Defending the Digital Frontier: European Nations Forge Resilience Against Relentless Cyber Warfare

Editor’s Note: ComplexDiscovery and HaystackID Newsline staff attended the October 2025 Tallinn Digital Summit to cover developments in European cyber defense, digital governance, and emerging threats. This article examines insights shared during the session “Under Pressure: How Can Europe Withstand Cyber and Hybrid Threats?” featuring military and civilian leaders from Ukraine, Finland, and Poland. For cybersecurity, information governance, and eDiscovery professionals, the relevance extends well beyond geopolitical analysis. The collaboration frameworks, public-private partnerships, and information sharing mechanisms described by panelists provide practical models applicable to organizational security programs regardless of size or sector.

When Colonel Maksym Pavliuk explains how Ukraine coordinated international assistance during Russia’s invasion, or when Dr. Anssi Kärkkäinen details Finland’s sector-specific information sharing groups, they’re describing approaches that organizations can adapt for managing cyber incidents, coordinating vendor responses, and building collective defensive capabilities within industries. Jacek Łęgiewicz’s discussion of Poland’s water infrastructure vulnerabilities directly parallels the challenges facing organizations with distributed assets—remote offices, branch locations, legacy systems—that lack centralized security oversight.

The article demonstrates why building defensive partnerships before crises occur determines organizational resilience when attacks intensify. The cyber warfare described in this piece isn’t distant or abstract—the tactics, targeting patterns, and defensive strategies apply directly to the threats facing legal technology providers, information governance consultants, and cybersecurity practitioners across sectors.

Industry News – Cybersecurity Beat

Defending the Digital Frontier: European Nations Forge Resilience Against Relentless Cyber Warfare

ComplexDiscovery Staff

The question confronting European nations today extends beyond simple defense. As Russian cyber forces intensify operations targeting hospitals, water systems, and critical infrastructure across NATO’s eastern flank, the challenge demands something Europe has historically struggled to achieve: seamless collaboration between governments, military units, private technology companies, and vulnerable public organizations. During an October 2025 session titled “Under Pressure: How Can Europe Withstand Cyber and Hybrid Threats?” at the Tallinn Digital Summit, military and civilian cyber defense leaders from Ukraine, Finland, and Poland shared hard-won insights about confronting hybrid threats that blur the boundaries between peacetime and conflict.

This conversation matters deeply for professionals managing digital evidence, securing sensitive information, and protecting organizational data. When cyberattacks target water treatment facilities, disrupt telecommunications networks, or infiltrate healthcare systems, the downstream consequences affect legal proceedings, regulatory compliance investigations, and the integrity of electronic records that information governance specialists work to preserve. Understanding how frontline nations coordinate defensive operations provides essential context for building institutional resilience.

Ukraine’s Battle-Tested Cyber Resilience

Ukraine’s experience demonstrates what happens when expectations meet reality. Colonel Maksym Pavliuk, Head of the Cyberwarfare Directorate for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, explained that widespread predictions of catastrophic infrastructure collapse during Russia’s February 2022 invasion never materialized—not because the threat was exaggerated, but because Ukraine prepared systematically after suffering attacks on its electrical grid in 2015 and experiencing the NotPetya malware outbreak that originated on Ukrainian soil. Estonia led international support efforts, training Ukrainian personnel and helping establish coordination structures, such as the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center. When attacks surged in early 2022, private sector companies, including CloudFlare, protected Ukrainian internet resources within hours, often negotiating during overnight emergency sessions.​​

That preparation created breathing room when Russian forces launched more than 800 cyberattacks in conjunction with the ground invasion. Ukraine’s information communication systems remained operational not through luck, but through international partnerships that pooled resources, expertise, and technology before the crisis escalated. The lesson for organizations managing sensitive data is that building defensive capabilities during peacetime determines whether systems survive crisis moments. Waiting until attacks intensify leaves little room for establishing the trust relationships and technical integrations that enable rapid response.​

Poland’s Critical Infrastructure Under Daily Siege

Poland faces similar pressure but with different characteristics. Jacek Łęgiewicz, Vice President of the Digital Poland Association, revealed that Russian hackers attempt 20 to 50 attacks on Polish critical infrastructure daily. The targeting has become disturbingly specific. In August 2025, Russian-backed attackers infiltrated a major Polish city’s water management network, attempting to shut down water supplies for residents. Polish authorities intercepted the attack before the water systems failed. Still, the incident exposed vulnerabilities in the dispersed infrastructure managed by local municipalities, which had historically prioritized visible public works over cybersecurity investments.​​

