportedly generate a total capacity of 1.88 gigawatts, which the Russian Ministry of Energy claimed is more than twice Kaliningrad's peak energy consumption.[18] It is unclear if Kaliningrad's transition to autonomous power generation will impact daily life or Russian military activity in the region.

## **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.**
- **Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.**
- **The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.**
- **The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.**
- **The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)



- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus


### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Russian forces maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) amid ongoing activity in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on February 8.** Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues southeast of Sudzha near Makhnovka, Cherkasskaya Konopelka, and Fanaseyevka and that Russian forces are clearing nearby forested areas.[19] Two Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces control Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, but another milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces both maintain positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[20]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces maintain positions in southern Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha).[21]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions at the Lotos gas station along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway southeast of Sudzha.[22] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from strongholds near Sverdlikovo (west of Sudzha).[23]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




ORBAT: Drone operators of the Chechen "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), and "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating southeast of Sudzha.[25] Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).[26] Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat-Russia" Motorized Rifle Regiment, Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion, the "Grom" detachment, and Rosgvardia's 116th Special Purpose "Stalhaya" Brigade are operating in Kursk's border areas.[27]

### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group consisting of 13 personnel and partially pushed them back over the international Ukraine-Russia border near Serednya-Buda, Sumy Oblast.[28]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 8 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 7 and 8.[29]



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**




**Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 7 and 8.[30] A Ukrainian brigade reported that elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) unsuccessfully conducted an at least company-sized mechanized assault near Pershotravneve (east of Kupyansk) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 armored vehicles during the assault.[31]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west and northeast of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[32]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces only occupy some areas in the northern part of the settlement.[33]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), with support from elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps, are operating near Dvorichna and advanced 250 to 300 meters southward along the Oskil River towards Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk and southwest of Dvorichna).[34] Elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[35]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 8 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lovoza, east of Borova near Kopanky, and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on February 7 and 8.[36] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated that Russian forces attacked Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) with one tank and three armored personnel carriers and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the vehicles.[37] A Ukrainian regiment reported that Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Lozova direction on the morning of February 7 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two infantry fighting vehicles and one tank during the assault.[38]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating near Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[39] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are also reportedly operating near Makiivka.[40]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 8.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Novolyubivka and towards Nove on February 7 and 8.[41]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and seized the fields east of the settlement.[42] Mashovets reported on February 8 that Russian forces recently seized Terny (northeast of Lyman).[43]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ivanivka (northeast of Lyman).[44]



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 8 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 7 and 8.[45]



Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 8 that Russian forces attacked near Bilohorivka and Verkhokamyanske with motorized and armored vehicle support and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five armored personnel carriers and 11 motorcycles during the attack.[46] A Ukrainian brigade commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces use tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to attack when frozen ground



provides more stable terrain and favor smaller infantry assaults in warmer weather when softer soil makes vehicle movement more difficult.[47]


**Ukrainian forces recently regain lost positions in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the direction on February 8.** Russian forces continued attacking within and near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne and Bila Hora on February 7 and 8.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continues in Shevchenko and Tsekh No. 2 microraions in southern Chasiv Yar and that Russian forces are concentrating attacks towards the T-0504 highway.[49]

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway south of Chasiv Yar.[50]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Russian forces advanced in an area 3.5 kilometers wide and over 1.5 kilometers in depth south of Chasiv Yar and seized the Stupki and Krinichki tracts in the area.[51] The milblogger noted that Russian forces continue to clear Novopivnichnyi Microraion (western Chasiv Yar) and positions south of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Airborne (VDV) Artillery Regiment, 299th VDV Regiment, and the 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in and near Chasiv Yar.[52]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Chasiv Yar Direction February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the direction on February 8.** Russian forces continued attacking near Toretsk and northeast of Toretsk near Krymske on February 7 and 8.[53]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kuzanva, Molodoi Hvardii, and Zhovtneva streets in northern Toretsk.[54]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are conducting clearing operations in Toretsk, Druzhba (east of Toretsk), and Krymske and that Russian forces are only


