


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

## June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- |  |  |                                    |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours                      | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia         |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory                | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare              | Ukrainian Advances in Russia       |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine                           |  |                                    |

**Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans,  
Jessica Sobieski, William Runkel, and Kateryna Stepanenko**

**June 21, 2025, 4:30pm ET**

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on June 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.** Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace.[1] Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of "external parties" rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself.[2] Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a "better fate" than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve "outstanding humanitarian issues." Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the "demilitarization" of Ukraine.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.[4]

**Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.**[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin's statement that Russia owns everywhere a "Russian soldier steps" and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia's intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.[6] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring "only death, destruction, and devastation" wherever they step.[7] Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin's continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin's theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine's will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[8]

**Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.** Putin responded to a question from the panel moderator at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about if Ukraine will use a dirty bomb (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material that is not a nuclear weapon) against Russia and stated that it would be a "colossal mistake" and that Russia will respond proportionately to all threats.[9] Putin underscored that Russia's response to Ukraine using a dirty bomb would be "catastrophic" for Ukraine but noted that there is no evidence that Ukraine intends to use a dirty bomb. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev seized on Putin's statement and claimed on June 21 that Russia would respond with a tactical nuclear weapon if Ukraine used a dirty bomb against Russia.[10] Russian officials previously intensified the "dirty bomb" narrative and nuclear blackmail in March and October 2022, and ISW assessed that Russian officials used this narrative to slow Western discussions of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and to undermine Western resolve.[11] Russian officials are likely reintroducing this narrative amid ongoing debates in the United States and Europe about further aiding Ukraine.

**US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.**[12] The two discussed international developments and bilateral relations.[13] US Deputy Special Envoy to Ukraine John Coale announced on June 21 that the United States brokered a deal with Belarus to free 14 Belarusian political prisoners.[14] The meeting marks the first high-profile public meeting between senior US and Belarusian officials since 2020.[15]

**Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.** Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy Beskrestnov told Ukrainian news agency UNIAN on June 20 that he estimates that Russia has increased its Shahed production capabilities sevenfold.[16] Beskrestnov noted that Russia is attempting to reduce its dependency on Iran by producing modernized Shahed drones with mostly Russian- and Chinese-made components and that Russia is equipping newer

Shahed models with antennas that are more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are constantly innovating Shahed tactics to improve strike accuracy and evade Ukrainian air defense systems and units. Beskrestnov reported that Russia is preparing to build another Shahed production facility in an unspecified location and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds, compared to the 300 to 400 that Russia typically launches in nightly strikes against Ukraine.

Head of the Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Spartak Borisenko reported on June 20 that Russia is modernizing its Geran-2 drones (Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones).[17] Borisenko reported that Ukrainian authorities have observed downed Geran-2 drones with a modified four-cylinder two-stroke engine, increased warheads, and new antennas and fuel systems, which are different from the components that Russia used in Shahed drones as of April 2025. Borisenko noted that Russia now has two factories producing modernized Geran-2 drones that use both Russian and imported dual-purpose components. ISW has recently reported on data indicating that Russia is expanding its long-range drone production capabilities.[18]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian milblogger claimed on June 21 and 20 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran-2 drones for strikes along the frontline, marking a departure from the Russian forces' previous pattern of using long-range Shahed/Geran drones against Ukraine's rear and deep rear.[19] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are using Geran-2 drones to strike targets five to seven kilometers from the frontline, which Russian forces used to strike with glide bombs or missiles. Russian forces' increased use of Shaheds to strike frontline and near-rear Ukrainian positions is another indicator of Russia's enhanced drone production capabilities.

