


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

July 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |

Jessica Sobieski, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted,
Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan, with Nate Trotter

July 11, 2025, 7:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on July 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with *NBC News* that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.[1] *Axios* reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one.[3] It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.[4]

Ukraine's European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly \$2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine's air defense capabilities.[5] The European Commission and Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB's innovation cycle.[6] The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).[7]

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia (\$6.2 million) to Ukraine's Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes.[8]

Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly.[9] Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night.[10] Ukraine's interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov assessed on July 11 that Russia's goal of seizing all of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025 is "not realistic." [11] Budanov stated that the Russian military command has also tasked Russian forces with advancing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and establishing another 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone in the oblast. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intends to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025.[12] The *Economist* assessed on July 9 that it would take Russian forces until February 2028 to seize the remainder of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts (which Russia has illegally annexed) at their current rate of advance.[13] Russian efforts to seize Donetsk Oblast, enter Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a 10-kilometer-deep buffer zone will likely exacerbate existing constraints in the Russian military by further extending the already degraded Russian Southern and Central groupings of forces that have been engaged in near constant combat operations in Donetsk Oblast since October 2023. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are taking very high casualties in return for disproportionately small gains in pursuit of their political and territorial ambitions.[14] It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military command imagined that it could seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by September 2025.


Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian business magazine *Expert* on July 11 that the "situation that [Russia is] in" geopolitically and in relation to the increasing speed of information necessitates military censorship and that the Russian government is "justified" in its ongoing efforts to eliminate media outlets that are critical of the Kremlin.[15] Peskov praised the Russian media's increase in positive "patriotic" content that generates feelings of loyalty to and pride in Russia. Peskov stated that he believes that the "patriotic" trend will continue and that the Kremlin will take into account the "mistakes" of the past when outlets, such as Russian opposition outlet Meduza, were allowed to criticize Russia broadly. Peskov stated that Russia will demand a "softer" informational policy in the future and that this will allow a number of "neutral" outlets to emerge. The Kremlin is unlikely to take an impartial view of the neutrality of media outlets in the future, however. Peskov stated in September 2024 that Russian media will shift to "freedom of information" if Russia emerges from this period of "acute inflammation," referring to its war in Ukraine and the geopolitical situation.[16] The refusal to acknowledge that Russia is, in fact, engaged in a major war is part of the Kremlin's general efforts to shape and distort the Russian information space.

Peskov's recent statements signal that the Kremlin has not abandoned its wartime efforts to censor and centralize control over the Russian information space and is setting conditions to continue censorship efforts post-war. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign aimed at controlling the narrative of the full-scale invasion since 2022. Russian officials have limited access to foreign websites and platforms, attempted to eliminate access to opposition media, and arrested administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership over the last three years.[17] The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for long-term control of the information space as it attempts to leverage social media and traditional news outlets to create future generations less likely to question Kremlin decision-making and narratives. The Kremlin is currently establishing an informal state ideology that promotes Russian nationalism, perpetuates the idea that the West unfairly and unjustly seeks to collapse the Russian state, and mythologizes veterans of the Russian military.[18] The Kremlin's efforts to encourage "patriotic" media are only one avenue through which the Kremlin is encouraging military service and loyalty to the Russian government throughout Russian society amid ongoing efforts to expand extracurricular youth military-political organizations and military education programs in Russian schools.[19]

Key Takeaways:

- **US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.**
- **Ukraine's European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).**
- **Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.**
- **Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.**
- **Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.**
- **Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)

- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on July 11.

Russian forces continued attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on July 10 and 11.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Tetkino and regularly attack Tetkino in groups of three to five personnel.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[23]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in the Russian deep rear. Sources in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian outlet *Suspilne* on July 11 that Ukrainian forces conducted a sabotage operation and damaged a Russian gas pipeline near Langepas, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.[24] GUR sources told *Suspilne* that the pipeline supplies Russian DIB plants in Chelyabinsk, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk oblasts and assessed that it will take Russia roughly a month to repair the pipeline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 11 that Ukrainian drones struck the Voronin Aviation Plant in Lukhovitsy, Moscow Oblast.[25] Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on July 11 that the Voronin Aviation Plant produces and modernizes Russian MiG aircraft, including the MiG-29 and MiG-31; develops new models of combat aircraft; and participates in the Shahed drone modernization cycle.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian special forces and security agencies struck the Shipunov Instrument Design Bureau in Tula, Tula Oblast, which produces missiles for the Zenit Missile and Zenit Missile-Gun anti-aircraft systems.[27]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced into northern Myropillia (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on July 10 and 11.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Beszalivka, north of Sumy City, near Kindrativka and Andriivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Oleksiivka.[31]

Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, including its Gunter Detachment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the direction of Oleksandrivske (northwest of Sumy City).[32] Drone elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[33] Drone elements of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian air strikes on Ukrainian positions in Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[34] Elements of the 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (1st Motorized Rifle Battalion) reportedly participated in the recent seizure of Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[36]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction July 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Vovchansk, and Starytsya on July 10 and 11.[37]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 11 that Russian forces continue attacking in small groups in Vovchansk and surrounding settlements, including at night, and are wearing anti-thermal ponchos in an attempt to hide from Ukrainian drones.[38] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to push Ukrainian positions away from the Vovcha River and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant.

A Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction published footage on July 11 of Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones striking and reportedly destroying a Pantsir-S1 air defense system in an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kindrashivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[40]


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[41]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Petro-Ivanivka and Zapadne, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on July 10 and 11.[42]

Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported on July 11 that Russian forces attempted to modify a damaged bridge near Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk) in order to transfer infantry across the Oskil River, but that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kontora Group (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[44] Elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrashivka.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction July 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced towards Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[46]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on July 10 and 11.[47]
A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled several Ukrainian counterattacks near Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) in the past week.[48]


Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[49] Russian sources are typically conservative when reporting on Ukrainian advances, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced within Ridkodub.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows elements of the Russian 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) operating in western and central Zelena Dolyna (north of Lyman), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 11 that Russian forces seized Zelena Dolyna.[51]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, Serednie, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and the Serebryanske forest area on July 10 and 11.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zelena Dolyna, Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[53]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction July 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST






Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and toward Vyimka on July 10 and

11.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[56]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of and within southwestern Chasiv Yar.[57]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Bila Hora, and Stupochky; and immediately west of Chasiv Yar near Mykolaivka on July 10 and 11.[58]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Koptieve (west of Toretsk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northwest of Toretsk advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway, northwest of Yablunivka, southwest of Katerynivka, southeast of Rusyn Yar, and east of Popiv Yar.[60]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Rusyn Yar; and toward Pleshchiivka, Katerynivka, and Stepanivka ; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on July 10 and 11.[61]


Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[62] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating between Romanivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Katerynivka.[63] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and drone operators of the 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Russian forces advanced north of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces continued assaults near Pokrovsk; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Malynivka, and Razine and toward Rodinske; east of Pokrovsk near Novoeconomichne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Zvirove, and Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Serhiivka on July 10 and 11.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Typhoon Detachment of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]



Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Footage published on July 7 and geolocated on July 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Novoserhiivka (northwest of Novopavlivka).[68]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and an unspecified Russian Spetsnaz Brigade recently advanced into central and south of Myrne (south of Novopavlivka).[69] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Hrushivske (southwest of Novopavlivka).[70]

Russian forces continued assaults toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near

Fedorivka, Yalta, Zaporizhzhia, Piddubne, and Myrne and Dachne, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and toward Novokhatske on July 10 and 11.[71]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are concentrating many motorized rifle units near Horikhove and that many of these units are degraded.[72] The spokesperson stated that Russian infantry walk 10 to 15 kilometers to frontline positions before attacking due to the pervasiveness of Ukrainian drones in the area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Muravka.[73] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking near Piddubne and toward Oleksandrohrad (southwest of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces attacked in the Velyka Novosilka direction on July 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Voskresenka and Maliivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Zelene Pole on July 10 and 11.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Voskresenka.[76] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating southwest of Vilne Pole.[77] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[78] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sichneve (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[79]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on July 11 but did not advance.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[81] Elements of the 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[82]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on July 11 indicates that Russian forces advanced into southern Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[83]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and east of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[84]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kamyanske.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kamyanske.[86] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka


Detachment are reportedly operating southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Novodanylivka, and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, and Stepanohirsk.[87] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka.[88]



Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on July 10 and 11 but did not advance.[89]

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with VDV and "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky on July 11 and inspected a Russian command post likely in occupied Kherson Oblast.[90]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction July 11, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 11 that GUR detonated a munition at a Russian military logistics hub in occupied Melitopol, killing five Rosgvardia personnel and destroying a satellite communications system.[91] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko, who frequently reports on Russian military activities in occupied southern Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, published footage of a Ukrainian strike against a train carrying 20 Russian tanks between occupied Tokmak and Chernihivka on July 10 and reported on July 11 that the strike destroyed five of the tanks.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 10 and 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 79 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 44 Shahed-type drones and that 16 drones were "lost" or suppressed by electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged residential infrastructure and injured at least 20 civilians in Kharkiv and Odesa cities.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian and Belarusian officials plan to develop a domestically trained artificial intelligence (AI) bot, likely to consolidate control over the information space within the Union State framework. State Secretary of the Union State Sergei Glazyev, a former Russian economic official, announced on July 11 that Russian and Belarusian officials plan to create an AI bot based on "traditional values." [95]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] <https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/exclusive-phone-interview-with-president-trump-243043909525>

[2] <https://www.axios.com/2025/07/11/trump-ukraine-weapons-nato-allies-sell>

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