10 kilometers away from Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[55] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Ukrainian forces hold isolated defensive positions in Toretsk and that Russian forces may spend several weeks clearing Ukrainian forces from the town.[56] A Ukrainian brigade officer operating in Toretsk reported on February 8 that his units are holding in their positions in Toretsk.[57]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Toretsk.[58]

**Ukrainian military officials reported on February 8 that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft on the outskirts of Toretsk.[59]** A Ukrainian brigade operating in the area reported that Ukrainian forces also likely used first-person view (FPV) drones to damage a Russian Mi-8 helicopter that tried to evacuate the Su-25 pilot.[60] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces used Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to down the plane.[61]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 8.**


Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Novooleksandrivka, Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Uspenivka, Kotlyne Pishchane, Nadiivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Zaporizhzhia on February 7 and 8.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Kotlyne and Pishchane.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Kotlyne.[64]

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 8 indicating that Russian forces advanced northeast of Novokalynove and in central Baranivka (both east of Pokrovsk).[65]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups and are conducting fewer mechanized assaults due to foggy weather conditions.[66] An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that the number of Russian assaults south of Pokrovsk has decreased but that fighting remains intense.[67] The officer stated that Russian forces are trying to reach the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway that runs west of Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) suffered significant losses south and southwest of Pokrovsk and that the Russian military command replaced the brigade with part of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD).[68] Mashovets stated that elements of the 433rd and 506th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA), 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA), 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA), 87th Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division), and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk. Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th and 80th tank regiments and 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (all of the 90th Tank Division) are operating along the Nadiivka-Sribne line southwest of Pokrovsk.

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction  
February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**




**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 8 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko and Andriivka; west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil; south of Kurakhove near Dachne; and southwest of Kurakhove near Zelenivka on February 7 and 8.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in western and northwestern Andriivka.[70]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy central Andriivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[71]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 67th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division) are operating on the eastern outskirts of Andriivka and that elements of the 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are operating along the


Shevchenko-Andriivka line.[72] Elements of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[73] See topline text for additional details about the evolving order of battle in the Kurakhove direction and how the Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.



**Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on January 8 but did not advance.[74]**

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

**Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 8 but Russian forces did not advance.[75]** A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked with armored vehicle support near Stepove and Kamyanske (both northwest of Robotyne).[76]




**Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Kherson direction on February 8.**

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[77]



**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction  
February 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 7 and 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 139 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts and that 71 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[79]

**Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed on February 8 the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and the Prosecutor General's Office to take measures to preserve government entitlements granting Russian military personnel fighting in the war to live in government housing.[80]

**Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



[1] [https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250208\\_05/](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250208_05/) ; [https://t.me/istories\\_media/8924](https://t.me/istories_media/8924) <https://t.me/bbcussian/76348>

[2] <https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-lets-do-deal-offering-trump-mineral-partnership-seeking-security-2025-02-07/>; [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13270](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270) ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsyia-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/>

[3] <https://t.me/brygada47/1228>

[4] <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250204006600315?section=nk/nk>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-4-2025>

[5] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2025>

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[7] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13270](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270) ; [https://armyinform.com\\_dot\\_ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsyia-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/](https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2025/02/08/putin-gotuyetsya-zovsim-ne-do-peremovyn-prezydent-zustrivsyia-z-novym-glavoyu-vijskovogo-komitetu-nato/)

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023>

[9] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13270](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13270)

[10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025>

[11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2024>

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[13] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31930>;

[14] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2025>

[15] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lithuania-cuts-russian-power-grid-ties-baltics-prepare-link-with-eu-2025-02-08/> ; <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/baltics-brace-cut-decades-old-ties-russian-grid-2025-02-07/> ; <https://www.freiheit.org/era-russian-energy-manipulations-over> ; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/08/baltic-states-leave-russian-power-grid-in-closer-eu-integration>

