


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

## June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- |  |  |                                    |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours                      | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia         |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives              | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory                | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare              | Ukrainian Advances in Russia       |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine                           |  |                                    |



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Angelica Evans, Jennie Olmsted,  
Jessica Sobieski, and Frederick W. Kagan

June 27, 2025, 7:20 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

**Note:** The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

**The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.** Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia's economy and that Russia's economic indicators are "satisfactory."<sup>[1]</sup> Putin acknowledged that Russia's economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia's economic growth in 2025 will be "much more modest to combat inflation." Putin also claimed that Russia's military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly \$172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.<sup>[2]</sup>

**Putin's statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia's war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.** Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense.<sup>[3]</sup> The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several

months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[4] Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector.[5] Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025.[6] Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about \$3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024.[7] Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

**Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.** Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges.[8] Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government.[9] Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived." [10] Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.[11]

**Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.** Data from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-affiliated Center of Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting published on June 26 indicates that Russia increased its industrial production by 2.6 percent between April and May 2025 and that the majority of this increase is due to a "sharp" increase in Russia's defense industrial output.[12] The center reported that Russia's monthly aircraft production rate increased by 16.9 percent in May 2025 compared to April 2025 and is 1.6 times greater than Russia's 2024 monthly production rates. The center reported that Russia increased its naval and aircraft production capacity by 16 percent between February and May 2025. The center's data suggests that Russia is attempting to expand its shipbuilding and aircraft production capacity, which are medium- to long-term efforts and likely part of Russia's ongoing force restructuring and regeneration efforts in preparation for a longer-term conflict with NATO.

Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia provides further evidence that Russia is increasing its ability to produce IFVs. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots and repair facilities via satellite imagery reported on June 26 that Russia is now able to refurbish and produce more BMPs than before an unspecified time and that Russia's decreased use of armored vehicles and tanks since Winter 2024-2025 is allowing Russia to stockpile IFVs.[13] The source noted that the Kurganmashzavod remains the sole publicly known Russian facility capable of producing Soviet-era BMP-3 IFVs. The source stated that satellite imagery indicates that some Russian armor repair plants appear to have used most of their Soviet IFV stocks, although at least one production plant in Rubtsovsk, Altai Krai, appears to have dramatically improved its modernization capabilities. It remains unclear whether Russia is aiming to stockpile materiel in preparation for a larger offensive operation against Ukraine in the near to medium term or to reconstitute the Russian military in preparation for broader future conflict with NATO. Additional open-source intelligence indicates that Russia is successfully increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities, further underscoring Russia's ongoing investment in long-term tank and armored vehicle production capacity.[14]

**Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.** Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov visited various Russian military industrial facilities in Novgorod Oblast on June 27, including a fiber-optic drone production site that produced Russia's first model of fiber-optic "Prince Vandal Novgorodsky" drones[15] The Russian government's press release of the visit reported that Russia is now capable of domestically producing hundreds of thousands of fiber-optic drones per month and fully satisfying the needs of the Russian Armed Forces. Manturov also visited a series of other defense companies in Novgorod Oblast, including companies that specialize in electronic components, and inspected the Intelligent Electronics-Valdai Innovative Scientific and Technological Center's new semiconductor materials science laboratory.[16] Manturov instructed the Ministry of Industry and Trade to examine the possibility of recapitalizing Novgorod Oblast's industrial development fund to support the production of high-tech products. ISW previously noted that Russian fiber optic production has allowed Russian forces to impose new battlefield dilemmas on Ukrainian forces starting in mid-2024 because these drones were resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference, enable precision strikes on armored equipment, and are scalable due to their simplicity.[17]

**Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.** A Russian milblogger claimed on June 27 that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Geran 2 and 3 drones – Russian analogues of the Iranian origin Shahed-136 – over guided glide bombs for short- to mid-range frontline strikes.[18] The milblogger noted that Russian forces began reprioritizing the use of Geran drones last winter when Russia began mass producing modernized Geran 2 drones with improved speed, range, and carrying capacities, and claimed that Russian forces are using these drones to target Ukrainian storage areas, command posts, and strongholds on the frontline and in the rear. The milblogger noted that elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA] (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) have pioneered mass frontline use of Geran drones and that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces, operating largely in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions, will reportedly soon adopt the use of Geran 2 drones once Russian manufacturers further increase

production rates. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces may be able to replace 500- and 1000-kilogram KAB glide bombs with Geran 3 drones if Russian developers are willing to compromise on the drone's range to account for an increased payload. The Russian milblogger's analysis largely coheres with ISW's observations that Russian forces are increasingly using Shahed-like drones to strike Ukrainian targets along the frontline.[19] Russia's defense industrial base has thus far successfully increased Geran drone production rates and improved the Geran drone's precision and operability, which have enabled Russian forces to more readily deploy such drones along the frontline.[20]


**Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.** The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security reported on June 27 that Ukrainian forces recorded 888 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in May 2025, including in grenades.[21] The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) published a report on June 26 confirming that environmental sample testing indicates that Russian forces used a first-person view (FPV) drone equipped with grenades containing chlorobenzalmalonodinitrile (CS) gas, a riot control agent (RCA) banned in modern warfare under the CWC, against Ukrainian forces near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in June 2025.[22]

#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.**
- **Putin's statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia's war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.**
- **Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.**
- **Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.**
- **Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.**
- **Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.**
- **Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.**



- Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

## **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

### **Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on June 27.**

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 26 and 27.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Glushkovo, Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino).[24]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 91st Sapper-Engineer Regiment (reportedly under the operational command of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[25]

### **Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

#### **Russian forces continued assaults in northern Sumy Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 26 that Russian forces advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka on June 26 and 27.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Novomykolaivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky.[28]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko reported on June 27 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are conducting fewer attacks in the Sumy Oblast international border area.[29] Demchenko assessed that Russian forces may be regrouping in the area. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on June 27 that

