Mon. Apr 22nd, 2024

Content Assessment: Escalation and Retaliation? Russo-Ukrainian War Update (July 17-24, 2023)

Information - 94%
Insight - 93%
Relevance - 93%
Objectivity - 94%
Authority - 95%

94%

Excellent

A short percentage-based assessment of the qualitative benefit of the post highlighting the recent Ukraine conflict assessments in maps from the Institute for the Study of War.

Editor’s Note: The Russo-Ukrainian conflict, particularly the week of July 17-24, 2023, was characterized by significant escalations in military operations and strategic maneuvers. The week began with an attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, disrupting Russian logistics, and concluded with a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow, likely conducted by Ukrainian forces. Amid these hostilities, eDiscovery, defined by the Electronic Discovery Reference Model (EDRM) as the process of identifying, preserving, collecting, processing, searching, reviewing, and producing electronically stored information (ESI) that may be relevant to a legal proceeding, could play a pivotal role in ongoing and future war crimes investigations.

Since the onset of the conflict in February 2022, numerous combatant actions could potentially be subject to such investigations. eDiscovery can facilitate the collection and analysis of digital evidence from a variety of sources, such as emails, social media posts, digital photographs, videos, and more. This evidence can provide crucial insights into potential war crimes, such as attacks on civilian infrastructure, use of prohibited weapons, or violations of the laws of war.

One example of potential criminal liability in the conflict is the forced deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia. Digital evidence, such as emails coordinating these actions, social media posts documenting the deportations, or geolocation data from mobile devices, could be collected and analyzed through eDiscovery processes. This evidence could help establish the timeline of events, identify the parties involved, and provide crucial context for these actions. It could also help corroborate witness testimonies or contradict official narratives.

However, the use of eDiscovery in war crimes investigations also presents challenges. These include issues related to data privacy, data security, and the authenticity and reliability of digital evidence. Therefore, it is crucial to have robust legal and technical frameworks in place to ensure the effective and ethical use of eDiscovery in such contexts.

As we delve into a detailed overview of the week, as reported by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), it becomes evident that the conflict’s dynamics are complex and rapidly evolving. The ISW’s comprehensive analysis and key takeaways provided below share invaluable insights into the military strategies, tactical maneuvers, and geopolitical implications of the ongoing hostilities. They also highlight key areas of potential war crimes where eDiscovery may be useful in helping bring accountability and justice for crimes committed.

This weekly update may be useful for cybersecurity, information governance, and legal discovery professionals as they consider investigations and litigation resulting from war crimes committed during the war.

Source Note: One of the most accurate and detailed sources for ongoing updates on the Ukraine crisis is the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment from the Institute for the Study of War. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a 501(c)(3) organization and produces strictly non-partisan, non-ideological, fact-based research. ISW seeks to promote an informed understanding of war and military affairs through comprehensive, independent, and accessible open-source research and analysis. ISW’s research is made available to the general public, military practitioners, policymakers, and media members. Providing a daily synthesis of key events related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, ISW updates may benefit investigators and litigators as they follow the business, information technology, and legal trends and trajectories impacted by and stemming from the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict.


Assessment and Maps*

Russo-Ukrainian Conflict Assessments – An Overview in Maps

General Assessment Background Info 

  • ISW systematically publishes Russian campaign assessments, including maps highlighting the assessed control of terrain in Ukraine and main Russian maneuver axes.
  • These maps augment daily synthetic products that cover key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments

  • July 24, 2023
  • By Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24.
  • Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him.
  • Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas.
  • The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains south of Kreminna.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Orikhiv area.
  • Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed successes of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
  • Ukrainian officials continue to reveal the involvement of Belarusian entities in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

Read the complete update.


  • July 23, 2023
  • By George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Thomas Bergeron, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.
  • Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West.
  • US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23.
  • Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas.
  • Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin.
  • Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure.
  • The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
  • The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made tactically significant gains.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area, and reportedly made gains near Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas but did not advance.
  • Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
  • Russian occupation authorities are bringing foreign citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter demographics.

Read the complete update.


  • July 22, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited material.
  • Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor.
  • Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign.
  • Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull.
  • Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
  • Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to Russian leadership.
  • Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space.
  • Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area but did not make gains.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut areas and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances in the Kupyansk area.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make advances.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances.
  • Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for the conscription age while maintaining the lower limit of 18.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
  • The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.

Read the complete update.


  • July 21, 2023
  • By Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
  • Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
  • Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
  • Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
  • Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
  • The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense’s July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
  • Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
  • Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
  • French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
  • A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
  • Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
  • A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.

Read the complete update.


