


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War

August 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



- | | | |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| Significant Fighting in the Past 24 Hours | Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory | Russian Advances in Russia |
| Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before 24 February 2022 | Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives | Claimed Russian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory | Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare | Ukrainian Advances in Russia |
| Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine | | |

**Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson,
Jessica Sobieski, Anna Harvey, and Karolina Hird**

August 2, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on August 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City, one of the four largest refineries in Russia.[1] The USF reported that the drone strike started a large-scale fire at the refinery and caused significant damage to its production facilities. The USF reported that the facility produces about 840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year — about 8.4 percent of Russia's total TS-1 production — and produces up to 17 million tons of oil per year, or 6.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on August 2 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed drones over the oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise.[2] The USF stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Annanefteproduct oil depot in Anna, Voronezh Oblast, which can receive petroleum products from up to 50 railway tanks and handle up to 160,000 tons of light petroleum products per year.[3] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified building in the oblast.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City.[5] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery.[6] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that falling drone debris killed one person in Kuybyshevsky Raion.[7] Ukrainian outlet *Militarnyi* reported on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck the Likhaya-Zamchalovo traction power substation at a Russian rear supply base near Uglerodovsky, Rostov Oblast.[8] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[9] Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that an unspecified enterprise caught fire in Uglerodovsky.[10]

Ukrainian outlet *Kyiv Post* reported that its sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that an explosion disabled a section of Gazprom's Central Asia-Center pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia.[11] The GUR sources did not specify the cause of the explosion. The pipeline reportedly supplies several Russian defense industrial enterprises.

Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the

Elektropribor plant in Penza City, which manufactures equipment for digital networks in Russian military control systems and devices for aviation, armored vehicles, ships, and spacecraft.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that Elektropribor specializes in producing secure telecommunications systems, cryptographic communications equipment, and printed circuit boards for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU), Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Russian space program.[13] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows an explosion at the Elektropribor plant.[14] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the Radiozavod enterprise in Penza City, which produces communications systems for the Russian military, including kits for armored vehicles, command and staff vehicles, and air defense systems.[15] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko claimed on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck an unspecified enterprise in Penza City and that Russian authorities limited mobile internet in the oblast as a result of the strike.[16] The SBU stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Primorsko-Akhtarsk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, hitting Shahed-type drone storage and launch sites.[17] FIRMS data shows heat anomalies at the air base, and an open source account on X (formerly Twitter) noted that a significant number of Russia's best air defense equipment surrounds the air base.[18] *Militarnyi* reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Russian 3rd Radio Regiment's "Periscope-VM" radar system near occupied Feodosia, Crimea, and FIRMS data shows heat anomalies near the radar's location.[19] Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a fire at a Russian radar base near Feodosia.[20]

The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia. The Kremlin, Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) did not directly respond to Trump's August 1 announcement, and ISW continued to only observe limited, dissonant responses from Russian state media and select Russian officials and milbloggers on August 2. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev attempted to discredit the credibility of Trump's announcement.[21] Kremlin newswire TASS published footage on August 2 showing the Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine arriving at the Russian Northern Fleet's main submarine base in Severnomorsk, Murmansk Oblast.[22] The Knyaz Pozharsky submarine entered service on July 24, 2025.[23] A Russian milblogger used the arrival of the submarine at Severnomorsk to claim that the Knyaz Pozharsky is far superior to American analogues and that the Russian Navy will put the Knyaz Pozharsky on combat duty in response to Trump's deployment of nuclear submarines.[24] TASS amplified a claim from a senior research fellow of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Latin America that Russia could deploy Oreshnik ballistic missile systems to other states, including those in Latin America and the Caribbean, to ensure Russia's global military presence and the sovereignty of Russia's allies.[25] The research fellow's August 2 claim parallels a Russian milblogger's August 1 call for Russian ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons to visit Cuba.[26] Both responses attempt to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands. Lavrov claimed on August 1 that Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine

are making progress and blamed Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.[27] Lavrov claimed that Russia is waiting to receive a concrete response from Ukraine regarding Russia's proposal to establish online working groups. Lavrov also claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is repeatedly shifting his demands for negotiations and a ceasefire. Lavrov signaled Russia's commitment to its long-standing war aims in Ukraine and Russia's demand that any peace settlement eliminate the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov's statements included many of the same phrases and nuances as Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements and occurred on the same day as the Putin-Lukashenko press event, indicating that these narratives are part of top-down Kremlin instructions to Russian officials about how to frame the negotiations process.[28] Putin's, Lukashenko's, and Lavrov's statements represent Putin's official position about negotiations and his war aims. ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in compromising on its long-standing demands that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's capitulation and continues to promote inflammatory rhetoric designed to undermine US-European cohesion.[29]


Indian oil refineries reportedly continue to import Russian crude oil despite US President Donald Trump's imposition of 25 percent tariffs on India's exports to the United States. Reuters reported on August 2 that sources in the Indian government stated that India will keep purchasing Russian oil. Reuters reported that Indian government sources stated that there are long-term oil contracts that prevent an immediate halt in Russian oil imports and that India's continued import of Russian oil has helped stave off a global surge in oil prices. Indian outlet *ANI* reported on August 2 that Indian oil refineries continue to source oil from Russian suppliers due to "price, grade of crude, inventories, logistics, and other economic factors." [30] Indian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stated that Russia and India have a "steady and time-tested partnership" and that India sources its energy needs based on "what is available in the markets and... prevailing global circumstances." [31] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil would further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine. [32] India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil, and continued third-state purchases of Russian oil in the face of Western sanctions will significantly limit the effectiveness of these economic measures to affect Russia's war effort.

Key Takeaways:

- **Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2.**
- **Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2.**
- **The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia.**
- **Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander**

Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian

violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 1 and 2 but did not advance.[33]


Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 1 and 2.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (north of Sumy City), Kindrativka, and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[35]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces infiltrated the Russian rear around Bezsaliivka (northwest of Sumy City).[36] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces engaged in friendly fire because Russian commanders misreported the location of Ukrainian forces. The milblogger complained that elements of the Russian 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment took up positions near Varachyne (north of Sumy City) but are not attacking out of fear of Ukrainian drones. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) have to coordinate passage through the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment's positions, which is leading to conflict among the Russian units.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast, and elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[37]




Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near and within Vovchansk on August 2.[38] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Vovchansk.[39]



Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 2.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 2 but did make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[40]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Krasne Pershe, Holubivka, and toward Novovasylivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 1 and 2.[41]


Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Lozova and southeast of Borova toward Cherneshchyna on August 1 and 2, but did not advance.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[43]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman toward Serednie, Korovyi Yar, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka; northeast of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 1 and 2.[44]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 1 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses with small infantry fireteams consisting of two to three soldiers.[45] The servicemember noted that Russian forces aim to infiltrate Ukraine's rear without engaging in combat and that Russian forces are using motorcycles mostly for logistics. The servicemember reported that the Russian forces in the area include new recruits and convict soldiers with two to three weeks' worth of training.




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhynokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka on August 1 and 2.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Serebryanka.[47]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shulytne on August 1 and 2.[48]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on August 1 that fighting continues in Chasiv Yar and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[49] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are struggling to seize Chasiv Yar due to the hilly terrain and the Siverskyi Donetsk-Donbas Canal, which Russian forces can only cross in a few locations and is causing logistics bottlenecks. The servicemember stated that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division operating in the settlement are well-equipped and are not suffering from

manpower shortages. The servicemember stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups and are using armored vehicles to transport infantry. The servicemember noted, however, that the pipes of the canal are limiting Russia's ability to use significant amounts of equipment.

