


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

April 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Nate Trotter,
Anna Harvey, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan**

April 4, 2025, 7:10pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on April 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered. Dmitriev spoke with Fox News and Newsmax while visiting Washington, DC, and attempted to paint Russia as an attractive market for American investment, claiming that the Russian economy is strong and growing despite Western sanctions.[1] Dmitriev also claimed that Russia is ready to collaborate with the United States on unspecified projects involving the Arctic, rare earth minerals, and liquified natural gas (LNG). Dmitriev has recently been at the forefront of Kremlin efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russia mining projects and other avenues of economic and financial cooperation, as ISW previously reported.[2] Dmitriev notably claimed that Russia "is not asking for lifting of sanctions" and "not making any preconditions for specific sanction relief" in response to a question about whether Russia considers sanctions relief a necessary precondition to a ceasefire agreement.[3] The Kremlin, in contrast, has explicitly demanded sanctions relief from the United States as a precondition for entering into a Black Sea strikes ceasefire.[4]

Dmitriev made several other statements that diverge from recent statements by other Kremlin officials, for example, saying that "some security guarantees may be possible" for Ukraine.[5] ISW recently

assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not accept Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine because their acceptance will represent a major concession, and the Kremlin has rejected the idea of making any concessions on its maximalist territorial and security demands from Ukraine.[6] Dmitriev's attempt to present Russia's interests in Ukraine as predominantly economic and financial is also disingenuous. Kremlin officials frequently make demands to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine) as preconditions for any sort of peace agreement.[7] The Kremlin's negotiating position has not changed despite Dmitriev's attempts to soften and deflect from Moscow's demands, and Dmitriev is attempting to use the promise of financial benefits to distract from the Kremlin's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.[8] Rubio noted that, while the United States remains optimistic about facilitating a peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine, it will consider implementing additional sanctions against Russia and may reassess its role in the negotiations and its support for Ukraine if Russia proves to be "unserious" and undermines the negotiation processes. Rubio met Dmitriev on April 4 to convey this message directly.[9] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not genuinely interested in negotiations but is instead prolonging the negotiation process to extract concessions and maximize territorial gains, while it continues to pursue its maximalist ambitions of total Ukrainian capitulation rather than engaging in good-faith negotiations or offering compromises.[10]

A Russian ballistic missile struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people, including children.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the missile damaged residential buildings and a playground, amongst other civilian infrastructure.[12] Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported that the strike damaged 29 apartment buildings and damaged the gas supply to some nearby areas.[13] ISW previously noted that continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy strikes are detrimental to the establishment of a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.[14]

Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile. Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko noted in an April 2 report that Russia used 83 missiles in total throughout March 2024, the lowest number of missiles used in a month since February 2022.[15] Kovalenko assessed that Russian forces are focusing on singular, massive missile strikes accompanied by drone waves, an approach that has hindered Ukraine's ability to intercept incoming missiles. An analysis done by *The Telegraph* found that the number of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine rose by over 50 percent since February 2025 compared to January 2025, partially as a result of Russian efforts to use massive drone strikes to secure concessions from Ukraine during ongoing negotiations with the United States.[16] An unspecified NATO official stated on April 3 that NATO intelligence indicates that Russia is producing a significant number of missiles domestically and purchasing additional missiles from North Korea to increase missile stockpiles in preparation for future large-scale missile strikes against Ukraine.[17] These

assessments are consistent with ISW's observation of recent Russian strike packages, which were composed predominantly of drones.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported on April 4 that Russian forces launched 78 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai overnight on April 3 to 4.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones over the northern, eastern, and central parts of Ukraine and that 22 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drone strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[19]

Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure. Ukrzaliznytsia announced the agreements on April 4 and reported that People's Republic of China (PRC) producers will provide Ukrzaliznytsia with 32 thousand tons of rail, which is enough to build or repair about 245 kilometers of railway.[20] The first 16 thousand tons of rail are expected to ship from the PRC sometime in April and arrive within three months. Ukraine's railway network spans about 19,772 kilometers.[21] These contracts are the result of Ukrzaliznytsia's first open-bid competition since 2021 and indicate Chinese interest in some level of direct economic cooperation with Ukraine.

PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi had reiterated on April 1 that the PRC is willing to play a "constructive role" in ending the war in Ukraine, which is consistent with previous PRC efforts to pose as a neutral mediator despite its growing ties with Russia.[22] A Russian milblogger expressed frustration with the PRC's refusal to fully realize Moscow's desired "no-limits" partnership with the PRC on April 4, claiming that Ukraine is flaunting its cooperation with "Russia's partner." [23] The Russian milblogger also noted that this deal reflects PRC's "real" attitude towards Russia to be of a "nothing personal, just business" nature, and warned that Russia should not expect "self-sacrifice" from the PRC's government.

Russia is reinforcing its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance Russian influence in Africa. Russia, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso agreed on April 3 at an AES summit in Moscow to establish a strategic partnership and strengthen the recently established AES joint armed forces, making Russia the first country to recognize the trilateral joint forces established on July 6, 2024.[24] Russia and AES member states expressed a willingness to jointly combat regional instability and enhance ongoing counterterrorism efforts, with Russia agreeing to provide modern weapons and military training for a planned 5,000-strong joint force that will deploy to the central Sahel region.[25] Bloomberg reported on April 3 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia will utilize military instructors already in the area to conduct such training – likely referring to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Africa Corps, which transported large convoys of equipment into Mali via Guinea in 2025.[26] Russia and the AES also agreed to cooperate in the fields of infrastructure, trade, economics, investment, and banking.[27]


Russia's support for the AES is a long-term strategic endeavor aimed at advancing the Kremlin's geopolitical goals of undermining Western influence in Africa and threatening NATO's southern flank, as the Critical Threats Project's Africa File has routinely assessed.[28] Russia's leading role in AES's military training and weapons procurement may yield additional lucrative benefits in the form of either

plausibly deniable illicit or legitimate resource concession agreements that would grant the Kremlin access to the energy- and mineral-rich region with potentially vast amounts of gold, uranium, and other valuable natural resources.

Key Takeaways:

- **CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine.**
- **The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.**
- **US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.**
- **A Russian ballistic missile struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people, including children.**
- **Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile.**
- **Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure.**
- **Russia is reinforcing its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance Russian influence in Africa.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.**
- **The Russian military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

Russian sources continued to claim on April 4 that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure facilities in Bryansk, Tambov, and Lipetsk oblasts and that Ukrainian forces have "unilaterally" struck Russian energy infrastructure on a daily basis for more than two weeks.[29] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova formally accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire, allegedly by striking Russian civilian objects, on April 4.[30]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 4 that Russian drones struck the Kherson Thermal Energy Station in Kherson City.[31]


Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border on April 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Guyevo, Kursk Oblast (south of Sudzha) and Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha), and reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[32]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the direction of Veselivka, Sumy Oblast (north of Sumy City).[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue operating near the Kursk Oblast border.[34]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[35]

The assistant chief of a Ukrainian border detachment operating in Belgorod Oblast reported on April 4 that Russian forces may launch a large-scale offensive across the entire international border between Russia and Ukraine, including Sumy Oblast, though Ukrainian forces have not observed a significant

buildup of Russian personnel or equipment.[36] The assistant chief noted that Russian forces remain active near the Ukrainian border, with squads of up to 15 personnel attempting to enter Ukrainian territory unsuccessfully.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[37]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on April 2 and 3.[38]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on April 4 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) on April 1, taking advantage of cloudy weather conditions to avoid Ukrainian drones.[39] The battalion commander noted that Russian forces first used motorcycles to try to distract Ukrainian forces, and that Russian assault squads of six to 10 soldiers then attempted to attack Ukrainian positions. The battalion commander emphasized that Russian forces employed an unusual tactic, but that Ukrainian forces were still able to repel the assault using drones.