**The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.[20]** The Russian government published a list of coordinates on June 20 that Russian officials intend to reassess Russia's territorial waters and suggested that Russia should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Maly Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, and near the northern delta of the Narva River. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Maly Tyuters, and Vigrund islands are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland share control over Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia. The Russian MoD published a similar proposal on May 21, 2024, that suggested Russia reassess maritime border coordinates near Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Maly Tyuters, and Vigrund islands, the northern delta of the Narva River, and the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast.[21] The Russian government's June 2025 proposal does not include the islands and capes around Kaliningrad Oblast. Russian officials denied that Russia planned to change its maritime borders in late May 2024, but the Russian government's June 2025 proposal suggests that Russia may attempt to reassess a smaller portion of its territorial waters, mainly in the Gulf of Finland.[22]


### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.**

- **Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.**
- **Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.**
- **US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.**
- **Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.**
- **The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.**
- **Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 20 and 21.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the Glushkovo direction.[24]

**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 21.**

**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recaptured Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[25]

Russian forces attacked near Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), Andriivka, and Yunakivka.[27]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 21 that 52,000 Russian forces are attacking in the Sumy direction and that Russian forces are directing 23 percent of all strikes across the frontline in the Sumy direction.[28]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[29]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast** (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Zelene and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on June 20 and 21.[30]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kharkiv Direction June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces attacked in the Kupyansk direction on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepove Novoselivka on June 20 and 21.[31]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekvivka, Olhivka, and toward Cherneshchyna on June 20 and 21.[32]


**Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) advanced in central Novyi Myr (northeast of Lyman).[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Novyi Myr, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Karpivka and Hlushchenkove and east of Lyman near Torske on June 20 and 21.[34] Geolocated footage published on June 20 indicates that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful assault with support from a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in northeastern Serebryanka (east of Lyman).[35]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are leveraging drone support in 80 percent of their operations in the Lyman direction.[36] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces operating in the Lyman direction have a numerical manpower advantage but are poorly trained and inexperienced in combat.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating in Karpivka.[38]



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast** (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 20 and 21.[39]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on June 20 and 21.[40]

A Ukrainian officer of a brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are trying to seize positions near Olkesiivka-Druzhivka (west of Chasiv Yar) in order to cut off Ukrainian forces in the area and bypass Toretsk.[41] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported that Russian forces are transferring forces to this direction, but are struggling to provide units with provisions and sufficient logistical support.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 299th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[43]


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove and advanced in northeastern Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[44]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka and Yablunivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on June 20 and 21.[45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[46] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalnyove.[47] Drone operators of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka.[48]





### Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to northern Novoekonomichne, near Koptieve (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and toward Novotroitske and Molodatske (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Koptieve, Malynivka, Myrne, Shevchenko Pershe, Razine, and Myrolyubivka and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrnohrad, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Shevchenko, Novotroitske, and Kotlyne on June 20 and 21.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[51]

## **Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement.[52] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing beyond Zaporizhzhia toward Yalta (northwest of Zaporizhzhia) and Zirka (west of Zaporizhzhia) and that Russian forces advanced from Komar (south of Zaporizhzhia) toward Piddubne (just northwest of Komar).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Nadiivka, and Sribne; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Odradne, and Bahatyr; and south of Novopavlivka near Myrne, Yalta, Fedorivka, and Vesele on June 20 and 21.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Piddubne (south of Novopavlivka).[56]

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on June 21 that Russian forces are using electric scooters in assaults to try and rapidly advance through the contested "gray zone" that Russian and Ukrainian drones have created along the frontline.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[58]



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern Shevchenko.[60]


Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Shevchenko on June 20 and 21.[61]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST







**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis** (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

**Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Hulyaipole direction on June 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 20 and 21 that Russian forces advanced east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 20 and 21.[63]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole).[64]

**Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 20 and 21.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Russian Airborne [VDV] Forces) and elements of the "Nemets" group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[66]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near the Antonivsky Bridge (east of Kherson City) on June 21 but did not advance. [67]**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Tambov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, two Iskander-K cruise missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and 272 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed three Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-47M2 air-launched ballistic missile, and one Iskander-K cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 140 drones and that 112 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic



warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Odesa, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast and Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[69]

**Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

*See topline text.*

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



[1] <https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/world/1804376-أفضل-مصير-أوكرانيا-تستحق>