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[17] [https://t.me/MID\\_Russia/51765](https://t.me/MID_Russia/51765)

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[19] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/64174](https://t.me/dva_majors/64174) ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31951> ; [https://t.me/sudoplatov\\_official/4120](https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4120) ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/24714> ; [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/20703](https://t.me/rusich_army/20703)

[20] [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/21836](https://t.me/notes_veterans/21836) ; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31924> ;  
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[21] <https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1888001111598186867>; <https://t.me/dshp78/290>

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[24] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/299716](https://t.me/tass_agency/299716) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85877> ;  
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[34] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2545>

[35] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/153912](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153912)

[36] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l> ;  
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[37] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5060](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060)

[38] <https://t.me/fedorenkoys/955>

[39] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548>

[40] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/153938](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/153938)

[41] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l> ;  
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[42] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/8323](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8323); <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=498280896623269>

[43] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548>

[44] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2548>

[45] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido8PPoAPhbFcY1LXYgkM5rCuNRFiZfqtBJf7DygnTdGCHSaBdt1bmcCXwMoh2bc6Pcl> ;  
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[46] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5060](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5060)

[47] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc>; <https://armyinform.com> dot  
[ua/2025/02/08/boloto-cze-klyuchova-perepona-na-siverskomu-napryamku-meteozalezni-shturmy/](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc)

[48] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfgEZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l> ;  
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[49] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878>

[50] <https://x.com/jkmncz/status/1887961714999611653>; [https://t.me/Sever\\_Z/9753](https://t.me/Sever_Z/9753)

[51] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85878>

[52] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23567>

[53] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfg EZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l>;  
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[54] [https://t.me/kurt\\_compani\\_group/590](https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/590);  
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[55] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/23590>

[56] <https://t.me/yurasumy/21004>

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[58] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/85901>

[59] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/5071](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/5071); [https://t.me/ombr\\_28/1796](https://t.me/ombr_28/1796)

[60] [https://t.me/ombr\\_28/1796](https://t.me/ombr_28/1796)

[61] <https://t.me/ButusovPlus/17260>

[62] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2VW5JTtQ6ZEhnSkiRNxvWTt2vYf4LWfg EZVg1rmKoZdoiSwPrRvRhpQfsk94TdyV5l> ;  
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[63] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/61977>

- [64] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/31955>
- [65] <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=973066108339801&set=pcb.973066381673107>
- [66] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc>; <https://armyinform.com> dot  
[ua/2025/02/08/zdijsnyuyut-sproby-zavershyty-svoye-zhyttya-samostijno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-tryvayut-zapekli-boyi/](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc)
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- [68] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2546>
- [69]  
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- [79] [https://t.me/police\\_su\\_region/25771](https://t.me/police_su_region/25771) ; <https://t.me/kyivoda/25092> ; <https://t.me/kpszsu/28328>
- [80] <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/23087787> ; <http://kremlin.ru/acts/assignments/orders/76233>

**Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson,  
Johanna Moore, and George Barros**

**February 7, 2025, 6:15 pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on February 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the February 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**


**Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.**

Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks.[1] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.[3] Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement.[4] ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.[5]



Russian sources provided additional information about the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area.[6] Russian milbloggers widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen drone operators.[7] Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.[8]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kursk Direction February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.** Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the state of the Russian economy.[9] Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer and electronic equipment sectors.

Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52 percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025. Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize, however. (Several studies indicate that Russia's inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.[10]) Mishustin highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.

Mishustin noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy complex is adapting and finding new markets.

Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has "successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia. Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to finance its war effort over the last three years.[11] The liquidity portion of Russia's National Welfare fund may run out by Fall 2025.[12]

**Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country's growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.** Ukraine's First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated on February 7 that Ukraine outperforms Russia in first-person view (FPV) drone production and that drone development is expanding rapidly in Ukraine.[13] Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine has introduced over 1,300 new weapon models, most of which are drones and drone munitions, since February 2022 and that Ukrainian officials approved more than 250 new drone models for use by Ukrainian forces in 2024 alone. Havrylyuk stated that while drones have become a crucial substitute for long-range missiles, Ukrainian forces require continued innovation to counter Russian defenses and stressed that international military assistance is critical for Ukraine, particularly for weapons where Ukrainian domestic production falls short.

