Content Assessment: REvil With a Cause? The Kaseya Ransomware Attack
Information - 95%
Insight - 90%
Relevance - 90%
Objectivity - 90%
Authority - 95%
A short percentage-based assessment of the qualitative benefit of the post highlighting an aggregation of announcements and articles commenting on the recent Kayesa ransonware attack.
Editor’s Note: From time to time, ComplexDiscovery highlights publicly available or privately purchasable announcements, content updates, and research from cyber, data, and legal discovery providers, research organizations, and ComplexDiscovery community members. While ComplexDiscovery regularly highlights this information, it does not assume any responsibility for content assertions.
To submit recommendations for consideration and inclusion in ComplexDiscovery’s cyber, data, and legal discovery-centric service, product, or research announcements, contact us today.
Industry Announcements and Article Extracts
Scale, Details of Massive Kaseya Ransomware Attack Emerge (The Associated Press)
Cybersecurity teams worked feverishly Sunday to stem the impact of the single biggest global ransomware attack on record, with some details emerging about how the Russia-linked gang responsible breached the company whose software was the conduit.
An affiliate of the notorious REvil gang, best known for extorting $11 million from the meat-processor JBS after a Memorial Day attack, infected thousands of victims in at least 17 countries on Friday, largely through firms that remotely manage IT infrastructure for multiple customers, cybersecurity researchers said.
REvil Ransomware Asks $70 Million to Decrypt All Kaseya Attack Victims (Bleeping Computer)
REvil ransomware has set a price for decrypting all systems locked during the Kaseya supply-chain attack. The gang wants $70 million in Bitcoin for the tool that allows all affected businesses to recover their files.
The attack on Friday propagated through Kaseya VSA cloud-based solution used by managed service providers (MSPs) to monitor customer systems and for patch management.
Customers of multiple MSPs have been impacted by the attack, REvil ransomware encrypting networks of at least 1,000 businesses across the world.
FBI Statement on Kaseya Ransomware Attack (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
If you feel your systems have been compromised as a result of the Kaseya ransomware incident, we encourage you to employ all recommended mitigations, follow guidance from Kaseya and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to shut down your VSA servers immediately, and report your compromise to the FBI at ic3.gov. Please include as much information as possible to assist the FBI and CISA in determining prioritization for victim outreach. Due to the potential scale of this incident, the FBI and CISA may be unable to respond to each victim individually, but all information we receive will be useful in countering this threat.
CISA-FBI Guidance for MSPs and their Customers Affected by the Kaseya VSA Supply-Chain Ransomware Attack
CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) continue to respond to the recent supply-chain ransomware attack leveraging a vulnerability in Kaseya VSA software against multiple managed service providers (MSPs) and their customers. CISA and FBI strongly urge affected MSPs and their customers to follow the guidance below.
CISA and FBI recommend affected MSPs:
- Download the Kaseya VSA Detection Tool. This tool analyzes a system (either VSA server or managed endpoint) and determines whether any indicators of compromise (IoC) are present.
- Enable and enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every single account that is under the control of the organization, and—to the maximum extent possible—enable and enforce MFA for customer-facing services.
- Implement allowlisting to limit communication with remote monitoring and management (RMM) capabilities to known IP address pairs, and/or
- Place administrative interfaces of RMM behind a virtual private network (VPN) or a firewall on a dedicated administrative network.
CISA and FBI recommend MSP customers affected by this attack take immediate action to implement the following cybersecurity best practices. Note: these actions are especially important for MSP customer who do not currently have their RMM service running due to the Kaseya attack.
CISA and FBI recommend affected MSP customers:
- Ensure backups are up to date and stored in an easily retrievable location that is air-gapped from the organizational network;
- Revert to a manual patch management process that follows vendor remediation guidance, including the installation of new patches as soon as they become available;
- Multi-factor authentication; and
- Principle of least privilege on key network resources admin accounts.
CISA and FBI provide these resources for the reader’s awareness. CISA and FBI do not endorse any non-governmental entities nor guarantee the accuracy of the linked resources.
- For the latest guidance from Kaseya, see Kaseya’s Important Notice July 3rd, 2021.
- For indicators of compromise, see Peter Lowe’s GitHub page REvil Kaseya CnC Domains. Note: due to the urgency to share this information, CISA and FBI have not yet validated this content.
- For guidance specific to this incident from the cybersecurity community, see Cado Security’s GitHub page, Resources for DFIR Professionals Responding to the REvil Ransomware Kaseya Supply Chain Attack. Note: due to the urgency to share this information, CISA and FBI have not yet validated this content.
- For advice from the cybersecurity community on securing against MSP ransomware attacks, see Gavin Stone’s article, How secure is your RMM, and what can you do to better secure it?.
- For general incident response guidance, CISA encourages users and administrators to see Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA20-245A: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity.
Updates Regarding VSA Security Incident (Kaseya)
Next Update is planned to be published July 5th in the morning EDT. The update will be published on the Kaseya.com support website (link here) in advance of the email being sent. Checking this link is the fastest way to ensure that you have the latest information from Kaseya.
Kaseya’s VSA product has unfortunately been the victim of a sophisticated cyberattack. Due to our teams’ fast response, we believe that this has been localized to a very small number of on-premises customers only.
Our security, support, R&D, communications, and customer teams continue to work around the clock in all geographies to resolve the issue and restore our customers to service.
This update provides further detail on the July 4, 2021 5:45 PM EDT and earlier updates.
- SaaS Restoration Timeline Updates – UPDATE
- Our executive committee met at 10:00 PM EDT and to best minimize customer risk, felt that more time was needed before we brought the data centers back online.
- They elected to meet again tomorrow morning at 8:00 AM EDT to reset the schedule with a goal of starting the restoration process to bring our datacenters online by end of day on July 5th local time (UTC) – but that timeframe is dependent on achieving some key objectives overnight.
- The next update will be tomorrow morning EDT after the executive committee reconvenes.
- On-Premises Patch Timeline Updates – NEW
- Once we have begun the SaaS Data Center restoration process (see SaaS Restoration Timeline Updates above), we will publish the schedule for distributing the patch for on-premises customers.
- All on-premises VSA Servers should continue to remain offline until further instructions from Kaseya about when it is safe to restore operations. A patch will be required to be installed prior to restarting the VSA and a set of recommendations on how to increase your security posture.
- We have been advised by our outside experts, that customers who experienced ransomware and receive communication from the attackers should not click on any links – they may be weaponized.
- The new Compromise Detection Tool can be download at the following link: VSA Detection Tools.zip | Powered by Box This tool analyzes a system (either VSA server or managed endpoint) and determines whether any indicators of compromise (IoC) are present.
- Risk and Reward? Considering Cyber Insurance and the Challenge of Cybersecurity
- Defining Cyber Discovery? A Definition and Framework