[2] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825>; <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/06/marko-rubio-zayavil-chto-ssha-pomogaya-ukraine-vedut-proksi-voynu-s-rossiey>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYbwqRwNZGw>; <https://lenta dot ru/news/2024/08/12/putin-obvinil-zapad-v-proksi-voyne-s-rossiey-rukami-ukraintsev/>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-invasion-update-25>; <https://www.npr.org/2022/12/22/1145004513/russia-ukraine-us-proxy-war-zelenskyy-visit>; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62389537>; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/26/russia-accuses-nato-of-proxy-war-in-ukraine-as-us-hosts-crucial-defence-summit>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reframing-us-policy-debate-%E2%80%99long-war%E2%80%99ukraine>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28>

[3] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525>; <https://kyivindependent dot com/russia-pushes-for-resuming-peace-talks-in-istanbul-based-on-2022-terms-situation-on-the-ground-ushakov/>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051525>

- [5] <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/20/06/2025/685582719a79474b7e0ee61b> ;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025>
- [6] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/14807](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14807) ; <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/koli-vbivcya-kazhe-sho-hoche-vbiti-mi-sprijmayemo-ce-vidpovi-98565>
- [7] [https://x.com/andrii\\_sybiha/status/1936115377437606091?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg](https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1936115377437606091?s=46&t=JHHzChDbvSf3JHpnTV6Hcg) ;  
<https://suspilne.media/1047955-odin-miljon-soldativ-dva-miljoni-nig-v-mzs-vidpovili-na-zaavi-putina/>
- [8] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125> ;  
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525>
- [9] <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77222>
- [10] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/321588](https://t.me/tass_agency/321588) ; [https://t.me/medvedev\\_telegram/591](https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/591) ;  
[https://t.me/medvedev\\_telegramE/80](https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/80)
- [11] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23> ;  
<https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Radiological%20Chemical%20False%20Flag%20Warning.pdf>
- [12] <https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-so-specposlannikom-prezidenta-ssa-kitom-kellogom> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/17259](https://t.me/pul_1/17259) ; <https://belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/> ; [https://t.me/pul\\_1/17257](https://t.me/pul_1/17257) ;  
<https://belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-vstretilsja-so-spetsposlannikom-prezidenta-ssha-kitom-kellogom-722207-2025/> ; <https://suspilne.media/1048295-kit-kellog-vidvidav-bilorus-ta-zustrivsa-z-lukaskom/> ; [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/321640](https://t.me/tass_agency/321640)
- [13] [https://t.me/belta\\_telegramm/318996](https://t.me/belta_telegramm/318996) ;
- [14] <https://x.com/johnpcoale/status/1936415572511875439>
- [15] <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trumps-ukraine-envoy-meet-belarus-lukashenko-sources-say-2025-06-17/>
- [16] [https://www.unian.ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETewelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV\\_yVrEZwUBA55z\\_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg\\_aem\\_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog\\_rewarded](https://www.unian.ua/weapons/shahedi-flesh-poyasniv-chogo-varto-boyatisya-ukrajincyam-13043865.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawLCS41leHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETewelp1SjhtSFduUU5WTHRIAR4ExaFHF65wLqRNeMe8MtCVzA-P9oV_yVrEZwUBA55z_fGmwK343klOfWUHSg_aem_uhBpFekZtpfod4L1XooAZw#goog_rewarded)
- [17] <https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1047615-rosiani-atakuvali-harkiv-bpla-z-bilsou-bojovou-castinou-i-potuznisim-dvigunom-so-znecat-ci-zmini/>

[18] <https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125> ; <https://isw.pub/ForceGen061125> ;  
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025>

[19] <https://t.me/milinfoLive/151274> ; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/53971](https://t.me/mod_russia/53971) ;  
[https://t.me/mod\\_russia/53959](https://t.me/mod_russia/53959)

[20] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024> ; [publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202506190024?index=2](https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202506190024?index=2) ;  
[https://t.me/tass\\_agency/321290](https://t.me/tass_agency/321290)

