Content Assessment: Intrigue and Insubordination? Russo-Ukrainian War Update (July 9-16, 2023)

Information - 94%
Insight - 93%
Relevance - 92%
Objectivity - 93%
Authority - 95%

93%

Excellent

A short percentage-based assessment of the qualitative benefit of the post highlighting the recent Ukraine conflict assessments in maps from the Institute for the Study of War.

Editor’s Note: The discipline of eDiscovery, which involves the identification, preservation, and analysis of electronic data, is increasingly being used in investigations and litigation relating to war crimes. In the case of the Russo-Ukrainian War, eDiscovery tools and techniques can be used to identify and collect electronic evidence of war crimes, such as emails, social media posts, and other digital communications that may provide valuable insights into the actions of individuals and organizations involved in the conflict. This evidence can then be used in investigations and legal proceedings to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable for their actions. Additionally, eDiscovery can help to efficiently and effectively manage the vast amount of electronic evidence that may be relevant to war crimes cases, allowing investigators and legal teams to quickly and accurately analyze the data to identify key pieces of information. This weekly update may be useful for cybersecurity, information governance, and legal discovery professionals as they consider investigations and litigation resulting from war crimes committed during the war.


Background Note: The Russo-Ukrainian War has seen some significant developments recently, as reported by the Institute of the Study of War (ISW).

The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) is reportedly dealing with a growing crisis within its chain of command in Ukraine. Insubordination is spreading amongst commanders and, to an extent, their soldiers, which could undermine tactical offensive operations critical to the Russian defense in southern Ukraine. Furthermore, this dynamic may demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine. There seems to be a narrative being promoted amongst Russian service members defending insubordination and amplifying defeatist discussions, thereby risking widespread demoralization.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are pushing back, conducting counteroffensive operations across several sectors of the front and reportedly making limited gains. The sectors include the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area, the area near Bakhmut, and various areas within occupied Luhansk Oblast.

In other developments, the Russian drone producer, Zalo Aero Group, announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems. Furthermore, some Chechen forces have reportedly been deployed to the Bakhmut area. Russian officials have also accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea.

Notably, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor, is reportedly set to integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV). Meanwhile, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the financier of the Wagner Group, appears to be losing influence.

Further incidents of insubordination within the Russian military were reported, with the dismissal of the 106th Guards Airborne Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov on July 15. This may be part of a larger purge of insubordinate commanders in an attempt to restore order.

On July 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated his intent to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force but aimed to separate its financier, Yevgeny Prigozhin, from the group’s leadership.

Lastly, reports indicate that Russian occupation authorities are persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity. In a similar vein, they are reportedly trying to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church.

Source Note: One of the most accurate and detailed sources for ongoing updates on the Ukraine crisis is the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment from the Institute for the Study of War. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a 501(c)(3) organization and produces strictly non-partisan, non-ideological, fact-based research. ISW seeks to promote an informed understanding of war and military affairs through comprehensive, independent, and accessible open-source research and analysis. ISW’s research is made available to the general public, military practitioners, policymakers, and media members. Providing a daily synthesis of key events related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, ISW updates may benefit investigators and litigators as they follow the business, information technology, and legal trends and trajectories impacted by and stemming from the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Assessment and Maps*

Russo-Ukrainian Conflict Assessments – An Overview in Maps

General Assessment Background Info 

  • ISW systematically publishes Russian campaign assessments that include maps highlighting the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine and main Russian maneuver axes.
  • These maps augment daily synthetic products that cover key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments

  • July 16, 2023
  • By Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort.
  • Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers.
  • Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD.
  • The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.
  • The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly.
  • Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization.
  • The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale.
  • The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine.
  • The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains.
  • Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances.
  • Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced.
  • Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.
  • Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16.
  • Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zalo Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad.
  • A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity.
  • Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV).

Read the complete update.


  • July 15, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Russian sources reported on July 15 that the Russian military command dismissed 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov.
  • Seliverstov’s dismissal may be a part of an ongoing purge of insubordinate commanders by the Russian military command and may suggest that the corrosion of the Russian chain of command in Ukraine is accelerating.
  • The Russian military leadership is likely attempting to dissuade commanders from emulating recent cases of insubordination by punishing those involved in leaking Popov’s message of complaints.
  • Growing insubordination will likely exacerbate existing factional divides within the Russian military and the wider Russian security sphere.
  • Factions within the Russian security forces and the Kremlin appear to be fighting for control over the Russian insider information space.
  • Polyakov’s arrest suggests that different factions within the Kremlin and Russian security entities are exploiting the Russian information space and secret information to advance their political and financial objectives against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on June 15 and reportedly made limited gains.
  • The New York Times (NYT) reported that the Ukrainian military has adjusted its strategy to minimize Ukrainian casualties while continuing to attrit Russian forces, supporting ISW’s previous assessments.
  • The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that it developed a plan for Wagner Group personnel to train Belarusian forces as Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusian sources continue to report that Wagner forces are moving to Belarus.
  • Russian authorities likely continue to forcibly integrate Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) dioceses into the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as part of a wider religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations and made limited territorial gains near Svatove.
  • Ukrainian forces reportedly made limited territorial gains on Bakhmut’s southern flank, while Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made limited advances on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.
  • Russian forces continued limited offensive operations on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka line but did not make any territorial gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and reportedly made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the completion of Russia’s spring 2023 conscription cycle on July 15.
  • The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Kremlin launched a program to recruit young adults in Russia for service in occupation administrations in Ukraine.