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction told the *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)* on February 7 that Ukrainian drone strikes significantly disrupt Russian operations in this direction.[14] The battalion commander noted that Ukrainian drone operators hold some areas of their defense lines in the Pokrovsk direction almost completely independent from infantry support. The commander stated that growing drone supplies have helped sustain Ukraine's defenses despite Russian forces outnumbering Ukrainians ten-to-one in the Pokrovsk direction. The commander highlighted that Ukrainian forces are reportedly inflicting a seven-to-one casualty ratio on Russian troops in the area but need more personnel to fully stop Russian advances in that direction.

ISW previously noted that Ukrainian drone operations have been key in defending against Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction and throughout the frontline, although Ukraine must address its

morale, force generation, and training issues to completely stall the Russian advance in Donetsk Oblast.[15]

**Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the *Washington Post* that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.[16] NOTE: A version of this text also appears in *ISW-CTP's February 7 Iran Update*.** Qasra is very likely referencing some form of economic relief to help improve Syria’s dire economic situation. The interim Syrian government has lobbied for economic relief from various sources since the fall of the Assad regime.[17] Cooperation with Russia could hinder European Union (EU) plans to lift sanctions on Syria, which are contingent on the new Syrian government pursuing a peaceful political future without extremism or involvement from Russia and Iran.[18] An unspecified Russian source told *Bloomberg* on January 28 that talks on Russian basing are “stuck.”[19] Russia has continued to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid ongoing negotiations with the interim Syrian government.[20]

**Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan.** Azerbaijani outlet *APA News*, citing sources familiar with the matter, reported on February 5 that Azerbaijan is preparing to take legal action against Russia in an international court, citing recent clear evidence identifying unspecified Russian actors responsible for the crash and Russia's failure to take responsibility for the crash.[21] Azerbaijan’s intent to sue follows the Azerbaijani Ministry of Digital Development and Transport's February 4 briefing of the initial investigation results attributing the AZAL crash to unspecified "foreign objects." [22]

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev previously accused Russia of attempting to cover up the incident, calling the Kremlin’s response “surprising, regrettable, and infuriating.”[23] Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Aliyev on December 28 that the crash occurred in Russian airspace but stopped short of admitting Russia’s fault in the crash and taking action against those responsible – demands Aliyev set forth following the crash.[24] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on February 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to make another statement regarding the AZAL plane crash.[25]

Azerbaijani outlet *Report.az* noted on February 6 that Azerbaijani officials have also formally notified the Kremlin of the closure of the local branch of the Russian Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (*Rossotrudnichestvo*), a Russian cultural diplomacy agency, citing national security concerns and a move away from “external interference.”[26] Russia currently has over 80 *Rossotrudnichestvo* branches concentrated in Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Central and Southeast Asia aimed at promoting Russian culture, strengthening the influence of the Russian language, supporting “compatriots abroad,” and preserving historical sites abroad with significance to Russia.[27] Moldovan and Ukrainian officials have previously warned that Russian officials use the branches to promote Russian propaganda and conduct “subversive work” abroad.[28]


**Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.[29]** Ukrainian

President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Moysiuk earlier on February 7 from his previous role as Special Envoy for the Implementation of International Security Assurances and Development of the Defense Forces of Ukraine.[30] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Moysiuk will focus on developing Ukraine's Defense Forces, particularly regarding mobilization processes and military training, and Churkin will lead the charge on defense innovations and technological development for Ukraine's military.[31]

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.**
- **The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.**
- **Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country's growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.**
- **Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the *Washington Post* that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are "benefits" for Syria.**
- **Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia's refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan**
- **Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.**
- **The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions.**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**


*Please see topline text for updates on Ukrainian operations in Russia.*

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on February 6 and 7.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on February 7 that there is fighting near Mali Prokhody and Velyki Prokhody (both north of Kharkiv City and west of Lyptsi), but ISW has not observed confirmation or other Russian reporting of fighting in this area.[33]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction**  
**February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on February 6 and 7.[34]

Russian-claimed advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Novomlynsk and Fyholivka (both north of Kupyansk).[35] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Dovhenke (north of Kupyansk and northwest of Dvorichna).[36] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.



