


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

April 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter and William Runkel

April 25, 2025, 9:30pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45am ET on April 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during multilateral talks in London on April 23. *The Telegraph* reported on April 25 that the Ukrainian-European proposal contained five points about territory, security guarantees, negotiations, refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).[1] Reuters published the full text of the terms that Ukrainian and European officials reportedly developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25.[2] The proposal as presented by Reuters calls for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with immediate technical negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the United States and European countries; United States-led ceasefire monitoring with support from third countries; robust Ukrainian security guarantees absent Ukraine's NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian children and detained Ukrainian civilians as well as engage in an "all-for-all" prisoner of war (POW) exchange. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian military, calls for an ad hoc group of European states and willing non-European countries to guarantee Ukraine's security, and rejects restrictions on the deployment of any friendly forces to Ukraine.[3]

The Ukrainian-European proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial issues only after the implementation of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the current frontline as a starting framework.[4] The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly

provide Ukraine with "unhindered access" to the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam.[5] The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to regain control over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "with US involvement." The Ukrainian-European proposal also reportedly states that Ukraine's partners will work toward a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue joining the European Union (EU).

The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly calls for the United States and Ukraine to implement the US-Ukraine minerals deal and economic cooperation agreement. The proposal states that US sanctions on Russia may be subject to "gradual easing" if a sustainable peace is achieved and may resume if Russia violates a peace agreement. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine's full reconstruction and financial compensation, including using frozen Russian assets.

Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.[6] Reuters reported that the US plan demands an immediate ceasefire and direct technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.[7] The US plan reportedly provides Ukraine with strong security guarantees from a coalition of European and willing non-European states but also calls for Ukraine to abandon efforts to join NATO while maintaining the option to pursue European Union (EU) membership. The US plan reportedly includes "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over occupied Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk Oblast and parts of occupied Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. **The recognition of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or any other areas of Ukraine under occupation since 2014 would constitute a significant concession to Russia that should be balanced by a significant Russian concession in return.**

The US plan reportedly stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which the United States would operate and which would supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and guarantee Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the United States will implement a mineral deal and economic partnership agreement, calls for Ukraine's full reconstruction, and offers financial compensation to Ukraine, but does not specify the funding source. The US proposal reportedly calls for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming US-Russian economic cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors.

The newly published Reuters document supports and clarifies earlier reporting by *Axios* and *The Telegraph* of the US seven-point proposal to Ukraine, but some details remain unclear.[8] The Reuters document affirms core details, such as territorial arrangements, Ukraine's non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of the ZNPP. The report also clarifies that Ukraine would regain control of the Kinburn Spit, the small part of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia currently occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters document does not address Sumy Oblast, where Russian forces recently began conducting offensive operations, or how the United States and Ukraine would gain access to the ZNPP, given that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are natural barriers between current Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces

would have to partially withdraw from either east (left) bank Kherson Oblast or permit a land bridge across the Kakhovka Reservoir under the US plan, but neither option inherently provides the strategic depth Ukraine would need to defend the ZNPP against further Russian aggression, as ISW has recently reported.[9]

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal. Witkoff met with Putin, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev, and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov.[10] Ushakov stated that the meeting lasted three hours, included discussions about possibly resuming direct Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, and claimed that the meeting brought US and Russian positions about Ukraine and other unspecified issues "closer together." [11] US officials have not reported on the details of Witkoff's meeting with Putin as of the time of this publication.

Bloomberg reported on April 24, citing people familiar with the matter, that Witkoff planned to present a demand that Russia accept Ukraine's right to develop an adequately equipped army and defense industry as part of a peace agreement with Russia.[12] This reported US demand is contrary to the Kremlin's demand for Ukrainian demilitarization – a demand that the Kremlin first made of Ukraine and the West in December 2021.[13] Russia then sought to force Ukraine into demilitarization by launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the Kremlin reiterated demilitarization as a demand in the March 2022 Istanbul negotiations, whose protocols essentially demanded Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and which the Kremlin has identified as its preferred basis for a peace deal in Ukraine.[14] Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined Ukrainian demilitarization and its other pre-war demands as prerequisites for a peace agreement, as these demands would allow Russia to launch renewed aggression from an advantageous position in the future.[15] Russia's acceptance of Ukraine's right to a developed military and defense industrial base would therefore be a significant Russian concession should the United States succeed in gaining Putin's agreement.

That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however. The initial full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine aimed to seize Kyiv in February and March 2022 in order to force Ukraine to capitulate fully, depose the current Ukrainian government, and disarm the Ukrainian military, amounting to the total defeat of Ukraine. Russia failed to achieve this objective because the Ukrainian military, with limited Western support, defeated the Russian attack on Kyiv and stalled Russian offensives in the east and south. Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in early April 2022 and from most of Kharkiv Oblast and all of west-bank Kherson Oblast later in 2022.[16] Russian forces remain unable to launch an offensive operation that could seize Kyiv or recross the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine at this time, and spent 2024 fighting desperately to seize an area nine-tenths the size of Rhode Island. Russia does not have the military power to seize the rest of Ukraine absent a full-scale mobilization of Russian society, and possibly not then, as long as Western support to Ukraine continues.