Russian forces continue to probe for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses in the area.[30] The deputy commander reported that neither Ukrainian nor Russian drone operators currently have drone superiority in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka.[31] Drone operators of the "Tiger" drone detachment of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[32] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[33]





## **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

#### **Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River and advanced in western Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on the southern bank of the river.[34]

Russian forces conducted ground assaults north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 26 and 27.[35]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction said that Russian forces are constantly attacking in small fireteams of two to three soldiers and are using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) when the weather conditions are good, but leverage armored vehicles during rainy weather.[36] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

### **Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

#### **Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicated that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[38]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk towards Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 26 and 27.[39]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on June 27 that Russian forces are constantly attacking along the Oskil River near Kupyansk and are trying to surround Kupyansk.[40] Shamshyn reported that Russian forces are trying to establish a river crossing over the Oskil River in order to transfer armored vehicles across the river, but are currently moving all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles to the right (west) bank of the Oskil River on boats and rafts. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of the good weather to optimize logistics and intensify assaults north and east of Kupyansk.[41] An officer in another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using artillery more conservatively and are increasingly relying on air strikes and glide bombs in the area.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova), but one milblogger claimed that the settlement remains a contested "gray zone." [44]

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on June 26 and 27. [45]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Lozova (northeast of Borova).[46]




## Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced in the Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 26 and 27 that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks and regained positions in northwestern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[47] ISW is therefore expanding Ukrainian advances into Ridkodub.

Russian forces continued ground assaults north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Zelenya Dolnya, and Shandryholove and toward Novyi Myr and Serednie; northeast of Lyman toward Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 26 and 27.[48]



A Ukrainian division commander operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are struggling with low-quality Russian- and North Korean-produced ammunition.[49]



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 27 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted ground assaults northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on June 26 and 27.[50]




**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Chasiv Yar and within central and southern Chasiv Yar, including in Shevchenko Microrain (southwestern Chasiv Yar).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Bila Hora and the northern outskirts of Stupochky (both south of Chasiv Yar).[52]

Russian forces continued ground assaults in Chasiv Yar itself; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bondarne; north of Chasiv Yar near Markove and Novomarkove; and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and toward Bila Hora on June 26 and 27.[53]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are sending reinforcements to the Kramatorsk direction and that the Russian servicemen often do not have any prior knowledge about where they are being sent.[54] The NCO reported that Russian forces are leveraging windy and rainy weather conditions to accumulate forces and conduct assaults on foot while the weather constrains Ukrainian drone operations. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low-altitude air superiority and are preventing Russian forces from completely seizing Chasiv Yar.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[56] Drone operators of the "Burevestnik" volunteer detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[57] Elements of the "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut (Chasiv Yar) direction.[58]



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Dylivka (north of Toretsk) and likely seized the settlement.[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka (both northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dylivka; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Poltavka, Pleshchiivka, Stepanivka, Rusyn Yar, and Katerynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Romanivka on June 26 and 27.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA}, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yablunivka.[62] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[63] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[64]

### **Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Andriivka highway northeast of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have advanced to within one kilometer of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and are attempting to bypass Udachne (east of Molodetske).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, and Shevchenko Pershe and toward Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne and toward Novopidhorodne on June 26 and 27.[67]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 27 that Russia has concentrated roughly 111,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction.[68] A communications officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating assaults south of Pokrovsk and are attacking with motorcycles from Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) toward Shevchenko.[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position near Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk) with a Geran-2 (Russian-produced Shahed variant) drone.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[71]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and east of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka) and north of Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[72]

Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Novomykolaivka, and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Troitske; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Novoukrainka, Bahatyr, Odradne, and Zeleny Kut; and south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Zaporizhzhia, Fedorivka, Myrne, and Komar and toward Yalta on June 26 and 27.[73]



Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian drone operators struck a North Korean-made artillery system in the Novopavlivka direction.[74]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the seizure of Yalta.[75]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shevchenko, west of Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), and south of Novopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[76]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and toward Voskresenka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole on June 26 and 27.[77]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis** (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 27 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced within southern and central Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[78]

Russian forces attacked east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 27.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malynivka.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[81]


**Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway into central Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[82] Additional geolocated footage published on June 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[83]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske on June 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Orikhiv near Robotyne.[85]


Order of Battle: Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Tokmachka and within Mala Tokmachka, respectively.[86] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[87]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Orikhiv Direction June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kamyanske Direction June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST






**Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on June 27 but did not advance.[88]**

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on June 26 and reported that GUR drone operators struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in an unspecified part of occupied Crimea, damaging the system's missile launcher, two multi-functional 92N2E control radars, and two 91N6E detection radars.[89]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction June 27, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles from airspace over Ryazan Oblast, six Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, and 363 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[90] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kalibr cruise missiles and 211 drones and that 148 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Starokostyantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, and

Kherson oblasts and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Kherson, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[91]

### **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Russia and Belarus are leveraging the Union State framework to further militarize their societies and indoctrinate youth into an anti-Western ideology, likely in preparation for a future conflict with NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the plenary session of the 12th annual Russian and Belarusian regions forum on June 27 and highlighted the importance of youth "military-patriotic" programs.[92] Putin stated that Russia and Belarus dedicated the 12th forum to policies aimed at encouraging youth to participate in "spiritual, moral... and traditional" values, patriotism, and military service. Putin stated that the Union State is implementing a specialized "road map" for youth policy through 2027 and is developing a medium-term strategy for the development of youth policy. Several organizations currently oversee Russia's various youth military-patriotic programs, and the Russian federal government is attempting to centralize control over these efforts.[93]

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



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