Read the complete update.


  • July 14, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

Key Takeaways

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin further indicated he intends to maintain the Wagner Group as a cohesive fighting force rather than breaking it up but seeks to separate Wagner Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin from Wagner leadership and forces.
  • Belarusian government and independent sources confirmed on July 14 that Wagner Group instructors previously deployed in Africa previously arrived at training grounds in Belarus.
  • Former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s dismissal continues to generate pronounced ire against the Russian military command and the Russian civilian leadership.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 14 and reportedly made gains in some areas.
  • Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 14.
  • Russian authorities detained former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly is the administrator of several popular telegram channels covering internal Kremlin politics.
  • Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are waging an interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in Russia.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizha Oblast border and reportedly made limited gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in this direction.
  • Russia continues efforts likely aimed at keeping high ranking officers in their positions without needing special exemptions to retirement age limits.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories by manipulating residence requirements and forcibly passportizing occupied populations.

Read the complete update.


  • July 13, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

Key Takeaways

  • Former Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov claimed in leaked audio that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu dismissed him for expressing persistent grievances about problems on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline to senior commanders.
  • Popov likely attempted to appeal to the Kremlin to partially or fully strip Gerasimov of command over operations in Ukraine.
  • Gerasimov may have tried to shield Putin from unwanted criticism to uphold Putin’s ignorance by firing Popov before he could appeal directly to the Kremlin.
  • Popov’s attempt to directly appeal to Putin for support and his insubordination of Gerasimov’s command is indicative of a pattern of corrosive behavior that has developed within the Russian command and the Russian forces fighting in Ukraine.
  • Russian milbloggers expressed varied reactions to Popov’s dismissal, though none disagreed with Popov’s complaints about problems Russian forces experience on the front.
  • Disruptions to the Russian command overseeing Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine will likely have some immediate but marginal impacts on Russian forces.
  • Popov’s dismissal over the issue of Russian casualties and reported complaints about lack of force rotations further supports ISW’s assessment that Russian defenses in Ukraine are likely brittle
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 13 and made gains in some areas.
  • The Kremlin reportedly ordered the detention and suspension of several senior military officers following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion on June 24, supporting ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin likely intends to purge the MoD of figures viewed as disloyal.
  • Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 13.
  • Russian and Ukrainian sources engaged in positional battles near Kreminna.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks and reportedly advanced around Bakhmut.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Ukrainian forces reported conducting limited offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and continued counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and made some gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of July 13.
  • Russia may not be fulfilling some of its commitments to Iran in their bilateral security partnership, even as the Russian military continues to rely heavily on Iranian-made drones in Ukraine.
  • The Associated Press (AP) reported on July 13 that Russian forces and occupation administrations are conducting a wide scale campaign to detain and abuse civilians and are planning to build additional internment infrastructure in the occupied territories.

Read the complete update.


  • July 12, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • The Group of Seven (G7) Coalition and NATO signed agreements to offer Ukraine long-term security commitments during the NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 12.
  • Ukraine secured additional bilateral security and defense agreements during the second day of the NATO summit on July 12.
  • The Russian information space continues to exhibit a generally muted response to the NATO summit. The muted Russian response belies the reality that the summit demonstrated the degree to which the 2022 Russian invasion has set back the goals for which the Kremlin claims it launched the war.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the frontline on July 12 and reportedly made gains in some areas.
  • Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes across Ukraine on July 12.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the Wagner Group has almost completely handed weapons and military equipment over to the MoD.
  • Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that certain members of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle may push Putin to end the war in order to depose him.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces continued skirmishes in the Kreminna area, where Russian forces reportedly made limited gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
  • Ukrainian forces continued limited mechanized assault operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russian officials continue to grapple with the issue of securing Russia’s international borders.
  • Russian occupation authorities are using the promise of medical treatment to coerce residents of occupied territories to receive Russian passports and relocate to Russian territory.

Read the complete update.