Water systems represent particularly attractive targets because they combine essential public need with decentralized management structures that often lack security expertise. For information governance professionals, this pattern should sound familiar. Organizations frequently concentrate security resources on centralized systems while neglecting distributed assets—such as branch offices, remote facilities, and legacy systems—that attackers exploit as entry points. Poland responded by establishing Europe’s first joint civilian-military cybersecurity operations center and allocating 80 million euros specifically for water system protection, increasing the overall cybersecurity budget from 600 million euros in 2024 to one billion euros in 2025.​​

Finland’s Collaborative Defense Model

Finland’s Dr. Anssi Kärkkäinen, Director General of the National Cyber Security Centre, highlighted a different approach built around Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) groups that bring together competitors within specific sectors to discuss threats, share intelligence, and develop collective defensive strategies. Finland operates more than 20 sector-specific ISACs covering finance, energy, water supply, and other critical industries. The voluntary nature of these groups demonstrates that effective security collaboration doesn’t require regulatory mandates when participants recognize shared vulnerability. Organizations see value in pooling threat intelligence even when they compete commercially because cyberattacks often target multiple entities within the same sector using similar tactics.​​

This model offers practical guidance for eDiscovery and cybersecurity professionals working within industry segments. Establishing confidential channels for discussing attack patterns, sharing indicators of compromise, and coordinating defensive responses strengthens collective resilience without requiring competitors to disclose proprietary business information. The technical details of how one organization detected and blocked a phishing campaign provide valuable intelligence for peers likely to face similar attacks.​

The Evolution of Information Warfare

Shane Harris, staff writer for The Atlantic and moderator of the summit session, probed the role of information operations in the current threat landscape. Colonel Pavliuk’s response carried particular weight given Ukraine’s experience. Before 2014, Russian propaganda dominated Ukrainian media through television channels, radio broadcasts, and cultural content that shaped public narratives. That information environment contributed to Russia’s successful seizure of Crimea because many Ukrainians simply couldn’t believe a neighboring state would annex territory in the twenty-first century.​​

Information operations have evolved substantially since then. Artificial intelligence now generates increasingly sophisticated deepfakes that challenge viewers’ ability to distinguish authentic from fabricated content. In March 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion, a deepfake video of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared online, falsely showing him surrendering to Russian forces. While that particular deepfake was relatively crude, the technology improves constantly. Colonel Pavliuk noted that distinguishing real from fake content has become genuinely difficult as deepfake generation capabilities advance.​​

For professionals managing digital evidence and maintaining information integrity, these developments present fundamental challenges. When video recordings, audio files, and photographic evidence can be convincingly fabricated, how do organizations establish authenticity? Dr. Kärkkäinen emphasized education as the primary countermeasure, arguing that building citizens’ critical thinking capabilities represents the best defense against manipulation. But he also noted that social media platforms must develop technical capabilities for filtering false information rather than placing the entire burden on individual users.​​

This tension between technical controls and individual responsibility mirrors debates within information governance about balancing automated security measures with user training. Neither approach succeeds in isolation. Technical systems that automatically detect deepfakes and flag suspicious content provide essential protection, but sophisticated attacks will sometimes bypass automated defenses. Users trained to think critically about information sources, verify claims through multiple channels, and recognize manipulation tactics provide a human layer of defense that complements technical measures.​​

From Gray Zones to Clear Boundaries

The panelists agreed that Europe faces what Colonel Pavliuk termed a “multi-domain warfare” environment where cyber capabilities amplify information operations, which in turn support physical disruptions ranging from sabotage to drone incursions. Russia tested these boundaries dramatically in September 2025 when approximately 20 drones penetrated Polish airspace, forcing Warsaw airports to close and triggering NATO Article 4 consultations. Additional drone incursions occurred in Romania, Estonia, Denmark, and Norway during the same period. These weren’t accidental spillovers from combat operations in Ukraine but deliberate probes testing NATO’s response protocols and alliance cohesion.​​

Colonel Pavliuk delivered perhaps the session’s most pointed observation: “Russia will go as far as you let them go”. He argued that ambiguous concepts like “gray zone” operations, “thresholds,” and “red lines” create uncertainty that benefits attackers by leaving defenders unsure when to respond decisively. For NATO members and the European Union, this ambiguity proves particularly problematic. What level of infrastructure disruption justifies invoking collective defense mechanisms? How many successful attacks on water systems, hospitals, or telecommunications networks constitute acts requiring military response rather than diplomatic protests and economic sanctions?​​