Order of Battle: A Ukrainian military observer posted a video suggesting that elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) have been operating near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City), but it is unclear when the footage was taken.[40] ISW most recently observed the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment operating northeast of Kupyansk (southeast of the Lyptsi area) in December 2024.[41]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced across the Oskil River northeast of Kupyansk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 and geolocated on April 4 shows that Russian forces advanced across the Oskil River to southeastern Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kamyanka; north, northeast, and south of Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk); in fields northeast of Mala Shaplivka (northwest of Kupyansk); and in fields southeast of Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[43] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Mala Shaplivka and Kindrashivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on April 3 and 4.[45]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and towards Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on April 3 and 4.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have increased the intensity of counterattacks in the Borova direction and that Ukrainian troops are trying to interdict the P-07 Svatove-Kupyansk road.[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Raihorodka-Cherneshchyna (east to southeast of Borova) and Pershotravneve-Kopanky (east of Borova) directions.[48]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Lyman near Nove and Katerynivka and towards Kolodyzai (northeast of Lyman).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Katerynivka, Nove, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Olhivka; and east of Lyman towards Torske on April 3 and 4.[50]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on April 4 that Russian forces have failed to reinforce recent tactical success northeast of Lyman in the Makiivka-Katerynivka-Ivanivka area, despite recent breakthroughs in the area and are now focusing more on cutting off the wide Ukrainian salient between Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman) and Kopanky (east of Borova).[51] Mashovets forecasted that elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (MMD) may soon regroup with elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division and 4th Tank Division (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army, MMD) to enter combat near Ivanivka in order to advance north and northwest from positions in the area. A Ukrainian brigade officer operating in the Lyman direction noted that the situation has "changed significantly" and that Russian forces in this area are using infantry groups of various sizes to attack Ukrainian positions with drone support.[52]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 254th, 283rd, 488th, and 1428 motorized rifle regiments and 59th Tank Regiment (all of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[53]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 4 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka on April 3 and 4.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published April 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to Dniprovska Street in southern Chasiv Yar.[55]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne on April 3 and 4.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[57] Drone elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[58] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[59]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Sormivska Street in southwestern Toretsk.[60]

Russian sources claimed on April 4 that Russian forces seized Oleksandropil, though ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of April 2.[61]


Russian forces recently attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Druzhba, and Dyllivka; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; and west of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Romanivka on April 3 and 4.[62] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 4 that Ukrainian forces

repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least five armored vehicles and an unspecified number of motorcycles in the Toretsk direction.[63]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 4 that Russian redeployments in the Toretsk direction are not aimed at assisting a Russian push to Kostyantynivka but are instead meant to replace exhausted and ineffective elements of the 51st CAA to provide a reinforcement for Russian positions on the left flank of the Russian salient near Yelyzavetivka.[64] A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction are mostly attacking in small assault groups rather than in mechanized assaults with tanks and are attempting to bypass Ukrainian forces and avoid combat engagements while advancing.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th and 163rd tank regiments and its 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (also 8th CAA, SMD), including its 242nd and 255th motorized rifle regiments, and of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[66] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[67] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD), the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet unit), and the 174th Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dylivka.[68]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 4 that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Kotlyne and southeastern Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[69]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[70]


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 4 that Russian forces seized Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Lysivka (south of Pokrovsk).[71] Another Russian milblogger claimed on April 3

that Russian forces advanced west of Preobrazhenka toward Troitske, from the south near Bohdanivka toward Troitske, and from Zaporizhzhia toward Troitske (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[72]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novokalynove; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Pishchane, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Uspenivka, Zvirove, Novooleksandrivka, Novoandriivka, and Kotlyarivka on April 3 and 4.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked near the Udachne-Kotlyne area.[74]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction and drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction April 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced three kilometers near Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and advanced in an area up to one kilometer deep and 1.5 kilometers wide near Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[76] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced west of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[77]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 3 and 4.[78]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 3 that the Russian forces' fire control over the H-15 Kurakhove – Zaporizhzhia City highway enables Russian forces to effectively disrupt Ukraine's ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area and form a bridgehead for future offensive operations.[79]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr, and elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[80]