The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying tanks with trawlers alongside several lightly armored vehicles in order to transport infantry to the frontline.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces are systematically attempting to cross the Oskil River near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) by transporting two to eight personnel on a rubber boat across the river, accumulating in forested areas on the west bank of the river, and then attacking neighboring settlements.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Fyholikva, and drone operators from the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[39]



**Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on February 7.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Nova Kruhlyakivka, Zeleny Hai, and Lozova; west of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on February 6 and 7.[40]

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on February 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[41]


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked north of Lyman towards Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna and northeast of Lyman near Novolyubivka, Terny, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka on February 6 and 7.[42] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) entered the forested area south of Yampolivka but that Ukrainian forces repelled the attack, making the area a contested "gray zone." [43]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Yampolivka.[44] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim, however.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are deploying small infantry teams consisting of two to three people in a "conveyor belt mode" all day and night.[45] The spokesperson added that the Russian command deployed poorly trained prison recruits or those from disadvantaged families to identify Ukrainian firing points, after which well-trained Russian personnel began to attack.[46] The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), citing a senior Ukrainian lieutenant, reported on February 7 that Russian forces have suffered over 1,000 casualties in assaults against Terny in an unspecified time frame but are now deploying small assault groups that are harder for Ukrainian drones to detect.[47] The WSJ reported that rain and fog hamper drone usage for Russians and Ukrainians, which provides opportunities for Russian forces to conduct large assaults with armored vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampolivka, and elements of the "Shrama" detachment of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[48]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on February 6 and 7.[49]

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on February 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 1L219M "Zoopark-1" counter-battery radar system – which Russian forces use to identify Ukrainian firing positions – in the Siversk direction.[50]


**Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself on February 7 but did not advance in this direction.**[51]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian source claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Avanhard Stadium and Hospital No. 3 in central Chasiv Yar and three residential areas in western Chasiv Yar.[52] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on February 7 that Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar with armored vehicle support, but Ukrainian forces destroyed a tank and an armored vehicle and damaged two additional armored vehicles during the assault.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[54] Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[55]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Chasiv Yar February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces recently advanced in northern Toretsk amid claims that Russian forces seized Toretsk as of February 7.** Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself and north of Toretsk near Dyliivka on February 6 and 7.[56]


Russian-assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Puzanova Street in northern Toretsk.[57]

Russian-claimed advances: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 7 that elements of the Russian 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] [formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Druzhba (east of Toretsk) and that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigades (all part of the 51st CAA) alongside elements of the Russian "Veterany" assault

detachment (likely referring to the "Veterany" Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade [Volunteer Assault Corps]) seized Toretsk.[58] A Russian milblogger also claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however, and has not observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces from some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk. A Russian milblogger noted on February 7 that the Russian MoD does not consider Krymske or the Toretska mine (northeast and north of Toretsk respectively) within the administrative boundaries of Toretsk according to their maps and assessments of Russian advances.[60]