These questions extend directly into organizational contexts. Information governance professionals face similar ambiguities when determining incident response thresholds. At what point does a security breach require notification to regulators, customers, and law enforcement? When do potential compromises of electronic discovery materials necessitate disclosure to opposing counsel? Clear policies established before incidents occur enable faster and more consistent responses, which reduce organizational risk and legal exposure.​

Public-Private Partnerships in Action

The practical cooperation mechanisms described during the session provide models for organizational implementation. Łęgiewicz explained that Poland’s public-private partnership began in 2019, bringing together more than 30 companies—both international corporations and local firms—as well as government agencies and non-governmental organizations. This coalition shares threat intelligence, vulnerability information, and incident details before the general public becomes aware of security issues. Industry participants also provide free training for thousands of government officials, contributing their expertise without financial compensation, as stable and secure operating environments benefit all participants.​​

This investment in training demonstrates an often-overlooked aspect of effective cybersecurity partnerships. Technical information sharing helps organizations respond to immediate threats, but building governmental capacity through sustained education creates long-term resilience. Organizations benefit when regulators, law enforcement agencies, and government administrators understand technical security challenges, threat actor capabilities, and incident response constraints. This understanding facilitates more effective public-private collaboration during crises and leads to better-informed policy decisions that strike a balance between security requirements and operational realities.​

Finland’s ISAC model adopts a different yet complementary approach by establishing sector-specific forums where critical infrastructure operators convene regularly to discuss cybersecurity challenges, conduct joint risk assessments, conduct exercises, and develop shared guidelines. These groups operate at multiple levels—technical specialists share detailed threat intelligence, operational managers coordinate response procedures, and strategic leaders align long-term priorities. The multi-level engagement ensures that collaboration extends beyond information exchange to influence organizational decision-making and resource allocation.​​

Lessons for Enterprise Security

For cybersecurity professionals working in legal technology, eDiscovery, or information governance, sector-specific collaboration offers particular value. Organizations within the same industry face similar threat actors using comparable tactics. Legal technology providers might collectively analyze attack patterns targeting cloud-based document repositories. Information governance consultants could share insights about ransomware groups specifically targeting firms holding sensitive client data. eDiscovery vendors might coordinate defensive strategies against actors attempting to compromise electronic evidence during litigation.​

The Ukraine coordination model addresses a different challenge: managing international assistance during active conflict. Estonia’s role proved particularly valuable because pre-war cooperation had established personal relationships between Ukrainian and Estonian cyber defense officials. When Russia invaded, those existing relationships enabled Ukraine to quickly communicate needs, prioritize assistance, and avoid duplicative efforts as multiple nations offered support. Estonia established a front office in Kyiv to coordinate the Tallinn Mechanism, which systematically matches donor country capabilities with Ukraine’s civilian cybersecurity requirements. This structured approach replaced ad-hoc emergency assistance with sustainable long-term support addressing both immediate incident response and capacity building.​

Organizations facing major security incidents experience similar coordination challenges. Multiple vendors, consultants, law enforcement agencies, and internal teams simultaneously respond to crises, often working at cross-purposes without clear coordination structures. Establishing incident command frameworks before emergencies occur—designating clear authority, defining communication protocols, specifying roles and responsibilities—enables more effective response when time-sensitive decisions must be made under pressure.​

Adapting to Rapid Threat Evolution

Colonel Pavliuk’s observation about the rapid obsolescence of defensive technologies carries important implications for organizational planning. He explained that in Ukraine’s high-intensity environment, countermeasures effective one week may become useless the next as adversaries adapt. This obsolescence creates procurement challenges because equipment manufactured in quantity may be outdated before deployment. The lesson extends beyond military contexts. Cybersecurity professionals operating in less intense threat environments still face adversaries who continuously evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures. Security controls that effectively blocked attacks last year may fail against this year’s threats unless organizations maintain continuous improvement programs.​​

This dynamic environment demands that cybersecurity, information governance, and eDiscovery professionals remain connected to threat intelligence communities that track emerging attack methods. Organizations benefit from subscribing to sector-specific threat intelligence feeds, participating in information sharing groups, attending security conferences, and maintaining relationships with law enforcement agencies that provide private sector briefings. These connections enable proactive adjustment of defensive controls rather than reactive responses after attacks succeed.​

Building Whole-of-Society Resilience

Dr. Kärkkäinen described Finland’s comprehensive security model as one that brings together the government, private sector, and citizens in preparing for and building resilience against various threats. This whole-of-society approach recognizes that cybersecurity isn’t purely a technical challenge managed by IT departments. Protecting organizations requires engagement across all levels—from board members who approve security investments, to middle managers who enforce policies, to frontline employees who recognize and report suspicious activity. Building security awareness throughout organizations creates multiple layers of defense rather than concentrating protection in specialized security teams that can be overwhelmed or bypassed.​​