[21] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024>

[22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024>

[23] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>

[24] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ; <https://t.me/rybar/71533>

[25] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23641>

[26] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23641> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/23976](https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976)

[27] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65307> ; [https://t.me/notes\\_veterans/23976](https://t.me/notes_veterans/23976)

[28] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/14804](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/14804)

[29] <https://t.me/sashakots/54438>

[30] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867)

[31] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>

[32] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>

[33] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639>

[34] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ;

[35] [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/29103](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/29103) ; <https://t.me/umftteam/524> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/20/dron-zaletiv-cherez-paradni-dveri-na-lymanshyni-znyshheno-shturmovu-grupu-shho-shovalasya-v-hati/>

- [36] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/>
- [37] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/21/pochuly-dron-i-zgurtuvalysya-v-odnomu-misczi-rosiyany-sami-sproshhuyut-yihnye-znyshhennya/>
- [38] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37639>
- [39] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>; <https://t.me/rybar/71533>
- [40] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27377>
- [41] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/taktyka-yak-u-bahmuti-rosiyany-namagayutsya-vidrizaty-kostyantynivku-vid-logistyky/> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg>
- [42] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/21/yidut-na-tak-zvanyh-bronetaksi-speczyfika-shturmiv-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/>
- [43] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30289>
- [44] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/37669>
- [45] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23640> ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ; [https://t.me/rusich\\_army/24276](https://t.me/rusich_army/24276) ;  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324>
- [46] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867)
- [47] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23640>
- [48] [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13947](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13947)
- [49] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23636> ;  
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210> ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23635>
- [50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737>  
; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ; <https://t.me/rybar/71537> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867)  
; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94210> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65324>
- [51] <https://t.me/wargonzo/27377>
- [52] <https://t.me/osintpen/1250>; [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/9432](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9432); [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/15598](https://t.me/voin_dv/15598);  
<https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1936348907002622296>
- [53] [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/53978](https://t.me/mod_russia/53978) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/94204> ; <https://t.me/vrogov/20827>  
; [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/15598](https://t.me/voin_dv/15598)



[54] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23632> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309> ;  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319> ;  
<https://t.me/rybar/71533> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27377>

[55] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737>  
; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319> ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ; <https://t.me/yurasumy/23635>

[56] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65309>

[57] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/21/vorog-lize-navit-na-elektrosamokatah-vijskovi-pro-boyi-bilya-dnipropetrovshhyny/>

[58] [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13948](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13948)

[59] [https://t.me/creamy\\_caprice/9431](https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9431) ; [https://t.me/BBS\\_110/391](https://t.me/BBS_110/391) ;  
<https://www.facebook.com/310mbr/videos/739260038677333/>

[60] <https://t.me/yurasumy/23633>

[61] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65319> ;  
<https://t.me/yurasumy/23633>

[62] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311> ; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/169638](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/169638) ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73867](https://t.me/dva_majors/73867) ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/27377>

[63] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730> ;  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65311>

[64] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/15587](https://t.me/voin_dv/15587)

[65] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25757> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>

[66] [https://t.me/rogozin\\_do/7225](https://t.me/rogozin_do/7225) ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73863](https://t.me/dva_majors/73863) ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/73876](https://t.me/dva_majors/73876)

[67] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25737> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25730>

[68] <https://t.me/kpszsus/36774>

[69] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/21/pryame-vluchannya-vorog-atakuvav-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-poltavshhyny/> ; <https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005> ;  
<https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/24005> ; <https://suspilne.media/odessa/1048209-na-odesini-ppo-zbila-ponad-20-bezpilotnikov/> ; <https://suspilne.media/odessa/1048041-v-odesi-prolunali-vibuhy-so-vidomo-35/> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/06/21/vorog-ne-prypynyaye-terror-harkivshhyny-drone-rakety-ta-zrujnovana-infrastruktura/> ; <https://t.me/syngubov/15195> ;  
<https://t.me/syngubov/15193> ; <https://t.me/syngubov/15192> ; <https://t.me/syngubov/15193>