The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces intend to leverage advances in Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk and southwest of Chasiv Yar).[61] Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces raiding Russian positions along Hryhoriia Skovorody streets in northern Toretsk, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions on the outskirts of Toretsk.[62] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances west of Toretsk and the seizure of Toretsk to push towards Kostyantynivka and pressure Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.[63]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in Toretsk February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Myrolyubivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Pishchane, Novooleksandriivka, Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka on February 6 and 7.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Pishchane, Nadiivka, and Zvirove.[65]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are accumulating near Baranivka (east of Pokrovsk) ahead of offensive operations against Tarasivka (north of Barasivka).[66] Ukrainian military expert Petro Chernyk stated on February 7 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction lost about 300-360 personnel per day in early January 2025 but that Russian casualty numbers have decreased


recently.[67] A Ukrainian platoon commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated to the *Wall Street Journal* that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces ten-to-one but that Russian forces are losing at least seven personnel for every one Ukrainian loss.[68] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that the number of Russian attacks this week (February 1 to 7) decreased compared to last week (January 25 to 31) but that fighting remains intense.[69]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on February 7 but did not advance.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Shevchenko, west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka, and southwest of Kurakhove near Dachne on February 6 and 7.[70]




Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove, and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[71]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on February 7 but did not make any confirmed advances.** Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopol, north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne on February 6 and 7.[72]

Russian-claimed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Velyka Novosilka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[73]

**Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast  
February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**




**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)**

**Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 7, but Russian forces did not advance.**[74] Geolocated footage published on February 5 shows Russian forces repelling a platoon-sized Ukrainian mechanized assault near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[75]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Anti-Tank Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[76]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 7.**

**Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction**  
**February 7, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST**



**Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 112 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 81 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts; that 31 decoy drones were "lost;" and that Russian drones struck Sumy, Kyiv, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a guided glide bomb over Zaporizhia Oblast but did not specify the means that Ukrainian forces used.[78] Unconfirmed reports suggested that Ukrainian forces used Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns to shoot down the guided glide bomb, though ISW is unable to verify such reports. [79]

### **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions. The Time of Heroes program announced on February 7 that Russian authorities appointed program participant Nursultan Mussagaleev as acting Orenburg Oblast Deputy Minister of Regional and Information Policy.[80] Orenburg Oblast Governor Denis Pasler expressed confidence that Mussagaleev's military experience in Ukraine will be an asset for the regional government. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported in October 2023 that Mussagaleev participated in the execution of civilians in Bucha.[81] Time of Heroes reported that the program has appointed 23 participants to government and business positions in Russia.[82]

Russia's labor shortage continues to hinder ongoing efforts to expand its defense industrial production. Ukraine's First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk told Ukrainian outlet *Ukriform* on February 7 that Russia has over 1,300 defense industrial facilities with roughly two million employees, but that Russia continues to lack hundreds of thousands of workers.[83] Havrylyuk stated that Russia's efforts to significantly increase weapons production have exacerbated Russia's labor shortage, but that Russia has increased its production of some weapons three- to six-fold since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022 despite this. Havrylyuk noted that Russia is still not able to produce enough weapons to meet the military's needs in Ukraine and is thus relying on Iran and North Korea to supply additional weapons. About 60 percent of Russia's shells fired against Ukraine reportedly are sourced from North Korea as of December 2024, for example.[84] Havrylyuk noted that Russia is working to increase and diversify its domestic drone production.

### **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

Nothing significant to report.

### **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.*

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

The independent Belarusian monitoring group Belarusian Hajun announced on February 7 that it is suspending operations, likely due to the Belarusian government's crackdown against the group.[85] Belarusian authorities had designated the Belarusian Hajun, which tracked military activity in Belarus and reported on Russian troop movements since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as an extremist organization in March 2022.[86] The Belarusian Hajun's telegram page

first reported on February 5 an unauthorized entry into the page that compromised user and owner data.[87] Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on February 7 that Belarusian security forces detained at least one person in connection to the page shortly after the leak.[88]

Belarusian officials continue to highlight increasing military cooperation with Russia. Chairman of the Belarusian State Military-Industrial Committee Dmitry Pantus claimed on February 7 that Belarus' military-technical cooperation with Russia is at a "maximum" and highlighted the increasing number of ventures including joint aircraft manufacturing projects.[89] Pantus also noted that Belarus is actively working on organizing mass first-person view (FPV) drone production and is incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into domestic technological developments.[90]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**

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