  • July 11, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed 131 and 136 drone strikes across Ukraine on July 11, likely in a demonstrative response to the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius and to threaten the Black Sea grain deal.
  • Germany and France pledged to provide Ukraine more weapons systems during the first day of the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
  • A coalition of 11 states signed a memorandum with Ukraine outlining the terms for training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft at the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11.
  • The Kremlin’s and Russian milbloggers’ reactions to the first day of the NATO Summit were relatively muted.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu attempted to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort against the backdrop of the NATO Summit.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 11 and made gains in some areas.
  • A Ukrainian Storm Shadow missile strike reportedly killed Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Oleg Tsokov at the command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in occupied Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for failing to defend against Ukrainian strikes on Russian headquarters.
  • Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly fired Commander of the 58th CAA Major General Ivan Popov after Popov voiced his concerns over the need for troop rotations in western Zaporizhia Oblast amidst Ukrainian counteroffensives.
  • An unknown actor killed the Krasnodar City Deputy Head for Mobilization, Captain Stanislav Rzhitsky, on July 10.
  • Russian forces are conducting offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and made territorial gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on Bakhmut’s northern and southern outskirts.
  • Russian forces launched assaults on Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk City-Avdiivka frontline.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Kremlin continues measures to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to meet Russian military demands in Ukraine without conducting a wider economic mobilization.
  • The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 11 that the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) is struggling to establish regional branches in occupied territories in Ukraine.

Read the complete update.


  • July 10, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian officials stated on July 10 that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Bakhmut and Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) around the city.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 10.
  • Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov’s first public appearance since Wagner’s rebellion supports ISW’s previous assessment that he will likely retain his official position within the Russian military.
  • The Kremlin and Western intelligence officials reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 29 (and/or July 1) following Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24.
  • Putin’s decision to meet with Prigozhin is inconsistent with the Kremlin’s prior rhetoric about Prigozhin and his role within the Wagner private military company (PMC).
  • A Kremlin-affiliated war correspondent characterized the Putin-Prigozhin meeting as the Kremlin’s attempt to “gently” replace Prigozhin and restructure Wagner.
  • Gerasimov’s public reemergence and the acknowledgment of the Putin-Prigozhin meeting is likely a part of the Kremlin’s wider narrative effort to portray itself as fully in control following Wagner’s rebellion while also reaching out to those who lean toward loyalty toward Wagner and especially Prigozhin himself.
  • It is unclear whether any agreements between the Kremlin and Prigozhin will prompt significant numbers of Wagner personnel to agree to sign contracts with the MoD.
  • Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces have deployed to the Bakhmut direction, but a local Ukrainian commander denied having encountered Chechen forces, suggesting that these Chechen elements are not making significant frontline contributions to Russian operations in Ukraine.
  • Former Russian officer and prominent critical nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin claimed on July 10 that he managed to deliver a speech in St. Petersburg despite efforts by law enforcement to censor him and prevent the speech from happening
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut direction.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 10.
  • Russian forces are continuing to suffer significant casualties on the battlefield.
  • Russian occupation officials acknowledged widespread utility service disruptions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Read the complete update.


  • July 9, 2023
  • By Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 9.
  • The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that Ukrainian forces are attempting to soften Russian defenses before liberating territory, accepting a slower pace of advance.
  • US President Joe Biden stated that Ukraine cannot join NATO until Russia’s war in Ukraine is over.
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed Turkey’s decision to allow the release of five Ukrainian commanders involved in the defense of the Azovstal Metallurgical Combine in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan on July 9.
  • The Russian ultranationalist community continued to blame the Kremlin for trusting Turkey to uphold the deal and to keep Azovstal defenders in Turkey.
  • Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) is deliberately censoring him.
  • Central African Republic (CAR) Presidental Spokesperson Albert Yaloke Mokpem stated on July 8 that Wagner Group personnel leaving CAR are conducting rotations and are not withdrawing.
  • Unknown persons leaked an image of what appears to be the Wagner Group’s founding charter on July 9, possibly to present the Wagner Group as a professional organization.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to not rapidly dispose of the Wagner Group and prosecute rebellion participants is placing himself and his subordinates in an awkward position.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna.
  • Ukrainian and Russian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and Russian forces advanced as of July 9.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts administrative border area, and continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russian forces reportedly continued to reestablish previously flooded positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of targeting the Kerch Strait Bridge.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly accepting Wagner Group mercenaries for contract service with the Russian MoD in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai.

Read the complete update.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


Chronology of Maps from July 9-16, 2023 – Mouseover to Scroll

Ukraine Conflict Maps 070923 – 071623

Review the PDF of Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes Maps


See the Institute for the Study of War Interactive Map of the Russian Invasion
Read the latest Ukraine Conflict updates from the Institute for the Study of War 

* Shared with direct express permission from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).


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