


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

June 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

**Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted,
Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros**

June 13, 2025, 5:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Putin had separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 13.[1] The Kremlin claimed that Putin condemned Israel's strikes as violations of the UN Charter and international law. Putin reportedly stated that Russia supports efforts to resolve the situation about Iran's nuclear program and noted that Russia has already suggested initiatives aimed at finding a "mutually acceptable agreement." The Kremlin claimed that Putin emphasized to Netanyahu the importance of returning to the negotiation process and resolving issues about Iran's nuclear program through political and diplomatic means. Putin reportedly told Netanyahu that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and Israel.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned Israel's strikes against Iran and notably claimed that "unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign UN member state, its citizens, sleeping peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure facilities are categorically unacceptable." [2] The Russian MFA claimed that these Israeli strikes against Iran undermined and set back efforts to find solutions to "eliminate any suspicions and prejudices regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear energy." The Russian MFA blamed Western states for provoking anti-Iranian "hysteria" in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referencing a June 10 resolution that the United States and E3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) proposed to declare Iran as noncompliant with its nuclear

safeguarding obligations.[3] The Russian MFA issued travel advisories for Russian citizens for Israel and Iran.[4] The Russian Embassy in Iran called on Russian citizens and "compatriots" in Iran to avoid military facilities and refrain from photographing or videoing "any part of Iran," and the Russian Embassy in Israel called for Russians in Israel to leave the country.[5]

Other Kremlin officials condemned Israel and the West for the strikes and advocated for a political and diplomatic Israeli-Iranian settlement.[6] First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's ties with Iran, including military ties, can become closer if necessary.[7] Zhuravlev claimed that Russia has provided Iran with air defense systems and praised Iran's military technology, including technology that Russia helps Iran develop. Zhuravlev criticized the West for perpetuating "global injustice" and inequality and claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at fighting this injustice.[8]

ISW will report further on the Russian reaction to the Israeli strikes against Iran in the upcoming Adversary Entente Task Force Update.

Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Brent crude oil futures prices rose by over five percent to \$74.47 per barrel on June 13 following the Israeli strikes against Iran.[9] Russia's oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 30 percent of total federal revenues in 2024, underscoring the significant role oil and gas revenues play in financing Russian government spending.[10] ISW previously assessed that compounding economic constraints on Russia are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war effort in Ukraine.[11] Russia may be able to leverage sudden upticks in oil prices to weather economic challenges and finance a protracted war in Ukraine, assuming the price of oil remains high (such as over \$60 per barrel). Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously signaled concern about reduced oil prices, suggesting that any reduction in the oil price would likely risk destabilizing Russia's economy.[12]

The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and a potential future war with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin opened the June 12 round of government discussions about the Russian State Rearmament Program for 2027-2036 that focused on the modernization and improvement of Russian air defense, space, drone, and robotic systems.[13] Putin claimed that Russia's air defense systems have downed over 80,000 air targets since February 2022, 7,500 of which Putin claimed were operational-tactical and cruise missiles. Putin claimed that almost all these missiles were Western-manufactured. Putin claimed that the war in Ukraine has demonstrated Russia's need for a "universal air defense system" capable of intercepting all projectiles regardless of their type. Putin also stated that the State Rearmament Program must focus on developing and proliferating advanced digital technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) in Russian military systems and equipment and that Russia must develop a group of unspecified spacecraft to increase Russia's reconnaissance and real-time command and control capabilities. Putin's statements regarding the need for enhanced Russian air defense systems are likely in part a response to Ukraine's "Operation Spider Web," in which Ukrainian forces demonstrated an ability to achieve operational surprise and launch drones against airbases in Russia's deep rear, highlighting the inability of air defenses in these areas to repel short-range Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone strikes.[14]