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on August 1 that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes against Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) and that a small Russian infantry group recently unsuccessfully attempted to break through toward Kostyantynivka along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Bakhmut highway.[50] The commander denied reports that Russian forces seized Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar). The commander stated that Russian fiber optic drones are waiting dormant near targets in order to conserve battery before striking.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including elements of its 217th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[52]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Krymske; north of Toretsk near Dylivka; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Ivanopillya; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 1 and 2.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Toretsk after bypassing Russian positions.[55]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 2 that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) seized the settlement.[56] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Kalynove as of July 31.[57] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on August 2 that Russian forces have started using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) but that the UGVs are not effective due to the rubble build-up.[58] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces have lost 50,000 personnel in the Toretsk direction in more than six months of fighting, of which more than 20,000 were killed in action (KIA).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[59] Elements of the Irbis Detachment of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk August 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating in western Pokrovsk.[61] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Zvirove and in Leontovychi (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Novoekonomichne, Zatyshok, Sukhetske, Nykanorivka, and Mayak; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 1 and 2.[63]

A Ukrainian drone company commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 2 that Russian forces are infiltrating Pokrovsk and are dressing in civilian clothing to evade detection – tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy, a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[64] The commander also stated that Russian forces are using drones to place mines along Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The commander stated that Russian forces continue to plant drones on roads, waiting to detonate them when Ukrainian forces pass.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.


Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced on the western outskirts of Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[65]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 1 and 2.[66]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated on August 1 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in the area and that Russian forces are attacking less compared to the previous week (roughly July 20 to 26).[67] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are not using equipment or motorcycles and can only use motorized vehicles to transport infantry to within 10 kilometers or more from Ukrainian positions, after which the infantry must move on foot. The spokesperson also stated that only some Russian elements in the Novopavlivka direction are well-equipped.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[68] Drone operators of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Filiya.[69]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction August 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka on August 1 and 2.[70]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[71]


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Hulyaipole near Novopil on August 1 and 2.[72]

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated on August 2 that Russian forces in the Hulyaipole direction are regrouping, resupplying, and conducting reconnaissance to prepare to resume assaults.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Zelenyi Hai (east of Hulyaipole).[74] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Olhivske (northeast of Hulyaipole).[75]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published August 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[76]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk on August 1 and 2.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[78]

Order of battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[79]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kamyanske Direction August 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including near the Antonivsky Bridge (northeast of Kherson City) and near Bilohrudyi and Velykyi Potemkin islands (both southwest of Kherson City, on August 1 and 2.[80]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 2 that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against a bridge in Kherson City.[81]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction August 2, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 45 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched eight high-speed, jet-powered drones from Bryansk Oblast, likely referring to Russia's Geran-3 drone.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 37 Shahed-type and decoy drones and eight jet-powered drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that eight drones struck five unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials and Russian opposition outlets reported that Russian forces attacked an

apartment building in Kharkiv Oblast, injuring 13 people and killing one person, and also struck a market in Druzhkivka, Donetsk Oblast[84]

The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine's (UN HRMMU) reported on July 31 that Russia launched 10 times more missile and loitering munition strikes against Ukraine in June 2025 than in June 2024 and that Russian strikes in June 2025 killed 232 civilians and injured 1,343 – the highest number of deaths and injuries in one month since the beginning of the war.[85] The UN HRMMU stated that preliminary data for July 2025 indicates that this trend is likely to continue. ISW previously assessed that Russia is dramatically increasing the size and scale of its strikes and will continue to do so in the coming months.[86]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



[1] https://t.me/usf_army/756; https://t.me/usf_army/755

[2] https://t.me/pavelmalkov_official/4830

[3] https://t.me/usf_army/755

[4] https://t.me/gusev_36/4156

[5] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27346>

[6] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11830

[7] <https://t.me/Fedorischev63/3345>

[8] <https://military.com/en/news/drones-attacked-traction-power-substation-in-rostov-region/>;

[9] <https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@40.06,48.14,14.00z>

[10] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/2501

[11] <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/57432>

[12] <https://t.me/SBUkr/15480>

- [13] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27346>; <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9592>
- [14] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1951554230789292345;
https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11833
- [15] <https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9592>
- [16] <https://t.me/omelnichenko/6439>
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