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 4 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), advanced near Fedorivka and Burlatske (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[81] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 500 meters deep and expanded their zone of control in an area roughly 400 meters to one kilometer near the Vilne Pole-Burlatske area.[82]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Vilne Pole on April 3 and 4.[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and elements of the Russian 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD), 5th Tank Brigade, and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Vesele.[84]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 3 and 4.[85]


Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 4 that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army's (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) offensive tempo stopped near the Dolyinka – Shcherbaky line (northwest of Robotyne) and the Pyatykhatky – Stepove line (northwest of Robotyne)

and that Russian forces cannot advance north of the Kamyanske – Orikhiv road (presumably the T-0812 road) towards the Stepove – Shcherbaky line (northwest of Robotyne) despite the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) continuing to attack in the area.[86] Mashovets reported that the command of the Russian 58th CAA redeployed a few battalions and drone units from its 100th Reconnaissance Brigade into the western Zaporizhia direction and is counting on reinforcements from the redeployments of Russian forces operating in Kursk. Mashovets stated that elements of the 108th and 247th VDV regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) have already redeployed to western Zaporizhia Oblast, and that elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (also of the 7th VDV Division) may also redeploy to reinforce Russian efforts in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets stated that one naval infantry brigade (NIB) - possibly the 155th NIB (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) or 810th NIB (Black Sea Fleet, SMD) could redeploy to western Zaporizhia Oblast. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces are trying to take control of tactical heights between Novoandriivka and Novopavlivka (both northwest of Robotyne) in order to have fire control along the Orikhiv – Komyshevakha line (north and northwest of Robotyne).

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 4, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dniro direction on April 3 and 4 but did not advance.[87]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russia continues to expand military cooperation and combined exercises with India. Surface vessels of the Russian Pacific Fleet conducted a combined exercise with Indian naval vessels in the Bay of Bengal focused on tactical maneuvering, firing artillery at air and sea targets, and combating UAVs and unmanned surface vehicles on April 4.[88] Russian corvettes *Rezkiy* and *Hero of the Russian*

Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov and tanker *Pechenga* exercised with Indian destroyer *Rana* and corvette *Kuthar*. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that the exercise participants returned to Port Chennai in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India, to conduct an official closing ceremony of the exercise.

The Russian military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa has recently reiterated Zelensky's February 2025 report that Russia aims to increase its military by 150,000 personnel in 2025, the equivalent of 12 to 15 divisions if all personnel were committed to combat units.[89] Palisa reported that Russian forces are not struggling to recruit new soldiers and that Russia aims to begin a new offensive effort to exert maximum pressure in the areas of the theater where Russia could advance.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian media reported on March 31 that Russian state-owned tech company Rostec has developed the first Russian super-resistant optical imaging modules for machine vision, with extremely low power consumption and high-speed operation.[90] Rostec designed the product for machine vision and video monitoring systems capable of operating in extreme conditions, including hot climates and sub-zero temperatures. The optical imaging modules use silicon crystals and reportedly have a resolution of 4 megapixels.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems.

Click [here](#) to read the April 3 Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus approved the establishment of an interstate data exchange system for data on foreign citizens and stateless persons between Belarus and Russia on April 4.[91] Belarus's Council of Ministers approved a regulation designed to determine the procedure for the functioning of a data system that will enable Russian and Belarusian authorities to exchange information at border crossing checkpoints and validate the authenticity of identity documents including but not limited to foreign citizens and stateless persons residing in the territory of Union State member states. This data exchange system will likely expand Russian law enforcement's ability to operate in Russia.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western

reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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