  • July 20, 2023
  • By Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, George Barros, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17.
  • The Russian military announced that it may consider civilian ships in the Black Sea en route to Ukrainian ports legitimate military targets.
  • The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation are likely a part of a Kremlin effort to leverage Russia’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and exact extensive concessions from the West.
  • The Kremlin likely views the Black Sea Grain Initiative as one of its few remaining avenues of leverage against the West and has withdrawn from the deal to secure these concessions.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced on July 20.
  • The United States and European Union (EU) reiterated their long-term security commitments to Ukraine via security assistance packages and proposals on July 19 and 20.
  • Wagner Group personnel are training Belarusian special forces on modern tactics at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus.
  • The Wagner Group may open another base in Belarus in Gomel Oblast near Belarus’ international border with Ukraine.
  • The Wagner Group reportedly suffered an 80 percent casualty rate and a 28 percent killed-in-action rate in Ukraine.
  • Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and advanced on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line as of July 20.
  • Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kupyansk, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and made gains near Bakhmut on July 20.
  • Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar, on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and south of Orikhiv and made limited territorial gains in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20.
  • Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully counterattack Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on July 20.
  • The Russian State Duma approved amendments increasing penalties for draft dodging and for officials and legal entities that fail to assist Russian force generation efforts on July 20.
  • Russian authorities continue persecution of non-Russian Orthodox churches in occupied Ukraine.

Read the complete update.


  • July 19, 2023
  • By Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, George Barros, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to export grain.
  • The South African Presidential Office announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit in-person in Johannesburg in August 2023.
  • An explosion at a Russian training ground in occupied Kirovskyi Raion (Islam Terek Raion), southeastern Crimea, disrupted the Russian use of the Tavrida highway that connects eastern Crimea to Sevastopol on July 19.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 19 and made gains in these areas.
  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and reportedly Wagner Commander Dmitry Utkin greeted Wagner fighters at the new Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18.
  • Russian sources claimed that Wagner will continue to operate abroad in African countries, although Prigozhin’s involvement in these activities remains unclear.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to display his knowledge of Russian history at odd moments, this time appearing to warn against the possibility of revolution in Russia.
  • Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials.
  • Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Kreminna, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and made gains near Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area.  They made marginal gains along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and reportedly made limited advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made reportedly made gains in both sectors of the front.
  • The Russian State Duma adopted on July 19 a law on the first reading and “in general” that allows the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to have heavy military equipment.
  • The Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group conducted another successful.

Read the complete update.


  • July 18, 2023
  • By Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.
  • Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
  • The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18.
  • Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability.
  • The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, southwest of Kreminna, and in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas and made limited territorial gains in all sectors.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut and advanced north of Bakhmut.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area and recently made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Some Russian sources suggested that recent measures supporting the development of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) allow it to posture as an alternative Russian military formation.
  • Russia continues to formalize methods of social programming targeted at youth in occupied areas of Ukraine.

Read the complete update.


  • July 17, 2023
  • By Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan

Key Takeaways

  • The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have significant and sustained impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.
  • Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
  • The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
  • The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
  • Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
  • Russian forces conducted active offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and have likely made marginal tactical gains in this direction.
  • Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southwest and south of Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
  • Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and advanced near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border.
  • Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that Russian authorities have removed at least eight Russian military commanders without reappointing them to new positions since the start of the war, which is largely consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
  • Russian occupation authorities continue to artificially increase the number of Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September regional elections.

Read the complete update.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


Chronology of Maps from July 17-24, 2023 – Mouseover to Scroll

Ukraine Conflict Maps – 071723 – 072423

Review the PDF of Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes Maps


See the Institute for the Study of War Interactive Map of the Russian Invasion
Read the latest Ukraine Conflict updates from the Institute for the Study of War 

* Shared with direct express permission from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).


About the Institute for the Study of War Research Methodology

ISW’s research methodology relies on both primary and secondary sources, enabling researchers to develop a comprehensive understanding of the situation on the ground. In order to analyze military and political developments in any given area, ISW’s research analysts must wholly understand the systems of enemy and friendly forces. They must also understand the population demographics, physical terrain, politics, and history of that area. This lays the analytical foundation for understanding the reasons for particular developments and fulfilling their assigned research objectives. ISW analysts also spend time in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in order to gain a better understanding of the security and political situation and to evaluate the implementation of current strategies and policies. Our researchers compile data and analyze trends, producing a granular analysis of developments in areas of research, producing an accurate, high-resolution, timely, and thorough picture of the situation. ISW’s research methodology guarantees its success and commitment to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations, achieve strategic objectives, and respond to emerging problems that may require the use of American military power.

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The Institute for the Study of War advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization.

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Source: ComplexDiscovery

 

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