It is unclear how Russia intends to finance these large-scale modernization efforts. Russia's DIB struggled to fulfill domestic and foreign contractual obligations even before the West implemented sanctions against Russia in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[15] Russia is also investing in the modernization and expansion of the Russian Navy and will need to reconstitute the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), which has suffered significant damage from Ukrainian strikes.[16] Increased oil prices as a result of Israeli strikes against Iran may help Russia finance some of these efforts should oil prices remain high in the medium- to long-term. The Kremlin is likely employing lessons learned in Russia's war against Ukraine to inform adaptations of Russia's military and preparing Russia's DIB for a protracted war against Ukraine and a potential confrontation with NATO.[17]

Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine on June 13. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on June 13 that Russia returned 1,200 bodies of Ukrainian citizens, a majority of which were military personnel.[18]

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.**
- **Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.**
- **The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and a potential future war with NATO.**
- **Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine on June 13.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted ground assaults in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast on June 12 and 13.[19] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) from Ryzhivka (southeast of Tetkino) and attacked toward the international border from Obody (south of Glushkovo).[20]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Machine Gun Artillery Division, 68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Tetkino direction.[21]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod on June 13.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[22]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized all Yablunivka.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced south, northwest, and west of Yunakivka; to the northern outskirts of Mala Korchakivka; near Novomykolaivka; and towards Khotin (all north of Sumy City).[24]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Yunakivka on June 13.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), Novomykolaivka, Yunakivka, and Andriivka.[26]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in unspecified locations in Sumy Oblast.[27] Elements of the 11th VDV Brigade (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Yablunivka.[28]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 12 and 13.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces intensified combat operations near Lyptsi, Kozacha Lopan, Hraniv (all north of Kharkiv City), and Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City).[30] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Lyptsi direction.[31]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Russian forces near Vovchansk are attacking using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) in order to quickly move soldiers between positions.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 12 and 13.[34]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking in the area less than in May 2025 and have switched tactics to use motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and buggies instead of heavy equipment.[35] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces usually deploy two motorcycles at the same time to pick up personnel and deliver ammunition.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 13 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka, northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka, east of Borova near Nadiya and Serhiivka, and southeast of Borova toward Novoserhiivka on June 12 and 13.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[37]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Lypove, Ridkodub, Karpivka, and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 12 and 13.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[39]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southwest of Hryhorivka, within Hryhorivka, and north of Bilohorivka (both northeast of Siversk).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnyokamyanske on June 12 and 13.[41]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces are using motorized vehicles more often in attacks instead of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Hryhorivka.[43]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Bila Hora (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced west and northwest of and within Chasiv Yar, including within Shevchenko Microrailon (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[45]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Markove, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka, Kurdyumivka, Andriivka, and Stupochky and toward Bila Hora on June 12 and 13.[46]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are increasing their use of first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables.[47] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on June 13 that Russian forces in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction are increasing their reconnaissance drone use in order to identify Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[48] Zaporozhets also stated that widespread use of Russian electronic warfare (EW) in the Kramatorsk direction is complicating Ukrainian forces’ attempts to conduct counterstrikes using FPV drones.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 661st VDV Engineering-Sapper Battalion and 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[49]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions in northern Dyliivka (north of Toretsk) and in southern Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk).[50]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 12 and 13 that Russian forces advanced northwest and south of Dyliivka and toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[51] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Toretsk, east of Kleban-Byk (northwest of Toretsk), to southwestern Novopaske, to western Yablunivka (both west of Toretsk), and northeast and north of Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk).[52]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Popiv Yar, and Yablunivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka on June 12 and 13.[53]

Zaporozhets reported on June 13 that Russian forces intensified assaults near Dyliivka and Yablunivka and are using motorcycles to ambush Ukrainian forces near windbreaks.[54] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction stated on June 13 that Russian forces near Toretsk are increasingly conducting assaults with infantry groups and motorcycles to support efforts to advance to Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[55]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Berkut Group" of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[56] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating south of Yablunivka.[57] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating north of Romanivka.[58] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in central Oleksandro-Kalynove.[59]




Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[60] Additional geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[61]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 13 that Russian forces seized Koptieve (northeast of Pokrovsk).[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southeast of Koptieve, east and northeast of Pishchane (south of Pokrovsk), south of Malynivka, and northeast of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[63]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novohrodivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on June 12 and 13.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have increased the intensity of their attacks and are attacking in small infantry groups consisting of one to two soldiers.[66] The deputy commander added that Russian forces have not recently conducted any mechanized assaults and are using tanks to fire from closed positions. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction also reported that Russian forces have almost entirely stopped using armored vehicles and are using motorcycles to quickly traverse open terrain and reach Ukrainian positions.[67] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue to try to accumulate forces in an area before consolidating new positions.



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces seized Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[68] Russian sources claimed Russian forces advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka), three kilometers west of Horikhove into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[69]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Bohdanivka on June 12 and 13.[70]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported that the Russian military command is bringing up reserves in order to intensify offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction.[71] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that the Russian military command transferred "fresh" units to the area after Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast, resulting in an increase in the number of Russian assaults and drone strikes in the Novopavlivka direction.[72] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces often set up ambushes with FPV drones with fiber optic cables against Ukrainian logistics routes.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Novopavlivka direction in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, elements of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division) are reportedly operating near Horikhove, and elements of the 1444th Regiment (reportedly of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 41st CAA) are reportedly operating in Muravka.[73]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction June 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Zaporizhzhia (west of Kurakhove) and south of Dachne (northwest of Kurakhove).[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 12 and 13.[75] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on June 13 that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack with four motorcycles in the direction of Zaporizhzhia.[76]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Oleksiivka, but that the situation in the western part of the settlement remains unclear.[77] The milblogger claimed that the information that Russian forces seized Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka (both west of Oleksiivka) is unconfirmed.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[78]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Komar, east of Komar, and southeast of Shevchenko (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 13 that Russian forces seized Komar.[80] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) with the reported seizure, and Russian milbloggers also credited elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure.[81] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Komar, south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and north of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[82]


Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Novyi Komar; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne, Burlatske, Vesele, Perebudova, Dniproenerhiya, Fedorivka, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko and toward Myrne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole on June 12 and 13.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[85]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction June 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 13, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on June 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered southern Malynivka and advanced southwest of Vysoke (both east of Hulyaipole).[86]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 12 and 13.[87]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vyacheslav Voloshyn reported on June 13 that the Russian military command is bringing up reserves in the Hulyaipole direction.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on June 13 but did not advance.


Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka and Novoandriivka and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 12 and 13.[89]

Voloshyn reported on June 13 that the Russian military command is bringing up reserves in the Orikhiv direction.[90]



Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[91]

Voloshyn reported on June 13 that Russian forces are constantly attempting to cross the straits in the Dnipro River using small infantry groups as part of efforts to seize bridgeheads on islands in the Dnipro River Delta but have yet to reach the greater Dnipro River.[92] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are also attempting to reach the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City) and are regularly conducting reconnaissance near Ivanivka and Kozatske (both northeast of Kherson City).



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and 55 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 28 drones and that 15 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian strikes primarily targeted Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and struck nine unspecified locations.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77181>

[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2025920/

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-11-2025>

[4] https://t.me/MID_Russia/61015

[5] <https://t.me/russianembassytehran/3216>; <https://t.me/RussiaInIsrael/5745>

[6] <https://t.me/Kosachev62/1796>; https://t.me/tass_agency/319781; https://t.me/slutsky_1/3508; <https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13016>

[7] <https://www.gazeta dot ru/army/news/2025/06/13/26027552.shtml>

[8] <https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13016>

[9] <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn4qe4w1n2go>

- [10] <https://www.bofbulletin dot fi/en/blogs/2025/falling-oil-prices-reduce-russia-s-budget-revenues/>
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