The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist objectives, moreover. Kremlin mouthpieces, including Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, have laid the rhetorical groundwork for Russia to eventually lay claim to most or all of Ukraine.[17] Russian officials have also doubled down on their demands for regime change in Ukraine and rhetoric intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government as recently as April 24.[18] Both of these efforts in concert indicate that Putin retains his objective of controlling all of Ukraine, but is limited by Russia's inability to achieve this objective militarily.

Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a report on April 25 entitled "80 Years After the Great Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Has Again Covered Europe," which accuses European states and officials of reviving Nazi ideology and creating policies that discriminate against Russian-speaking populations, especially in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.[19] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova amplified this report and claimed that European states are preventing Russia from achieving its long-held objectives of demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine due to this alleged support of Nazism.[20] Russian officials regularly invoke "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[21] Zakharova specifically accused the Baltic States and Poland of justifying and reviving Nazism.

Russian officials have notably leveraged accusations of neo-Nazi ideology to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine, and Russian officials leveraging these narratives against European states - especially the Baltics and Poland - supports ISW's assessment that Russia may be setting informational conditions to justify future aggression against these states as well.[22] Russian officials are likely attempting to discredit European states more broadly in order to deter them from providing further assistance to Ukraine and revitalizing their defense industries in order to set conditions for future Russian aggression against a weakened Europe.[23] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to discrediting Europe in response to European leaders' reinvigorated commitment to rearming Europe in alignment with US President Donald Trump's policy goals.

Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated during the opening ceremony of an annual film festival commemorating Russia's Victory Day at the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C., on April 24 that the Soviet-US military alliance formed during World War II should serve as an example of US-Russian relations today.[24] Darchiev's remarks indicate that the Kremlin aims to portray to its domestic and foreign audiences that US-Russian relations are on the mend and simultaneously exacerbate divisions between the United States and Europe.


Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25. Unknown actors detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) filled with shrapnel, rigged to a vehicle as Moskalik passed the car.[25] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of involvement in Moskalik's assassination.[26] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the attack as of this publication. The Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) claimed responsibility for assassinating the

Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17, 2024, making this the second assassination of a Russian general in Moscow in the last five months.[27]

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during the multilateral talks in London on April 23.**
- **Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.**
- **US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal.**
- **That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however.**
- **Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.**
- **Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Pokrovsk.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced near the international border in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[28] Additional geolocated footage published on April 25 shows that Russian forces reached the northeastern outskirts of Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[29]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 25 that Russian forces advanced into Gornal, to the Psel River northeast of Gornal, and northeast of Oleshnya.[30]

Fighting continued toward Oleshnya and near Gornal on April 24 and 25.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border).[32]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[33] Assault elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and drone elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating and striking Ukrainian positions near Gornal, respectively.[34]

Fighting continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 25.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced in Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[35]

Fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka on April 25.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 and 25 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popovka and near the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast administrative boundary near the international border.[37]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian "15th Tank Regiment" (reportedly 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the "Aida" group of the 204th Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[38]



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Pratsi Street in southern Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[39]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced across the international border northeast of Sadky and entered northern Bilovody (both northeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and northeast of Sumy City near Bilovody and Sadky on April 25.[41]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[42] Elements of the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykolaivka.[43] Drone elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[44]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 25.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on April 25.


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Bohuslavka, northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya and Novoyehorivka, and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on April 24 and 25.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Novyi Mir, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on April 24 and 25.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[47] Elements of elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly attacking in Nove.[48]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnyokamyanske on April 24 and 25.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Markove, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne and near Bila Hora on April 24 and 25.[50] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 25 that Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction recently conducted a company-sized mechanized assault using six armored vehicles and five civilian passenger cars.[51]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 299th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[52] Elements of the "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[53]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near a reservoir north of Toretsk and east of Toretsk near Krymske.[54]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; southwest of Toretsk near Petrivka, Romanivka, Stara Mykolaivka, Kalynove, Leonidivka, Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, Berezivka, and Yelyzavetivka; and west of Toretsk near Petrivka, Romanivka, and toward Shcherbynivka on April 24 and 25.[55] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Fomikha Mine waste heap in northern Toretsk and near Tarasivka.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Stara Mykolaivka.[57] Elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[58] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[59]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 25, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced to southern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk).[61]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on April 24 and 25.[62]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone operations continue to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Lysivka.[63]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) advanced south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and toward Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Uspenivka).[64] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) advanced in northwestern Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Uspenivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, and Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske and Bohdanivka on April 24 and 25.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Uspenivka.[66]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Oleksiivka (west of Kuakhove) and near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne (all southwest of Kurakhove).[67]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka; and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 24 and 25.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[69]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Odradne.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 1.5 kilometers north of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and 500 meters south of Malynivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[71]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 24 and 25.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[73]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Malynivka.[74] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 305th Artillery Brigade (both 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Shevchenko (west of Velyka Novosilka).[75]




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the southeastern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[76]


Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 24 and 25.[77]



Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 25.[78]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces participated in meeting engagements near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City).[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[80]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 103 Shahed and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones in northern and central Ukraine and that 40 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Sumy, Cherkasy, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[82]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 25 purportedly showing a Russian Geran-2 (Russian analogue of the Shahed-136) drone striking a Ukrainian position in an unspecified

location in the Zaporizhia direction, potentially in an area closer to the frontline than the typical Russia Shahed targets in Ukraine's deep rear areas.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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