The panelists were remarkably frank about persistent challenges. Łęgiewicz noted that Poland experiences ransomware attacks at rates exceeding even the United States, with 83 percent of Polish companies—including micro-enterprises—reporting they had been attacked during the previous year. That near-universal targeting demonstrates that organizational size provides no protection. Small firms often face greater risk because they lack dedicated security staff while still holding valuable data or providing access to larger partners’ networks.​​

The water system attacks in Poland illustrate this vulnerability pattern. Local municipalities operating water treatment facilities often lack cybersecurity expertise and face tight budget constraints that prioritize visible infrastructure improvements over invisible security investments. Yet these facilities’ control systems are essential for public health and safety. When attacks succeed, the consequences extend far beyond the directly targeted organization—residents lose water service, businesses cannot operate, and healthcare facilities struggle to maintain sanitary conditions.​​

Similar dynamics affect organizations across sectors. Small law firms handling sensitive client matters, regional healthcare providers maintaining electronic health records, local government agencies managing citizen data—all hold information valuable to attackers but often lack resources for sophisticated security programs. For information governance and cybersecurity professionals, this reality reinforces the importance of partnerships and information-sharing arrangements that help smaller organizations benefit from threat intelligence, defensive expertise, and incident response capabilities that they cannot individually afford.​

Defining Response Thresholds

The session concluded with a discussion of how nations should define response thresholds. Colonel Pavliuk challenged European governments to honestly assess their boundaries rather than relying on ambiguous language about gray zones and red lines. He noted that Ukraine has experienced casualties, infrastructure disruption, and widespread cyber attacks, yet the conflict continues expanding rather than being contained. European nations must determine their actual tolerance for disruption and communicate those limits clearly, rather than remaining deliberately vague in the hope that ambiguity will deter aggression.​​

This principle applies within organizations as well. Senior leadership should clearly define unacceptable outcomes—data breaches affecting customer information, ransomware infections disrupting operations, successful attacks on systems supporting legal obligations or regulatory compliance—and establish response authorities and escalation procedures triggered by those thresholds. Ambiguous policies that require extensive deliberation during crises slow response and increase damage.​

As Europe confronts what Colonel Pavliuk described as unconventional warfare already underway, the collaboration models developed by Ukraine, Poland, and Finland provide practical frameworks for building resilience. Public-private partnerships that share threat intelligence, coordinate responses, and pool defensive capabilities create collective strength exceeding what individual organizations achieve alone. Sector-specific information sharing enables competitors to cooperate on security while competing commercially. International coordination mechanisms systematically match assistance with needs rather than relying on ad-hoc emergency measures.​​

For cybersecurity, information governance, and eDiscovery professionals, the underlying message is clear: defensive success requires building partnerships before crises strike, investing in people and training alongside technical controls, and maintaining continuous adaptation as threats evolve. The question isn’t whether your organization will face sophisticated attacks—the question is whether you’ve built the relationships, capabilities, and response frameworks needed to withstand them when they arrive.

Will your organization’s defensive partnerships prove as resilient as Ukraine’s when the pressure intensifies, or will you discover critical gaps only after attacks succeed?

News Sources

• Tallinn Digital Summit. (2025, October 10). Under Pressure: How Can Europe Withstand Cyber and Hybrid Threats? [Panel discussion transcript]. Tallinn, Estonia. Panelists: Colonel Maksym Pavliuk (Head of Cyberwarfare Directorate, Armed Forces of Ukraine), Dr. Anssi Kärkkäinen (Director General, National Cyber Security Centre, Finland), Jacek Łęgiewicz (Vice President, Digital Poland Association), Shane Harris (Staff Writer, The Atlantic, Moderator).
• Tallinn Digital Summit 2025

Assisted by GAI and LLM Technologies

Additional Reading

• The Agentic State: A Global Framework for Secure and Accountable AI-Powered Government
• Cyberocracy and the Efficiency Paradox: Why Democratic Design is the Smartest AI Strategy for Government
• The European Union’s Strategic AI Shift: Fostering Sovereignty and Innovation
• Learning from Collective Failures: A Pre-Summit Reflection on AI Governance
• When the Sky Falls Silent: Europe’s New Hybrid Threat Landscape
• European Drone Incidents Expose Critical Gaps in Enterprise Security and Hybrid Defense

Source: ComplexDiscovery OÜ